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Abstract
I show that risk sources such as unexpected demographic changes or shocks to the
agents subjective time preferences may have stronger implications and be of greater
importance for asset pricing than risk in the (aggregate) consumption growth process.
In the rst chapter, I discuss stochastic changes to time preferences. Shocks to the
agents subjective time discounting of future utility cause stochastic changes in asset
prices and the agents value function. Independent of the consumption growth process,
shocks to time discounting imply a covariation between asset returns and the marginal
utility process, and the equity premium is non-zero. My model can generate both a
reasonably low level and volatility in the risk-free real interest rate and a high stock
price volatility and equity premium. If time discounting follows a process with mean-
reversion, then the interest rate process is mean-reverting and stock returns are (at
long horizons) negatively auto-correlated.
In the second chapter, I analyze the asset pricing implications of birth and death rate
shocks in an overlapping generations model. The interest rate and the equity premium
are time varying and under certain conditions the interest rate is lower and the equity
premium is higher during periods characterized by a high birth rate and low mortality
than in times of a low birth rate and high mortality. Demographic changes may explain
substantial parts of the time variation in the real interest rate and the equity premium.
Demographic uncertainty implies a large unconditional variation in asset returns and
leads to stochastic changes in the conditional volatility of stock returns.
In the last chapter, I illustrate how shocks to the death rate may a¤ect expected asset
returns in the cross-section. An agent demands more of an asset with higher (lower)
payo¤ in states of the world when he expects to live longer (shorter) and marginal utility
is high (low) than an asset with the opposite payo¤ schedule. In equilibrium, the rst
asset pays a lower expected return than the latter. Empirical evidence supports the
model. Out-of-sample evidence suggests that a strategy, which loads on uncertainty
in the death rate, pays a positive unexplained return according to traditional market
models.
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Chapter 1
Is Consumption Growth merely a
Sideshow in Asset Pricing?
Abstract
Shocks to the agents subjective time discounting of future utility cause stochastic
changes in his consumption-to-wealth ratio. In general equilibrium, asset prices cru-
cially depend on the current consumption-to-wealth ratio. Time discounting also a¤ects
the agents value function and - given he has recursive preferences - his marginal utility.
Independent of the consumption growth process, shocks to time discounting imply a
covariation between asset returns and the marginal utility process, and the equity pre-
mium is non-zero. My model can generate both a reasonably low level and volatility in
the risk-free real interest rate and a high stock price volatility and equity premium, even
in absence of consumption growth shocks. If time discounting follows a process with
mean-reversion, then the real interest rate follows a mean-reverting stochastic process
and realized stock returns are negatively auto-correlated (at long horizons). The mar-
ket price of risk, equity premium, and the conditional volatilities in the stock price and
real interest rate follow stationary Markov di¤usion processes. The price-earnings ratio
has power to predict future stock market excess returns, and reveals contains about
various unobservable key quantities in asset pricing.
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1.1 Introduction
General equilibrium models in asset pricing literature build on the premise that uncer-
tainty in (aggregate) consumption growth is the fundamental driving force for pricing,
and other risk sources only matter if they covary with the consumption growth process.
However, standard consumption-based asset pricing models as originally dened in Lu-
cas (1978), Grossman and Shiller (1981), and Hansen and Singleton (1983) encounter
many problems when trying to t the data (for an overview of empirical stylized facts
see Campbell (2003)).
Most prominent is Mehra and Prescotts (1985) equity premium puzzle and the
closely related risk-free rate puzzle of Weil (1989).1 Another important (and related)
problem of standard consumption-based asset pricing models is that in equilibrium the
stock price volatility essentially equals the variation in aggregate consumption growth.
But in the data the aggregate consumption process is extremely smooth while the stock
price is volatile. In addition, there are several other puzzles including the low corre-
lation between stock returns and aggregate consumption growth, autocorrelation in
realized stock returns and predictability of expected returns, while aggregate consump-
tion growth is di¢ cult to forecast.
Many extensions of the standard consumption-based models are introduced in the
literature,2 and while some empirical facts might be partially explained, we still do not
have a fully satisfying answer to the asset pricing puzzles. I challenge the fundamental
1Moreover, Shiller (1982), Hansen and Jagannathan (1991), and Cochrane and Hansen (1992) show
that the challenge to explain the equity premium puzzle is to nd a way to introduce su¢ cient variation
in the marginal utility process to match the large Sharpe ratio in the data.
2Extensions of standard consumption-based models include habit formation preferences (Abel
(1990), Constantinides (1990), Campbell and Cochrane (1999)), information asymmetry (Wang
(1993)), heterogeneous agents (Dumas (1989), Constantinides and Du¢ e (1996), Sandroni (1999);
Chan and Kogan (2002), Brav, Constantinides and Geczy (2002), Constantinides, Donaldson and
Mehra (2002), Storesletten, Telmer and Yaron (2007), Gomes and Michaelides (2008), Bhamra and
Uppal (2010), Garleanu and Panageas (2010), Cvitanic, Jouini, Malamud and Napp (2011)), rare disas-
ters (Rietz (1988), Barro (2006), Martin (2007), Wachter (2008), Gabaix (2011), Chen, Joslin and Tran
(2012)), parameter uncertainty (Weitzmann (2007)), adjustment costs (Gabaix and Laibson (2001)),
and taste shocks (Normandin and St-Amour (1998)), and long run riskmodels (Barsky and De Long
(1993), Bansal and Yaron (2004), Bansal, Khatchatrian and Yaron (2005), Bansal, Kiku and Yaron
(2007a, 2007b), Bansal, Dittmar and Kiku (2008), Hanson, Heaton and Li (2008), Kaltenbrunner and
Lochstoer (2010), Kung and Schmid (2011) - although long run riskmodels are promising they seem
inconsistent with many empirical facts documented by Le Roy and Porter (1981), Shiller (1981), Hall
(1988), Campbell and Mankiw (1989), Yogo (2004), Pakos (2007), Vissing-Jorgensen (2002), Hasanov
(2007), Bonaparte (2008), Campbell and Beeler (2009), Cochrane (2011)).
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assumption that uncertainty in consumption growth is the main driving force in asset
pricing. Pushing it even further, I question whether shocks to consumption growth
have rst order e¤ects or are merely a sideshow in asset pricing.
I present a model with a risk source that is able to shed light on many of the asset
pricing puzzles (empirical stylized facts) and yet can be completely independent of the
consumption growth process. In general equilibrium the asset pricing implications of
shocks to consumption growth are negligible in comparison to the e¤ects of my new
risk source.
I employ a standard Lucas (1978) economy with a representative agent who has
recursive preferences, and introduce shocks to the representative agents time prefer-
ences (subjective time discount rate of future utility) as a new source of uncertainty.
Time preferences describe the agents preferences over the trade-o¤ between streams of
(expected) utility received at diverse points in time (Uzawa (1968a, 1968b, 1969)), or
simply the agents impatience.
I illustrate that shocks to time preferences have substantial implications for asset
pricing, and risk in the aggregate consumption growth is of secondary or essentially
no importance. Uncertainty in time preferences generates both a large equity pre-
mium and substantial stock price volatility, and a reasonably low risk-free real interest
rate which follows a smoothprocess. In my model the market price of risk, equity
premium, conditional stock price volatility, interest rate and its conditional volatil-
ity follow mean-reverting stochastic processes. The price-earnings ratio has power to
predict future stock market excess returns, and realized stock returns are negatively
auto-correlated at long horizons. The correlation between stock returns and the real
interest rate (or its conditional volatility) is relatively low, and so is the correlation
between stock returns and aggregate consumption growth. Because the consumption
growth process has negligible asset pricing implications, I can simply choose a process
to match aggregate consumption growth data.
In more detail, a shock to time discounting of future utility gives rise to an instant
adjustment in the agents consumption-to-wealth ratio and results in a stochastic change
in the real interest rate and the stock price. Intuitively, if prices do not change with
an increase in impatience, then the agent desires to liquidate assets and trade future
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consumption for current consumption. But because in equilibrium the representative
agent cannot change his consumption path and asset holdings due to the feasibility
constraint in the economy (or equivalently because market clearing has to be satised
and the aggregate endowment and the supply in nancial markets remain constant),
asset prices have to adjust until the agents desire to liquidate assets and increase current
consumption vanishes. In particular, an increase in impatience results in a drop in the
stock price and in nancial wealth. Accordingly, because the absolute consumption
level is unchanged, the consumption-to-wealth ratio increases.
If the agent has recursive preferences, then marginal utility depends on the current
consumption level and the value function (time discounted future utility). The value
function crucially depends on the agents impatience. Equivalently, I show that the
quadratic variation in the value function is well described by the quadratic variation
in the consumption-to-wealth ratio. So, shocks to time preferences cause shocks to
the consumption-to-wealth ratio and result in stochastic changes in the value function
and marginal utility. It follows that the market price of risk is a¤ected by uncertainty
in the agents subjective time discount rate. Intuitively, an increase in impatience is
associated with a bad state of the world, and because the stock price is decreasing in
impatience, the agent requires a positive compensation to hold stocks - that is, the
equity premium is positive due to uncertainty in the agents time preferences.
It is important to understand that uncertainty in the agents time preferences is
priced completely independent of the consumption growth process - that is, even if
aggregate consumption is constant over time.
My model has several empirical implications. Most importantly, the price-earnings
ratio - an observable variable in the data - is highly correlated with the representative
agents current time discount rate - the (unobservable) key state variable in the model.
Therefore, the price-earnings ratio well captures the variation in the consumption-to-
wealth ratio, the real interest rate level and conditional volatility, the conditional stock
price volatility, the market price of risk and the equity premium - quantities which are
not (directly) observable in the data. Furthermore, shocks to time preferences imply a
low correlation between the real interest rate and the conditional expected consumption
growth rate and therefore, the estimates of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution
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in literature are biased towards zero (even if household data is used for the estimation).
Though my model uses shocks to time preferences, the same modeling tools and
asset pricing channel can be employed for various other risk sources. Crucial is that
the agent has recursive preferences and the chosen risk source has a direct or (through
market clearing) an indirect e¤ect on the agents consumption-to-wealth ratio. Indirect
channels might be shocks in the bond market which result in shocks to the interest rate
and make the agent instantly adjust his consumption-to-wealth ratio. In turn, shocks
to the bond market might for instance be triggered by monetary or scal policy or
changes in laws that lead rms to adjust their capital structure.
My paper relates to the literature on changes in time preferences and taste shocks.
Nason (1991) explores how taste shocks a¤ect an agents optimal consumption path,
and Atkeson and Lucas (1992) and Farhi and Werning (2007) discuss the e¢ cient con-
sumption goods allocation under taste shocks. In international nance literature taste
shocks have been employed to explain puzzles like the equity home bias, a low inter-
national consumption correlation, the exchange rate risk premium, and comovements
between stock, bond and foreign exchange markets (Stockman and Tesar (1995), Bergin
(2006), Pavlova and Rigobon (2007), Feng (2009), Jimenez-Martin and Cinca (2009)).
Normandin and St-Amour (1998) attempt to explain the equity premium puzzle using
taste shocks. They do not consider shocks to time discounting (see section 2.2 for a
discussion on the di¤erence between shocks to time discounting and instantaneous taste
shocks) and work with a model in partial equilibrium. In contrast to uncertainty in
time preferences, instantaneous taste shocks do not have implications for the stock price
volatility and only a¤ect the equity premium if they are correlated with the aggregate
consumption growth process.
Time variation in the time discount rate is discussed in diverse contexts. Kreps
(1979) discusses an agents preference for exibility in the context of time variations
in preferences (see also Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini (2001), Dekel et al. (2007),
Higashi, Hyogo and Takeoka (2009), Krishna and Sadowski (2010) and Higashi, Hyogo
and Takeoka (2011) for extensions). Uzawa (1968a, 1968b, 1969) introduces state
dependent time preferences (the discount rate is a function of the consumption path)
from where a large body of literature emerged. Using extensions of Uzawas preferences
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an agents optimal consumption path is studied by Epstein (1983), Shi and Epstein
(1993) and Acharya and Balvers (2004), an extension of the CCAPM is introduced by
Bergman (1985), macroeconomic growth models are discussed by Epstein and Hynes
(1983), Devereux (1991) and Sarkar (2007), and a real business cycle model is set up
by Mendoza (1991). Becker and Mulligan (1997) introduce a model of endogenous
time preferences in the sense that the agent can invest in a technology to reduce time
discounting. Their approach is mainly applied in macroeconomic growth theory (Stern
(2006), Le Van, Saglam and Erol (2009), Chen, Hsu and Lu (2010), Dioikitopoulos and
Kalyvitis (2012)). Dutta and Michel (1998) and Karni and Zilcha (2000) study the
optimal consumption path and the wealth distribution in an economy with stochastic
changes in the time discount rate. Finally, there is empirical evidence that suggests
discount rates to depend on state variables and to vary over time (Lawrence (1991),
Samwick (1998), Bishai (2004), Meier and Sprenger (2010)).
Models of heterogeneous agents could produce a representative agent with a time
varying time discount rate. However, the dynamics of the model and the pricing impli-
cations would di¤er from my paper. The individual agent would still faces a constant
time discount rate in his individual optimization problem and the value function de-
pended only through market clearing on a time varying "time discount rate" of the
representative agent. Asset pricing literature has not considered a model with recur-
sive preferences and heterogeneity in agentstime preferences.
The modeling tools and the pricing channel in this paper are closely related to my
paper on demographic changes (Maurer (2012)), where shocks to birth and death rates
are used to introduce risk in the consumption distribution across cohorts. In a similar
spirit as uncertainty in time preferences, demographic shocks have pricing implications
independent of the aggregate consumption growth process.
The chapter is organized as follows. In section 1.2, I introduce the setup of the
model. In section 1.3, I derive the specication of the consumption-to-wealth ratio and
discuss the qualitative implications for the stock price and the pricing kernel. In section
1.3.5, I illustrate the quantitative magnitude of the qualitative results. I conclude in
section 1.4, and the proofs are in the appendix.
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1.2 Model
I consider an endowment economy as in Lucas (1978) with a single consumption good
and an innitely lived representative agent. The consumption good is the numeraire in
my analysis and follows an exogenously specied process. The novelty in my model is
the specication of the agents preferences. I let the agents subjective time discount
rate follow a stochastic process - that is, I introduce shocks to the agents time preference
structure, which determines his patience and willingness to defer consumption. In
addition, the agent maximizes a recursive (non-time additive expected) utility function.
1.2.1 Aggregate Endowment, Financial Markets and Budget
Constraint
The supply side in the consumption goods market is constituted by a representative
rm which produces (or is endowed with) Yt units of the consumption good at time
t. As in Lucas (1978), production is exogenous, in the sense that the rm cannot
reinvested any of its output, and the evolution of Y is specied by the dynamics
dYt
Yt
= (Y )dt+ (Y )dfWt (1.1)
with the constant drift term (Y ) and di¤usion vector (Y ), and fW denoting a d-
dimensional Wiener process. The rm pays earnings Yt as dividends Dt to shareholders.
Financial markets are assumed to be dynamically complete.3  denotes the (unique)
stochastic discount factor (SDF) in the economy and is determined in equilibrium. The
agents nancial wealth at time t is denoted by Wt. He consumes ct and invests the
remaining part of his nancial wealth in equities and bonds. Equities are claims on
the stream of dividends Dt paid out by the representative rm. The price of equity
3This assumption is satised given equity and bond contracts as long as there is only one source
of uncertainty, that is fW is a one-dimensional Wiender process. In the general case where output,
time discount factor and instantaneous taste shocks are not perfectly correlated, I implicitly suppose
the existence of further contracts that dynamically complete nancial markets - that is the existence
of a complete set of Arrow-Debreu securities that allow to trade any of the d independend Brownian
motions. My focus lies on equity and bond markets only.
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denoted by Pt is equal to the present value of the stream of future dividends
Pt = Et
Z 1
t
s
t
Dsds

(1.2)
The supply of equities is normalized to one. xt denotes the number of equities pur-
chased by the agent at time t. To do not permit arbitrage opportunities I restrict
trading activities according to the standard technical assumption xtPt
Wt
2 L2, with
L2 
n
x 2 L j R T
0
x2tdt <1 a:s:
o
and L is the set of processes adapted to the l-
tration FP generated by asset prices, FPt   fPu : u  tg. Bonds are instantaneously
risk free and pay interest rt with
rtdt = Et

 dt
t

(1.3)
Bonds are in zero net supply. The part of the agents nancial wealth that is not used
to buy stocks, (Wt   xtPt) is invested in bonds.
An agents nancial wealth Wt evolves according to the dynamics
dWt = Wtrtdt| {z }
risk free return
+ xt (dPt +Dtdt  Ptrtdt)| {z }
stock market excess return
  ctdt|{z}
consumption
(1.4)
I dene the set of feasible cash ows as (M +W )t  fx : x Wt 2Mg, where M
denotes the set of all marketable cash ows and a cash ow is marketable if it is nanced
by a trading strategy xtPt
Wt
2 L2. The set of admissible cash ows is =t  (M +W )t\L+,
where L+ includes all non-negative processes adapted to FP . The agents consumption
ct has to be an element of the set of admissible cash ows =t.
1.2.2 Agents Objective Function
The agents preferences are an adaptation of the stochastic di¤erential utility functions
of the Kreps and Porteus (1978) type introduced by Du¢ e and Epstein (1992a, 1992b).4
I extend their specication with shocks to the agents taste and his subjective time
preferences, which describes his preferences over the trade-o¤between streams of utility
4Stochastic di¤erential utilities by Du¢ e and Epstein (1992a, 1992b) are the continuous time equiv-
alent of the discrete time recursive preferences discussed by Epstein and Zin (1989, 1991).
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received at di¤erent points in time. The recursive utility function Vt is characterized as
Vt = Et
Z 1
t
f (cs; Vs; Zs; s) ds

(1.5)
with the aggregator function f (:) given by
f (ct; Vt; Zt; t) =
Ztc

t   t [(1  )Vt]

1 
 [(1  )Vt]

1  1
(1.6)
where Zt captures instantaneous taste shocks, t describes discounting of future utility
(time preferences), the term 1
1  equals the elasticity of intertemporal substitution
(EIS), and  controls relative risk aversion. The specication allows to disentangleEIS
and , and describes an agents preferences over the timing of uncertainty resolution,
as discussed in Kreps and Porteus (1978). The special case of time additive constant
relative risk aversion preferences is recovered if 1   = .
The subjective time discount rate  is dened on the space (L; H) and follows an
Orenstein-Uhlenbeck process,
dt = 
()
t dt+ 
()
t dfWt (1.7)
= m()
 
   t

dt+
p
t   L
p
H   t()dfWt
wherem() determines the speed of mean-reversion of  towards the long run (expected)
level , and () is a constant di¤usion vector. The su¢ cient condition 2m() >
(H   L)()
 
()
T
ensures that  is never absorbed at the boundaries L and H
or crosses them (Feller (1951)).
I model the impatience parameter  by an Orenstein-Uhlenbeck process with well
dened boundaries for several reasons. Most importantly, the specication allows to
(roughly) match the dynamics of the model implied risk-free real interest rate with stan-
dard short rate models in the literature, which employ generalizations of the Orenstein-
Uhlenbeck process (for instance Vasicek (1977), Cox, Ingersoll and Ross (1985), Hull
and White (1990), Black and Karasinski (1991), Longsta¤ and Schwartz (1992), Chen
(1996)). As I show below, the mean-reversion property of  results in a stationary real
interest rate process which is expected to revert to its mean in the long run. It also
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implies that the (stock) price-earnings ratio is stationary and mean-reverting, and (at
long horizons) stock returns are negatively auto-correlated. Finally, it seems natural to
assume that the subjective time discount rate is bounded, and the assumption delivers
well specied boundary conditions to solve the ordinary di¤erential equation (1.9).
In contrast to shocks to time preferences (), shocks to Z are interpreted as instan-
taneous taste shocks. I suppose that Z follows a martingale process with the dynamics
dZt = 
(Z)
t dt+ 
(Z)
t dfWt (1.8)
= Zt
(Z)dfWt
A non-zero drift term (Z)t would a¤ect time discounting of future utility - the e¤ective
subjective time discount rate equals  + (Z) - and stochastic changes in (Z) would
be equivalent to shocks to . Choosing (Z)t = 0 allows to separate the instantaneous
taste shocks Z from the dynamics in the time discount rate . The focus in literature
solely lies on instantaneous taste shocks and the interaction with risk in consumption
growth, while the pricing implications of stochastic changes in the agents time prefer-
ences are ignored (for instance Stockman and Tesar (1995), Normandin and St-Amour
(1998), Pavlova and Rigobon (2007), Feng (2009)). The main purpose of my analysis
is to study the asset pricing implications of shocks to time preferences and I introduce
instantaneous taste shocks merely to point out the fundamental di¤erences between
the two risk sources and thus, the di¤erences between my model and the literature on
taste shocks.
The agents objective is to maximize the value function subject to the dynamic or
equivalently the static budget constraint,
sup
fc;xg2(=L2)

Vt (c) = Et
Z 1
t
f (cs; Vs; Zs; s) ds

; s:t: dYs; ds; dZs (P1)
1.3 Equilibrium
1.3.1 Denition of Equilibrium
An equilibrium is dened by a set of adapted processes fc; x; g such that at any time
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(i) the agents utility is maximized subject to the budget constraint (Problem (P1)),
(ii) the consumption goods market clears, Yt = ct,
(iii) the equity market clears, 1 = xt,
(iv) the bond market clears, 0 = Wt   xtPt.
1.3.2 Consumption-to-Wealth Ratio
The key quantity in my analysis is the agents consumption-to-wealth ratio  t =
ct
Wt
.
Given the exogenous evolution of Y and the the consumption-to-wealth ratio  , it is
straightforward to derive equilibrium asset prices.
Proposition 1.1 There exists an equilibrium with the consumption-to-wealth ratio  t (t)
described by the ordinary di¤erential equation
0 =   t + t   (Y ) +

( )
t
 t
+

2
(Y )
 
(Y )
T   (1  )(Y )  (Z)T (1.9)
+(1  )(Y )
 

( )
t
 t
!T
  1   + 
2

( )
t
 t
 

( )
t
 t
!T
 1     
2
(Z)
 
(Z)
T
+
1  


( )
t
 t
 
(Z)
T
for t 2 (L; H), and  t (t) follows a Markov di¤usion process
d t = 
( )
t dt+ 
( )
t dfWt (1.10)
with

( )
t =
@ t
@t

()
t +
1
2
@2 t
@2t

()
t


()
t
T
(1.11)

( )
t =
@ t
@t

()
t (1.12)
Proof. See Appendix.
It is important to notice that Proposition 1.1 does not qualitatively change for the
special case where the agent has time additive preferences (1   = ).
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The consumption-to-wealth ratio  t is a function of only the agents current sub-
jective time discount rate t. It is independent of the state variables Y and Z. The
latter two state variables would matter in a setting where the aggregate endowment
and the agents taste followed more general di¤usion processes rather than a geomet-
ric Brownian motion with constant drift and di¤usion5. However,  t depends on t
independent of the specication of the stochastic process driving  - even in the case
where  is specied by a geometric Brownian motion with constant drift and di¤usion
dt = t
() + t
()dfWt. The impact on the consumption-to-wealth ratio and the
asset pricing implications of instantaneous taste shocks versus shocks to time prefer-
ences are very di¤erent.
The dependence of  t on t arises from the direct relationship between the agents
(current) impatience and the desire to consume his wealth early in time. Intuitively,
this relationship ought to be positive as an increase in the time discount of future utility
suggests a desire to shift the optimal consumption plan from lateconsumption and to
consumption earlyin time, such that marginal utility equals at every point in time.
Mathematically, the sign of the dependence of  t on t is not obvious because a change
in t also a¤ects the quantities
@ t
@t
, @
2 t
@2t
, ()t and 
()
t . For instance, if an increase
in t at some point t = b leads to a large enough decrease in  1 +2 ( )t t ( )t t T ,
then  t might in fact be declining in t (at t = b). Economic intuition tells that
a change in impatience may lead to a change in uncertainty in the agents subjective
time discount rate ()t , and a change in the variation in the consumption-to-wealth
ratio ( )t , which e¤ectively captures the uncertainty perceived by the agent. In turn,
a change in risk triggers a change in todays precautionary savings motive and in the
current consumption-to-wealth ratio. An increase in impatience may increases the
precautionary savings motive and decrease the consumption-to-wealth ratio.
Lemma 1.1 If () ! 0 and (H   L) <1, then  t (t) is continuous and monoton-
ically increasing in t (8t 2 (L; H)).
Proof. See Appendix.
5See for instance the long run risk literature initiated by Bansal and Yaron (2004), who assume
more exible dynamics in the aggregate endowment process.
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Intuitively, as ()t becomes very small, there is (almost) no uncertainty about
changes in the agents time preferences and his precautionary savings motive (almost)
disappears. It follows the rst intuition that an increase in impatience leads to the
desire of more current consumption in expenses of future consumption. Given aggre-
gate endowment is una¤ected by the increase in impatience, the desire to liquidate
assets and to increase current consumption implies that in equilibrium there has to be
a downward adjustment in the stock price until the agents desire to sell his assets and
buy more consumption goods vanishes and all market clearing conditions are satised.
A decrease in the stock price leads to a decrease in the agents (nancial) wealth and
subsequently to an increase in the consumption-to-wealth ratio because the absolute
consumption level remains constant.
Numerical solutions of the ODE (1.9) presented in section 3.5 suggest the same
conclusion of a positive relation between the consumption-to-wealth ratio and the cur-
rent impatience. The numerical results also suggest that @ t
@t
< 1 and mostly smaller
than 0:65; that is, the variation in the consumption-to-wealth ratio is substantially
lower than the variation in the subjective time discount rate. Intuitively, after a sud-
den increase in impatience the agent expects to revert to be more patient in the long
run (because t follows a mean-reverting process) and thus, he does not increase his
current consumption-to-wealth ratio as much as if the shock to time discounting was
permanent. In equation (1.9) this mean-reversion (damper) e¤ect is captured by the
term 1
 
@ t
@t
m()
 
   t

< (>) 0, for t > (<) . The mean-reversion property in the
time discount rate process further implies that the consumption-to-wealth ratio follows
a mean-reverting process.
1.3.3 Stock Price
Given the consumption-to-wealth ratio, it is straightforward to derive the stock price.
Financial markets clearing (solving the equilibrium conditions (iii) and (iv) for Pt) tells
us that in equilibrium the stock price has to equal the agents (nancial) wealth, Pt =
Wt.6 Rewriting the expression in terms of the consumption-to-wealth ratio ( t =
ct
Wt
)
6The same result is obtained when combining the denition of the stock price being equal to
the present value of future dividends or equivalently the present value of aggregate endowment or
consumption (consumption goods market clearing) with the agents static budget constraint. That is,
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and using the market clearing condition in the consumption goods market (equilibrium
condition (ii), Yt = ct) yields
Pt =
1
 t
Yt (1.13)
The (stock) price-earnings ratio (or equivalently the price-dividend ratio) is Pt
Yt
= 1
 t
.
From the discussion on the consumption-to-wealth ratio it follows immediately that the
price-earnings ratio is continuous and monotonically decreasing in the agents current
impatience t, and
Pt
Yt
follows a stochastic process with mean-reversion. Given the
mean-reversion property in the price-earnings ratio, I conjecture that the realized stock
return is negatively correlated at relatively long horizons. Intuitively, at short horizons
the mean-reversion in Pt
Yt
is weak and noise dominates, while at long horizons the reverse
is true. This is because the speed of mean-reversion is proportional to the time horizon
while volatility is proportional to the square root of the time horizon.
The ex-dividend stock price is not a constant multiple of aggregate consumption as
in Lucas (1978), but it is cointegrated with the aggregate endowment process because
 t is stationary. In other words, the ex-dividend stock price follows a noisy, mean-
reverting process with the (less noisy) stochastic and non-stationary mean (trend) equal
to the aggregate consumption process.
Applying Itôs Lemma to equation (1.13) shows that the stock price follows a Brown-
ian di¤usion process with the dynamics
dPt = 
(P )
t dt+ 
(P )
t dfWt (1.14)
with

(P )
t
Pt
= (Y )   
( )
t
 t
+

( )
t
 t
 

( )
t
 t
!T
  (Y )
 

( )
t
 t
!T
(1.15)

(P )
t
Pt
= (Y )   
( )
t
 t
(1.16)
The (conditional) stock price volatility depends on shocks to aggregate endowment
and to the agents subjective time discount rate, even in the special case of time additive
Pt = Et
hR1
t
s
t
Dsds
i
= Et
hR1
t
s
t
Ysds
i
= Et
hR1
t
s
t
csds
i
=Wt.
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preferences. Time preference shocks imply a quadratic variation in the consumption-
to-wealth ratio (equation (1.9)) which causes an instantaneous volatility in the stock
price (equation (1.13)). Instantaneous taste shocks do not matter, provided that Z
follows a geometric Brownian motion with constant drift and di¤usion terms.
For illustrative purposes I suppose for now that (Y )
 
()
T
= 0. It is important to
understand that shocks to the agents time preferences a¤ect the stock price completely
independent of aggregate endowment shocks; the volatility terms (Y ) and ( )t are
additive in equation (1.16). Shocks to time preferences matter for asset pricing even
in absence of consumption growth! The intuition is as mentioned earlier. Sudden
changes in the agents subjective time discount rate cause pure demand shocks while
the supply is xed. An increase in impatience means that at current prices the agent
wants to liquidate assets and buy more consumption goods. Since the supply in all
markets remains unchanged and in equilibrium market clearing must be satised, the
stock price has to adjust (fall) until the agent revokes his plan to liquidate assets for
more current consumption. The decline in the stock price causes the agents (nancial)
wealth to drop and accordingly, the consumption-to-wealth ratio to increase, which
explains the contemporaneous relation between Pt and  t.
It follows that the stock price volatility is larger than the variation in aggregate con-
sumption growth. Indeed, as illustrated in the Monte Carlo simulations in section 3.5
stochastic changes in time preferences are responsible for (almost) the entire variation
in the stock price and the unconditional excess volatility in the stock market over the
variation in aggregate consumption growth is substantial (the di¤erence is more than
one order of magnitude). Finally, because 
( )
t
 t
is a function (or equivalently @ t
@t
,  t and

()
t are functions) of the current level t, the conditional stock price volatility follows
a stationary stochastic process and is expected to revert in the long run to a constant
mean.
The conditional expected stock return is 
(Y )
t +Dt
Pt
dt. It is trivial that 
(Y )
t +Dt
Pt
dt cru-
cially depends on the current level of the agents impatience and for ()t ! 0 it features
the same qualitative properties as  t. Most important, the conditional expected stock
return follows a stationary stochastic process that reverts in the long run to a constant
mean. Intuitively, if the agent is very impatient, then the price-earnings ratio lies far
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below its long run average and the stock is relatively cheap. Since the agent expects to
become more patient in future (t reverts to ) and the price-earnings ratio is expected
to increase, the expected stock return is large. Moreover, the expected stock return is
declining as t reverts to , the price-earnings ratio increases to its long run average
and the stock becomes relatively more expensive. Given a persistence at short hori-
zons in the conditional expected stock return process, I conjecture that realized stock
returns are (slightly) positively correlated at short horizons.
The equity premium can be written as 
(P )
t +Dt rtPt
Pt
dt. Alternatively, using the de-
nition of the stock price being equal to the present value of future dividends (equation
(1.2)) and noticing that Et [Ps] for s < t is a local martingale yields
Et

dPt +Dtdt
Pt

  rtdt =  dPt
Pt

dt
t
T
=

(P )
t
Pt
(t)
T dt (1.17)
where tdfWt =  dt Et[dt]t is the market price of risk. The interpretation of equation
(1.17) is standard: if an asset pays o¤ low (high) during times when the agent faces a
high (low) marginal utility and desires much (does not need much) wealth (negative
correlation between SDF and stock price), then the agent demands a premium to hold
the asset (positive equity premium). Either expression of the equity premium requires
me to solve for the risk-free real interest rate or the market price of risk to be able to
give an interpretation.
1.3.4 Stochastic Discount Factor and Equity Premium
Proposition 1.2 In an equilibrium with  t as described in Proposition 1.1, the pricing
kernel  follows a Markov di¤usion process dened by
dt
t
=  rtdt  tdfWt (1.18)
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with the risk-free real interest rate rt and the market price of risk t characterized as
rt = t + (1  )(Y )  
 (2  )
2
(Y )
 
(Y )
T
(1.19)
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 t
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(Z)
t + 
(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(Y )   1  

(Z) +
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   


( )
t
 t
(1.20)
The risk-free real interest rate and and market price of risk are functions of the current
state t and follow a stationary Markov di¤usion processes with the dynamics specied
in equations (1.51), (1.52), (1.53) and (1.54). The equity premium can be written as
Et

dPt +Dtdt
Pt

  rtdt = (Y )
 
(Y )
T   1     


( )
t
 t
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(1.21)
+
1       

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t
 t
! 
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T
The equity premium is a function of of the current state t and follows a stationary
Markov di¤usion process.
Proof. See Appendix.
The risk-free real interest rate depends of the three standard quantities: the repre-
sentative agents current time discount rate of future utility, his expected consumption
growth over the next instant in time, and precautionary savings. Precautionary savings
depend on aggregate endowment risk and uncertainty in the agents taste and time pref-
erences. In the special case of time additive preferences (1   = ), the precautionary
savings motive depends only on aggregate consumption risk and the interaction (co-
variation) between aggregate consumption risk and taste shocks - in particular, shocks
to time preferences are irrelevant.
In general, a change in the agents time preferences has two e¤ects on the interest
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rate. An increase in impatience has the direct consequence to generate a desire of
the agent to increase current consumption and therefore liquidate his nancial assets,
which leads to a drop in the bond price and an increase in the interest rate. How-
ever, an increase in impatience may also lead to an increase in uncertainty about the
(future) consumption-to-wealth ratio

 t,
@ t
@t
and ()t are functions of t

. The ad-
ditional risk may increase the agents precautionary savings motive and cause a decline
in the interest rate. It is hard to tell which of the two opposing e¤ects dominates.
The numerical results in section 3.5 show that the latter (precautionary savings) chan-
nel dominates if the agent is patient enough ( @rt
@t
< 0), and the rst (direct) e¤ect
dominates if the agent becomes su¢ ciently impatient ( @rt
@t
> 0).
Garleanu and Panageas (2010) show that in an economy where agents are hetero-
geneous with respect to the curvatures in their objective functions, empirical estimates
of the EIS are biased towards zero, if the econometrician uses aggregate consumption
data in his estimation. In their paper the expected consumption growth of an individual
agent (dEt
h
ln

Cit+1
Cit
i
) and the interest rate (dEt [ln (1 + rt+1)]) are stochastic (due to
stochastic changes in the distribution of aggregate consumption among agents), while
expected aggregate consumption growth is constant (dEt
h
ln

Caggt+1
Caggt
i
). Accordingly, if
the true economy is populated by heterogeneous agents but the econometrician uses
aggregate consumption data, then the estimation
EIS =
dEt

ln
 
Caggt+1
  ln (Caggt )
dEt [ln (1 + rt+1)]
(1.22)
which is derived (approximated) from the Euler equation in a representative agent econ-
omy (Vissing-Jorgensen (2002)), will be biases towards zero. However, this problem can
be circumvented and an unbiased estimate can be obtained if household consumption
data is used to estimate the EIS (=
dEt[ln(Cit+1) ln(Cit)]
dEt[ln(1+rt+1)]
) for each individual investor.
Indeed empirical estimates of the EIS by Hall (1988), Campbell and Mankiw (1989),
Yogo (2004) and Pakos (2007) - who use aggregate consumption data - are indistin-
guishable from zero. In contrast, estimates by Hasanov (2007) and Bonaparte (2008)
- who use household specic data - yield a higher EIS of around 0:3. Garleanu and
Panageas (2010) deliver a nice explanation for the di¤erence in the estimates. However,
in most economics literature EIS = 0:3 is still considered to be low.
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The result of my analysis is even stronger than the conclusion in Garleanu and
Panageas (2010). Since rt is a function of t, the interest rate follows a stationary
stochastic process which is expected to revert in the long to a constant mean.7 It is im-
portant that there is variation in the interest rate which originates from shocks to time
preferences and is unrelated to variation in either aggregate or the individual investors
(expected) consumption growth. Accordingly, due to shocks to time preferences there is
a bias towards zero in the estimation of the EIS no matter whether the econometrician
uses aggregate or household consumption data. This is in contrast to the case in Gar-
leanu and Panageas (2010) where the use of household consumption data resolves the
estimation problem. Therefore, shocks to time preferences explain why the estimates
by Hasanov (2007) and Bonaparte (2008) are still lower than expected (and lower than
the true EIS).
The market price of risk depends on risk in aggregate consumption growth, taste
shocks, and uncertainty about time discounting. Although taste shock a¤ect marginal
utility, they only matter for the equity premium if they are correlated with either one
of the two other risk sources. In contrast, aggregate consumption growth and time
preferences matter for the equity premium independent of the correlation structure
because they both a¤ect marginal utility and the stock price volatility. Accordingly,
the asset pricing implications of instantaneous taste shocks and stochastic changes in
time preferences are very di¤erent.
For illustrative purposes, I suppose for now that aggregate consumption growth is
constant ((Y ) = 0; no risk in the aggregate consumption process) and taste shocks are
unrelated to risk in time discounting ((Z)
 
()
T
= 0). The equity premium simplies
to
Et

dPt +Dtdt
Pt

  rtdt =  1  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
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t
 t
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It depends only on shocks to time preferences and it is positive if and only if EIS =2
min

1

; 1

;max

1; 1

 
or   1  

= 1 EIS
1 EIS > 0

. In the special case of time ad-
ditive preferences the market price of risk and the equity premium are zero.8
7Remember that this result is one of the main reasons for me to model  as a mean-reverting
process in the rst place.
8In the case of CRRA utility, shocks to the agents subjective discount factor only a¤ect the equity
premium if they are correlated with risk in the aggregate consumption growth process.
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In the special case of time additive preferences (1  = ), the stream of utility the
agent receives at some time t depends only on the current consumption level. Marginal
utility also depends only on current consumption and the marginal utility process is a
function of the agents current consumption growth. Accordingly, the subjective time
discount rate of future utility does not a¤ect the marginal utility process and has no
e¤ect on the market price of risk (and the equity premium). In contrast, shocks to
aggregate consumption and instantaneous taste shocks, which have a scalinge¤ect on
the current consumption level, a¤ect marginal utility and the market price of risk.
Under more general recursive preferences, the stream of utility the agent receives at
some time t depends on a weighted average of past, current and future expected con-
sumption. The agents time preferences determine the weightsused in the weighted
average- that is the importance of consumption streams at di¤erent points in time.
Marginal utility is again a function of a weighted average of past, current and future
expected consumption and the marginal utility process depends on a weighted aver-
age of past, current and future expected consumption growth. Since the market price
of risk is dened by stochastic changes in the marginal utility process and past con-
sumption is realized (no uncertainty), the market price of risk is a function of only the
quadratic variation in current consumption growth and future expected consumption
growth. Equations (1.6) and (1.24) suggest that the variation in the value function is
a su¢ cient statistic of the variation in future expected consumption growth. By de-
nition of the value function, time preferences matter in a crucial way. A shock to the
agents subjective time discount rate means an unexpected change in the weightingof
future expected consumption and an unpredictable shock to the value function. This
is equivalent to a stochastic change in marginal utility and the shock to time prefer-
ences a¤ects the market price of risk. From section 3.3.3 I know that the stock price
instantly reacts to sudden changes in the agents time preferences. Accordingly, shocks
to time preferences imply a covariation between the marginal utility process and the
stock price, and the equity premium is non-zero. Finally, shocks to aggregate consump-
tion and instantaneous taste shocks have the exact same e¤ect on marginal utility and
the market price of risk as in the case of time additive preferences.
In mathematical terms, from equations (1.6) and (1.24) it follows that marginal
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utility is a decreasing (increasing) function in (1  )Vt if 1  1  < (>) 0. Equation
(1.34) states that (1  )Vt is decreasing (increasing) in  t if 1  > (<) 0. Accordingly,
marginal utility is increasing in the consumption-to-wealth ratio if and only if 1  

< 0
(or EIS =2

min

1

; 1

;max

1; 1


). If a shock to time preferences yields an increase
(decrease) in the consumption-to-wealth ratio, then the agent is in a high (low) marginal
utility state (if 1  

< 0). In equilibrium, an increase (decline) in the consumption-to-
wealth ratio implies a drop (increase) in the stock price (equation (1.16)). Therefore, the
stock return is negatively correlated with the marginal utility process and by denition
(equation (1.17)) the equity premium is positive.
On a more intuitive level, an increase (decrease) in impatience means that the agent
discounts his future utility is more (less) heavily. This is plausibly associated with a
bad (good) state of the world and the agent desires much (does not need much) wealth.
An increase (decrease) in time discounting also corresponds to a decline (rise) in the
stock price (see section 3.3 for an intuition). Therefore, the stock pays o¤ low (high) in
a bad (good) state of the world, which is an undesirable payo¤ schedule, and the agent
requires a positive premium to hold the stock (positive equity premium).
Finally, because 
( )
t
 t
is a function of the current state t, the market price of risk
and the equity premium both follow a stationary stochastic process which is expected
to revert in the long run to a constant mean.
1.3.5 Numerical Results and Monte Carlo Simulations
I solve the model numerically to quantify the magnitudes of my qualitative results.
Uncertainty in the agents subjective time discount rate has quantitatively important
implications for asset pricing (rst order e¤ect). In contrast, the pricing implications
of aggregate consumption growth shocks are negligible (second order e¤ect).
I suppose that in the long run the subjective time discount rate is always expected
to revert to  = 0:045. The speed of mean-reversion is assumed to be moderate, m() =
0:175, and I chose the conditional volatility ()
p
H   t
p
t   L = 0:125
p
t   2t ,
that is () = 0:125, L = 0, and H = 1. Although the support of t is dened by
the interval (L; H) = (0; 1), the mean-reversion and the state dependent conditional
volatility of t imply that t does not travel too far from the long run mean . Indeed
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Monte Carlo simulations suggest that the time discount rate does not leave the interval
(0; 0:2775) with a condence of 99:9% (see table 1.1 for an estimate of the e¤ective
unconditional distribution of the time discount rate). Simulations also show that the
unconditional mean of t roughly equals , and the unconditional volatility of t is
4:26%, which matches the conditional volatility at t =  (
()
q
   2 = 2:59%; the
conditional volatility has to be adjusted for the speed of mean-reversion to compare it
to the unconditional volatility).
Unconditional Distribution of Simulated Time Discount Rate
Percentile 0:1% 0:5% 1% 5% 10% 25%
t 0:0000 0:0002 0:0005 0:0025 0:0050 0:0136
Percentile 75% 90% 95% 99% 99:5% 99:9%
t 0:0634 0:1029 0:1313 0:1945 0:2202 0:2775
Table 1.1: Unconditional distribution of t from 100 simulations of 10000 years of
weekly data.
I choose (Y ) = 0:02 and (Y ) = 0:01 to roughly match the rst two unconditional
moments of aggregate consumption growth in US data. Setting (Y ) = 0 hardly a¤ects
my results. It is hard to tell how large the correlation between shocks to time prefer-
ences and shocks to consumption growth is ought to be. Though, for instance theory
papers by Uzawa (1968a, 1968b, 1969) and Becker and Mulligan (1997) suggest that
(Y )
 
()
T
< 0.9 For simplicity I set (Y )
 
()
T
= 0. Since I merely introduce instan-
taneous taste shocks in my analysis to point out the fundamental di¤erences in pricing
compared to uncertainty in time preferences (see sections 3.2 to 3.4 for a su¢ cient
discussion), I suppose now that Zt = 1. For the curvature in the agents preferences I
assume the two conservative values  = 0:5 and EIS = 0:9.
Figure 1.1 and 1.2 plot the consumption-to-wealth ratio ( t,

( )
t
 t
), the interest rate
(rt, 
(r)
t ) and the stock price (
()
t ,

(P )
t
Pt
, Et
h
dPt+Dtdt rtPtdt
Pt
i
, Pt
Yt
) against the agents
9One could also estimate the correlation between t and Yt from the expression
Corr


(P )
t
Pt
; (Y )

=

(P )
t
Pt
((Y ))
Tvuut(P )t
Pt
 

(P )
t
Pt
!T
(Y )((Y ))
T
=
 
(Y ) 
( )
t
 t
!
((Y ))
T
vuut (Y ) ( )t t
! 
(Y ) 
( )
t
 t
!T
(Y )((Y ))
T
, assuming
one knows the correlation between the stock price and aggregate consumption growth. If I assume
Corr


(P )
t
Pt
; (Y )

= 0:25 (and the parameterization in section 3.5), then Corr (t; Yt) =  0:175.
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Figure 1.1: Black line: Dependence of the consumption-to-wealth ratio  t (top-left
panel), the conditional volatility in the consumption-to-wealth ratio 
( )
t
 t
(top-right
panel), the riskfree real interest rate rt (bottom-left panel), and the conditional volatility
in the interest rate (exposure of interest rate to changes in impatience) (r)t (with 
(r)
t as
dened in the appendix; a negative (r)t means a that rt is decreasing in t) (bottom-
right panel) on the agents impatience t (subjective time discount factor of future
utility). The blue line indicates the unconditional expectation of the time discount
factor (). The horizontal axis spans the interval between the bottom 0:1% and the
top 99:9% percentiles of the stationary distribution of t.
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subjective time discount rate (t). Although I solve the ODE (1.9) for the entire
support (L; H) of t, the plots only display the results for t 2 (0; 0:2775), the interval
between the bottom 0 and the top 99:9% percentiles of the unconditional distribution
of t, and my discussion shall be limited to this smaller support.
In contrast to the numerical solutions (gure 1.1 and 1.2), table 1.2 presents the
averages and standard deviations of estimated unconditional moments of the key vari-
ables from 100 Monte Carlo simulations of 10000 years of weekly data; that is, for every
simulation (10000 years of weekly data) I estimate the 20 unconditional moments in
table 1.2, and I report the average and standard deviation over the 100 estimates.
The consumption-to-wealth ratio is almost linear in the time discount rate and
increases monotonically from 6:36% to 21:23% (top-left panel in gure 1.1). In the
long run it is expected to be  t
 
t = 

= 8:53% which almost coincides with the
estimated unconditional expected value E^ ( t) = 8:55% (table 1.2). The numerical
results also show that Et [d t] < 0 if and only if t 2
 
; H

, which conrms the
mean-reversion property in process of  t. Moreover,
@ t
@t
2 (0:479; 0:628), suggesting
that the conditional variation in  t is substantially lower than the conditional variation
in t. Indeed the estimated unconditional volatility in the time discount rate (4:26%)
is twice as large as the volatility in the consumption-to-wealth ratio (2:14%) (table
1.2). The top-right panel in gure 1.1 further presents the relation between the state
variable t and the key quantity

( )
t
 t
(conditional volatility of percentage changes in
 t), which essentially describes the economic uncertainty introduced by shocks to time
preferences and determines the precautionary savings motive, the stock price volatility
and the equity premium. 
( )
t
 t
is a hump-shaped function in t. The uncertainty is
steeply sloping in the vicinity of the boundary L (and H) where 
()
t approaches zero
as t ! L (and t ! H) to ensure that t 2 (L; H) almost surely.
The risk-free real interest rate is a U-shaped function in the time discount rate
(bottom-left panel in gure 1.1). It declines monotonically from 2:22% to 0:50% for
t 2 (0; 0:028) ((r)t < 0), and is thereafter strictly increasing in t ((r)t > 0) and
reaches its maximum of 22:40% at t = 0:2775. On the interval (L; 1) = (0; 0:028)
there is a strong increase in uncertainty in the consumption-to-wealth ratio (top-right
panel in gure 1.1) which gives rise to a rapid increase in precautionary savings and
31
0.0 0.1 0.2
6
8
10
12
14
16
.
.
Pr
ic
e-
Ea
rn
in
gs
 R
at
io
Impatience
0.0 0.1 0.2
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
.
.
St
oc
k 
Pr
ic
e 
V
ol
at
ili
ty
Impatience
0.0 0.1 0.2
-1.0
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0.0.
M
ar
ke
t P
ric
e 
of
 R
is
k
Impatience
0.0 0.1 0.2
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
.
.
Eq
ui
ty
 P
re
m
iu
m
Impatience
Figure 1.2: Dependence of the stock price-earnings ratio Pt
Yt
(top-left panel), the condi-
tional stock price volatility 
(P )
t
Pt
(top-right panel), the market price of risk with respect
to uncertainty in time preferences ()t (bottom-left panel), and the equity premium
Et
h
dPt+Dtdt rtPtdt
Pt
i
(bottom-right panel) on the agents impatience t (subjective time
discount factor of future utility). The blue line indicates the unconditional expectation
of the time discount factor (). The horizontal axis spans the interval between the
bottom 0:1% and the top 99:9% percentiles of the stationary distribution of t.
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results in a drop in the interest rate. The negative impact on the interest rate is large
enough to dominate the positive e¤ect due to the growing impatience of the agent. In
turn, for t > 0:028 uncertainty does not increase by much and even starts to decrease
for t  0:162, and the positive e¤ect on the interest rate (increasing impatience)
dominates. Since rt is not everywhere monotonically increasing in t, there exist some
(few) circumstances where the interest rate process is temporarily expected to move
away from its mean. However, in the long run the interest rate is always expected
to revert to the level rt
 
t = 

= 0:86%. Monte Carlo simulations show that risk-
free bonds pay on average a real interest of 2:03% (table 1.2), which is higher than
rt
 
t = 

due to the convexity in the function rt (t).
The conditional volatility of the interest rate is hump-shaped on the interval (L; 1)
= (0; 0:028) and strictly increasing in the agents impatience (for t 2 (0:028; 0:2775)).
In the long run it is expected to revert to (r)t
 
t = 

= 0:96% (bottom-right panel
in gure 1.1). Simulations show that the unconditional volatility in the interest rate is
much larger (2:56%), which is due to the substantial (unconditional) variation (1:57%)
in the conditional interest rate volatility (r)t (table 1.2).
The price-earnings ratio equals the inverse of the consumption-to-wealth ratio (equa-
tion (1.13)). It is monotonically decreasing in the agents impatience and almost linear
in 1
t
(top-left panel in gure 1.2). Moreover, it follows a mean-reverting stochastic
process with the long run level 11:72. The unconditional average is 12:27 (table 1.2).
The conditional stock price volatility (
(P )
t
Pt
) strongly depends on the variation in
time discounting. 
(P )
t
Pt
is a linear function in 
( )
t
 t
, and the dependence on the state
variable t is displayed in the top-right panel in gure 1.2. It follows a stationary
stochastic process and is expected to revert to its the long run level of 14:63%. From
simulations I estimate an unconditional mean and volatility in the conditional stock
price volatility of 12:24% and 4:33%, while the estimated unconditional volatility in
realized stock returns is 13:85% (table 1.2). Shocks to aggregate consumption growth
merely generate a volatility of 1%, while risk in the time discount rate accounts for
the remaining stock price volatility. Accordingly, if (Y )
 
()
T
is small (I assume it
is zero), the correlation between the stock market return and aggregate consumption
growth is small (close to zero).
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Unconditional Moments (Simulated Annual Data)
Mean across Std across
Simulations Simulations
E^ [t] 4:48% 0:13%s
E^

t   E^ [t]
2
4:26% 0:15%
E^ [ t] 8:55% 0:07%s
E^

 t   E^ [ t]
2
2:14% 0:08%
E^
h

( )
t
i
1:11% 0:02%s
E^


( )
t   E^
h

( )
t
i2
0:61% 0:01%
E^ [rt] 2:03% 0:07%s
E^

rt   E^ [rt]
2
2:56% 0:16%
E^
h

(r)
t
i
0:78% 0:05%s
E^


(r)
t   E^
h

(r)
t
i2
1:57% 0:03%
E^
h

()
t
i
 66:56% 0:66%s
E^


()
t   E^
h

()
t
i2
24:88% 0:31%
E^
h

(P )
t +Dt rtPt
Pt
i
9:34% 0:14%s
E^


(P )
t +Dt rtPt
Pt
  E^
h

(P )
t +Dt rtPt
Pt
i2
4:82% 0:04%
E^
h

(P )
t
Pt
i
12:24% 0:12%s
E^


(P )
t
Pt
  E^
h

(P )
t
Pt
i2
4:33% 0:05%
E^
h
Pt+1 Pt+Dt+1
Pt
i
11:55% 0:08%s
E^

Pt+1+Dt+1
Pt
  E^
h
Pt+1+Dt+1
Pt
i2
13:85% 0:17%
E^
h
Pt
Yt
i
12:27 0:07s
E^

Pt
Yt
  E^
h
Pt
Yt
i2
2:40 0:04
Table 1.2: Estimation of unconditional moments of annual key quantities: average and
standard deviation across 100 simulations of 10000 years of weekly simulated data.
34
The market price of risk in the agents time preferences (()t ) is a linear function
in  
( )
t
 t
and a U-shaped function in t (bottom-left panel in gure 1.2). It is sharply
decreasing for small values in t as uncertainty in time discounting is rapidly increasing
for t close to L. 
()
t is dened on the negative space - that is, marginal utility
is increasing in the agents impatience as discussed in section 3.4 (provided EIS =2
min

1

; 1

;max

1; 1


). In the long run it is expected to revert to ()t
 
t = 

=
 80:28%. The unconditional mean and volatility in ()t are  66:56% and 24:88%
(table 1.2). The market price of risk for uncertainty in time discounting is on average
two orders of magnitude larger than the (constant) market price of risk for uncertainty
in aggregate consumption growth ((Y )t = 
(Y ) = 0:5%)!
The equity premium is a quadratic function in 
( )
t
 t
and a hump-shaped function in
t (bottom-right panel in gure 1.2). In the long run the equity premium is expected to
revert to the level of 11:72%. The estimated unconditional mean and standard deviation
in the equity premium are 9:34% and 4:82% (table 1.2). Risk in aggregate consumption
growth is almost not compensated in nancial markets; the equity premium due to
aggregate consumption shocks is almost zero (0:005%). In contrast, uncertainty in the
agents time preferences generates essentially the entire equity premium. Moreover, all
variation in the equity premium comes solely from changes in the agents perceived
uncertainty 
( )
t
 t
due to changes in impatience.
In table 1.3 I report estimated unconditional correlations from 100 Monte Carlo
simulations. For every simulation I generate a 10000 year sample path for  and
estimate the unconditional annual correlations between the quantities Pt
Yt
,  t, rt, 
(r)
t ,

()
t ,

(P )
t
Pt
, 
(P )
t +Dt rtPt
Pt
, and Pt+1 Pt+Dt+1
Pt
. I report the average over the 100 estimated
correlation matrices in table 1.3.
I nd a strong correlation between t and all the reported quantities since all the
variables crucially depend on the agents current impatience. The correlation between
time discounting and the realized stock return over the subsequent year (t; t+ 1) is
weaker (than the other correlations) because Pt+1 Pt+Dt+1
Pt
depends only indirectly on
t due to mean-reversion. Unfortunately, the representative agents current subjective
time discount rate is not observable in the data, and neither are the quantities  t, rt,

(r)
t , 
()
t ,

(P )
t
Pt
, and 
(P )
t +Dt rtPt
Pt
.
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Unconditional Correlations (Simulated Annual Data)
t
Pt
Yt
 t rt 
(r)
t 
()
t

(P )
t
Pt

(P )
t +Dt+1 rtPt
Pt
Pt
Yt
 0:96
 t 1:00  0:96
rt 0:87  0:71 0:88

(r)
t 0:97  0:96 0:96 0:80

()
t  0:75 0:88  0:73  0:33  0:72

(P )
t
Pt
0:76  0:89 0:74 0:35 0:74  1:00

(P )
t +Dt+1 rtPt
Pt
0:85  0:96 0:83 0:47 0:86  0:97 0:97
Pt+1 Pt+Dt+1
Pt
0:45  0:45 0:44 0:35 0:44  0:38 0:38 0:41
Table 1.3: Estimation of unconditional correlations between annual key quantities:
average across 100 simulations of 10000 years of simulated data.
However, from the above discussion I know that there is a strong relation between
the price-earnings ratio and the agents subjective time discount rate (Pt
Yt
depends almost
linearly on 1
t
). Indeed the state variable t becomes (almost) observable through the
price-earnings ratio. Therefore, particularly striking from an empirical perspective is
the strong correlation between the price-earnings ratio - which is an observable variable
in the data - and literally all the key quantities in my model. The price-earnings
ratio reveals much information about the unobservable variables  t, rt, 
(r)
t , 
()
t ,

(P )
t
Pt
,
and 
(P )
t +Dt rtPt
Pt
. Moreover, the current price-earnings ratio is able to predict future
(realized) stock returns.
Most of the (postulated) relations in table 1.3 are almost impossible to test em-
pirically because only noisy estimates are available of the true quantities. However,
consistent with the results in table 1.3 empirical work by Campbell and Ammer (1993)
suggests that there is a rather weak correlation between realized stock returns (and/or
equity premia) and the interest rate. Keim and Stambaugh (1986), Campbell and
Shiller (1988) and Fama and French (1988a) explore the power of the price-earnings
ratio to forecast future stock returns and nd evidence which is consistent with table
1.3.
Finally, table 1.3 makes clear that ex-post realized stock returns are not a good
proxy for expected returns - the unconditional correlation is only 0:414. Empirical
estimates of correlations between expected stock returns - using ex-post realized returns
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as a proxy - and quantities such as the price-earnings ratio, the conditional stock price
volatility, the real interest rate or the conditional interest rate volatility will be severely
biased towards zero (even if the econometrician was able to perfectly measure the real
interest rate or the conditional volatilities in the stock price or interest rate).
Auto-Correlation in Realized Stock Returns Pt Pt 1+Dt
Pt 1
Holding Period
10 years 5 years 1 year 1 month 1 week 1 day
Mean across Simulations  0:089  0:152  0:050  0:005  0:001  0:000
Std across Simulations 0:036 0:022 0:011 0:004 0:002 0:001
Table 1.4: Estimation of auto-correlations in realized daily, weekly, monthly, annual,
and 5-year stock returns: average across 100 simulations of 10000 years of simulated
data. Notice that the power of the test declines quickly if sample paths shorter than
10000 years are simulated and used to estimate the auto-correlation.
In table 1.4 I present estimated auto-correlations in simulated stock returns for
various holding periods. I nd a negative auto-correlation in stock returns at long
horizons; though for very long holding periods the auto-correlation starts to disappear
again. For short holding periods the auto-correlation is small and does not signicantly
di¤er from zero. The negative auto-correlation is induced by the mean-reversion in the
price-earnings ratio process as conjectured in the discussion on the price-earnings ratio
in section 3.3. The pattern in table 1.4 is consistent with empirical evidence provided
by Fama and French (1988b). My model illustrates that stock returns can be auto-
correlated if investors are perfectly rational and informed, there are no frictions, and
asset prices are e¢ cient in the sense that they incorporate all available information in
the economy (prices are forward looking).
1.4 Conclusion
Traditional consumption-based asset pricing models miss several empirical stylized
facts. In contrast to the literature, I argue that the aggregate consumption growth
process is merely of secondary importance while other (unrelated) risk sources are the
main driving forces in asset pricing.
I show that shocks to the representative agents subjective time discount rate of
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future utility have rst order implications for asset pricing, while risk in the aggregate
consumption growth process does not essentially matter. For illustrative purposes I
suppose that shocks to time preferences are independent of the consumption growth
process. This assumption helps to gain a better understanding of the newly introduced
pricing channel and to demonstrate the fundamental di¤erences to the pricing channel
in related literature, which crucially depends on risk in the aggregate consumption
growth process. Although I restrict my analysis to uncertainty in time preferences, the
same modeling tools and asset pricing channel can be applied in the context of other
risk sources. Important is that the agent has recursive preferences and the chosen risk
source has implications for the representative agents consumption-to-wealth ratio.
My model is able to match the data well and provides answers to various challenges
in (empirical) asset pricing literature. Uncertainty in time discounting generates a
large equity premium and stock price volatility. The risk-free real interest rate is low
and has a moderate variation. The market price of risk, equity premium, conditional
stock price volatility, interest rate and its conditional volatility follow mean-reverting
stochastic processes. The price-earnings ratio has power to predict future stock market
excess returns, and realized stock returns are negatively auto-correlated at long hori-
zons. The correlation between stock returns and the real interest rate (or its conditional
volatility) is low, and so is the correlation between stock returns and aggregate con-
sumption growth. Because the consumption growth process has negligible asset pricing
implications, I can simply choose a process to match aggregate consumption growth
data.
The most important empirical implication of the model is that the price-earnings
ratio, which is an observable variable in the data, is highly correlated with the un-
observable current time discount rate of the representative agent. Accordingly, the
price-earnings ratio reveals much information about other unobservable key quantities
in nance such as the consumption-to-wealth ratio, the real interest rate level and its
conditional volatility, the conditional stock price volatility, the market price of risk and
the equity premium.
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1.5 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1.1 & 1.2. Following Du¢ e and Skiadas (1994, Theorem 2),
the Gateau derivative (directional derivative) of the utility function at time s at c in
the direction x is
rVs (c;x)  lim
!0
Vs (c+ x)  Vs (c)

(1.24)
= Es
Z 1
s
e
R t
s
@
@Vu
f(cu;Vu;Zu;u)du
@
@ct
f (ct; Vt; Zt; t)xdt

= Es
Z 1
s
Rtxdt

The Riesz representation process Rt is dened as
Rt = e
R t
s
@
@Vu
f(cu;Vu;Zu;u)du
@
@ct
f (ct; Vt; Zt; t) (1.25)
Optimality implies (assuming that the optimal consumption plan c is in the interior)
rVs (c; [c  c]) = 0 (1.26)
for all admissible consumption plans c 2 =. Since  cs   cs spans the set of all mar-
ketable cash ows M ,
rVs (c;x) = 0 (1.27)
holds for all marketable cash ows x 2 M . This implies that the Riesz representation
process is a multiple of a SDF ,
Rt = t (1.28)
for some constant . Since markets are dynamically complete, the found pricing kernel
is unique. I can solve for the optimal consumption plan by plugging in the expression
for the Riesz representation process (from now I drop the notation of indicating the
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optimum by a star)
t = e
R t
s
@
@Vu
f(cu;Vu;Zu;u)du
@
@ct
f (ct; Vt; Zt; t) (1.29)
ct = 
  1
1 Z
1
1 
t e
1
1 
R t
 1
@
@Vu
f(cu;Vu;Zu;u)du [(1  )Vt]
1  
(1 )(1 ) 
  1
1 
t (1.30)
ct
cs
=

Zt
Zs
 1
1 
e
1
1 
R t
s
@
@Vu
f(cu;Vu;Zu;u)du

Vt
Vs
 1  
(1 )(1 )

t
s
  1
1 
(1.31)
Using dynamic programming to solve the utility maximization problem, I can state the
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation as follows
0 = sup
fct;Xtg
ff (ct; V (W;Z; ; t) ; ; Zt; t) dt+ Et [dV (W;Z; ; t)]g (1.32)
with W indicating the nancial wealth. The rst order condition with respect to
optimal consumption is given by
@
@ct
f (ct; V (W;Z; ; t) ; Zt; t) =
@
@W
V (W;Z; ; t) (1.33)
I make the following conjecture for the value function
V (W;Z; ; t) =
(Wt)
1 
1   Z
1 

t  t (Zt; t)
  (1 )(1 )
 (1.34)
Plugging the conjectured value function into the FOC yields
ct = Wt t (1.35)
Plugging back into the conjectured value function and solving for ct, allows us to rewrite
the expression for optimal consumption as
ct = [(1  )Vt]
1
(1 )  
1

t Z
  1

t (1.36)
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Combining this with the expression obtained from the martingale approach (equation
(1.30)) and solving for the value function leaves us with
Vt =
1
1   
  1 
 e
1 

R t
 1
@
@Vu
f(cu;Vu;Zu;u)duZ
1 

t  
  (1 )(1 )

t 
  1 

t (1.37)
@
@Vt
f (ct; Vt) is a function of only , and it is a Markov process,
@
@Vt
f (ct; Vt; Zt; t) =
1     

Ztc

t [(1  )Vt]
 
1    1  

t (1.38)
=
1     

 t  
1  

t
Solving for optimal consumption yields
ct = 
  1
 e
1

R t
 1
1  

 u  1  uduZ
1 

t  
  1  

t 
  1

t (1.39)
ct
cs
= e
1

R t
s
1  

 u  1  udu

Zt
Zs
 1 


 t
 s
  1  


t
s
  1

(1.40)
The dynamics of the utility function are given by
dVt
Vt
=
1  

@
@Vt
f (ct; Vt; Zt; t) dt+
1  
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By denition the drift term of the value function equals  f (ct; Vt; Zt; t) dt, which
boils down to a ODE determining the function  t () and at the same time veries my
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conjecture about the value function (given a solution for the stated ODE exists)
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The last step is equivalent to solving the HJB equation. I can use expression (1.39) to
get the dynamics of the optimal consumption process
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Setting equation (1.43) and using the market clearing condition in the consumption
goods market dYt = dct and solving for the SDF
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Plugging into equation (1.42) yields an ODE that determines  t ()
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which proves Proposition 1.1. Plugging back into equation (1.44), Proposition 1.2
follows from the denition of the SDF
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Finally, using equation (1.17) together with equation (1.50) the equity premium is given
by
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Proof of Lemma 1.1. Suppose
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For () ! 0 and (H   L) <1 the ODE (1.9) becomes
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with some constant C2. Note that for C2 = 0,  t
 
t = 

=  +C1. I show this using
LHopitals rule as follows
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And for C2 6= 0,  t
 
t = 

= 0, which is not an economically meaningful quantity.
Moreover, given the mean-reversion property of the process , I know that limt!1 t =
, and t is absorbed at  as soon as t reaches  (since 
() ! 0). At the point
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t = , the model coincides with a standard Lucas (1978) economy with constant time
preferences , for which the solution of the consumption-to-wealth ratio is well-known,
that is  = +C1. Note that for C2 = 0, the function  t (t) is continuous everywhere
(8t 2 (L; H)). Next, I solve equation (1.56) for @ t@t
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t)). Suppose next that  t
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for some bt 2  ; H. Then since @ t@t j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and will approach  + C1 as
t ! 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t) =  + C1). Hence, there exists a  t (t) which is continuous
and monotonically increasing in t;8t 2 (L; H).
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Chapter 2
Asset Pricing Implications of
Demographic Change
Abstract
An overlapping generations (OLG) model featuring demographic uncertainty (stochas-
tic changes in birth and death rates) is solved in general equilibrium. Given a moderate
level of relative risk aversion (RRA) and a low enough elasticity of intertemporal sub-
stitution (EIS), the interest rate is decreasing in the birth rate and increasing in the
death rate. If agents have recursive preferences, demographic uncertainty is priced in
nancial markets. The market price of risk and the equity premium are time varying
and under certain conditions they are higher during periods characterized by a high
birth rate (baby boom) and low mortality than in times of a low birth rate and a high
death rate. Demographic changes appear to explain substantial parts of the time vari-
ation in the real interest rate, the market price of risk and the equity premium. Due
to demographic uncertainty the conditional volatility of stock returns is stochastically
changing over time and the unconditional volatility of asset returns is substantially
larger than the unconditional variation in aggregate consumption growth.
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2.1 Introduction
In the developed world there is a substantial demographic transition in progress (large
increase in the retiree-to-worker ratio) caused by the post World War II baby boom in
conjunction with declining mortality rates. The demographic change is likely to have a
signicant impact on the global economy, including GDP growth prospects, government
policies, the solvency of social security systems, and nancial markets.
I explore how optimal consumption decisions and asset prices are a¤ected by demo-
graphic transitions and by uncertainty about the timing of future demographic changes.
The focus lies on the time variation in the rst two moments of nancial asset returns.
I solve in general equilibrium an analytically tractable OLG model featuring sto-
chastically changing birth and mortality rates. In contrast to the literature, I model
births and deaths as Poisson events and in my model stochastic changes in birth and
death rates have no e¤ect on the instantaneous variation in the population size, labor
supply and aggregate production output. Instead, ignoring total factor productivity
(TFP) shocks for now, population and production output growth are locally deter-
ministic processes (zero quadratic variation). More important, a shock to the birth or
the death rate implies a redistribution of aggregate consumption within the population
(across cohorts). The consumption distribution in the population is essential because
pricing depends solely on consumption growth of existing agents in an OLG model.1
But, because changes in the population size are perfectly predictable over a small in-
stant in time, shifts in the consumption distribution are also perfectly forecast over a
short horizon. Demographic shocks do not add any instantaneous risk, but only long
run risk - shocks to the expected growth rate in consumption of existing agents - to the
economy.
A smooth growth in the population size, as found in the model, is close to what we
observe in the real world. In reality, birth and death rates are subject to unpredictable
changes, but in the short run the population grows gradually and growth is highly
predictable.
In my theoretical model the interest rate is decreasing in the birth rate and increas-
1Existing agents are agents which were already alive at time t and survive over the next dt time
period.
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ing in the death rate, given a moderate level of RRA and a small enough EIS. The key
driving forces for the result are the following. A high birth rate implies an expectation
for large new born cohorts to enter the economy in future. A large new born cohort
claims a big share of aggregate consumption and growth in consumption of existing
agents is expected to be moderate. A small growth in consumption of existing agents
corresponds to a low interest rate in equilibrium. It is important to understand that
the main driving force is not the change in expected aggregate consumption growth
but the shift in the distribution of aggregate consumption within the population (from
existing agents to the new born cohort), which results in a drop in the existing agents
expected consumption growth rate and a decline in the interest rate.
In contrast, a high death rate implies a short life expectancy, a high discount of
future utility and few savings. Accordingly, the interest rate is high. In addition,
aggregate consumption has to be split among only few survivors, if the death rate is
high, and the consumption growth of existing agents is large. In equilibrium, this also
corresponds to a high interest rate.
Because birth and death rates a¤ect the interest rate through di¤erent channels,
they have to be modelled separately and not as one general state variable that deter-
mines total population growth or the average age of the population.
The stock price volatility exceeds the variation in aggregate consumption growth
because of demographic uncertainty. Stock prices respond to demographic changes
through di¤erent channels. First, expected growth in labor supply, production output
and dividends are sensitive to birth and death rate changes (Barsky and De Long
(1993)). Second and more important, demographic changes have a similar e¤ect on the
discount rate of stocks as on the real interest rate. Because stock prices incorporate
information about changes in future dividend growth and the discount rate, there is an
instantaneous volatility in stock prices due to demographic uncertainty. In my model,
uncertainty in the distribution of consumption within the population - which is the
responsible channel for changes in the discount rate - is the major source for volatility
in nancial markets rather than stochastic changes in the expected production growth
rate.
If agents maximize utility functions of the power utility family, then an immediate
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implication of a locally deterministic consumption process (no instantaneous shocks
to consumption growth) is that the stochastic discount factor (SDF) has no quadratic
variation. As demographic uncertainty adds (only) long run risk to the economy, it has
an impact on the interest rate and the stock price volatility but the equity premium is
not a¤ected.
In the case of recursive utility, pricing depends on the covariation of asset returns
and instantaneous and future consumption growth (Bansal and Yaron (2004)). The
variation in the current consumption-to-wealth ratio is a su¢ cient statistic for the vari-
ation in future consumption growth. As the consumption-to-wealth ratio is a function
of the interest rate and time discounting of future utility, it instantaneously responds
to changes in birth and death rates. Accordingly, demographic uncertainty induces a
covariation between stock returns and the consumption-to-wealth ratio, and is priced
in nancial markets. The equity premium is time varying and I provide conditions that
su¢ ce for it to be positive and increasing in the birth rate and decreasing in the death
rate.
In contrast to other long run risk models, in my analysis shocks to future consump-
tion growth of existing agents are not triggered by shocks to expected production (or
aggregate consumption) growth but by shocks to the allocation of aggregate consump-
tion to the new born generation versus existing agents. In other words, the redistribu-
tion risk of the aggregate endowment between the new born cohort and existing agents
is the main channel of pricing rather than long run risk in production output. This also
implies that pricing of demographic uncertainty works mostly through the channel of
shocks to the discount rate rather than stochastic changes in future expected dividend
growth.
My model suggest that demographic changes explain substantial parts of the time
variation in the interest rate, the market price of risk and the equity premium. A
large body of empirical literature explores stock return predictability. Returns are
found to be more predictable at low frequencies than over the short run, and most of
the predictable variation is due to variation in discount rates rather than changes in
expected dividend growth (e.g. Keim and Stambaugh (1986), Fama and French (1988a,
1988b), Ammer and Campbell (1993), Goetzman and Jorion (1993), and Cochrane
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(2011) as a summary). Moreover, Ferson and Harvey (1991) suggest that time variation
in the market price of risk rather than time variation in the exposure of a stock to
systemic risk is the driving force causing a time variation in discount rates. According
to my qualitative and quantitative results, these facts may be explained (partly) by
demographic changes.
My qualitative and quantitative results require preferences with a low EIS, which is
consistent with a large body of empirical literature.2 Hall (1988), Campbell andMankiw
(1989), Yogo (2004), and Pakos (2007) use aggregate consumption and nancial data
to estimate the EIS from the Euler equation in a representative agent model. They get
estimates close to zero. Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) disentangles asset holders from non-
asset holders and estimates an EIS coe¢ cient of 0.3 for stockholders. Her estimates
are noisy and not signicantly di¤erent from zero. Hasanov (2007) and Bonaparte
(2008) use household-specic consumption and portfolio choice data to take account
for heterogeneity. They get an EIS of about 0.25, but the noise of the estimates is not
negligible and much lower levels of the EIS are possible.
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Figure 2.1: Left panel: Real interest rate in USA (red line), and implied interest rate
from regression results and observed birth and death rates (black line). Right panel: 10
year averages of US stock market excess returns (red line), and implied equity premium
from regression results and observed birth and death rates (black line).
According to the model changes in birth and death rates matter for asset pricing
behind the e¤ects on the interest rate. The interest rate is not a "su¢ cient statistic"
2Mostly I also require RRA > 1 but not too large, which is an unproblematic assumption.
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that summarizes asset pricing implications of demographic changes. I illustrate this
result empirically in gure 2.1 (details are in the appendix). Consistent with my qual-
itative results, a linear regression analysis suggests that the real interest rate depends
negatively on the birth rate and positively on the death rate. Stock market excess
returns are positively related to the birth rate and negatively related to the mortality
rate. The picture suggests a strong relation between the demographic and nancial
quantities. Before the mid 1970s the relation appears stronger than in recent years.
A weaker link in recent times might be explained by the increasing globalization in
nancial markets (Geanakoplos et al. (2004)).
Most related literature asks how retirement of the baby boomers a¤ects asset prices.
The focus lies on models with perfectly predictable baby boom and bust "cycles". In
the long run there is a time variation in asset returns as baby boomers proceed through
the life-cycle and the "average savings behavior" across the population slowly and
predictably changes.
Empirical studies suggest that in the long run asset prices, price/dividend ratios, the
interest rate and equity premia are linked to various demographic quantities (Mankiw
and Weil (1989), Bakshi and Chen (1994), Erb, Harvey and Viskanta (1997), Porterba
(2001), Geanakoplos et al. (2004), Goyal (2004), Ang and Maddaloni (2005), Huynh et
al. (2006), Tamoni et al. (2007), Acemoglu and Johnson (2007), Hanewald (2010) and
Takats (2010)). Calibrations by Brooks (2000, 2004) and Geanakoplos et al. (2004)
suggest that predictable baby booms and busts cause the interest rate and equity prices
to vary over time as the baby boomers live through the life-cycle. Most of the results
are driven by the assumption that consumption-to-wealth ratios di¤er across cohorts
because agents face a xed lifetime horizon. Abel (2003) shows in an analytically
tractable model that the price of a unit of capital is increasing in the birth rate and
follows a mean reverting process. Unfortunately, the risk free rate and the equity
premium cannot be disentangled in his model. Auerbach and Kotliko¤(1987), Kotliko¤,
Smetters andWalliser (2001), Fehr et al. (2003), and Fehr, Jokisch and Kotliko¤(2004a,
2004b) use dynamic general equilibrium simulation models to explorer the possible
impact of deterministic trends in birth and death rates on long run economic and scal
conditions.
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I take a di¤erent approach and ask how the uncertainty about future demographic
shocks a¤ect asset pricing. Recursive preferences are crucial for demographic uncer-
tainty to be priced in nancial markets and present a novel channel that introduces a
time variation in the interest rate and the equity premium. Another key contribution
is the tractability of the model which allows me to derive qualitative results about
the implications of demographic changes on the level of and the time variation in the
interest rate and the equity premium.3 I am able to distinguish various (o¤setting)
channels through which asset returns are a¤ected by birth and death rates, and for
di¤erent preference parameter regions I can prove which channel is dominant. My
calibration exercise replicates part of the (in US data) observed time variation in the
interest rate and stock market excess returns, and the results are consistent with my
empirical ndings displayed in gure 2.1.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the model. In the
following I present my results in three steps. First, I discuss the simplest version of the
model with constant birth and death rates and use comparative statics analysis to gain
a rst intuition about the dynamics in my model. Second, I proof that the intuition
from the constant case carries over to a dynamic two state Markov switching model and
derive further qualitative results. Third, I generalize the model to include TFP shocks
and Brownian uncertainty and numerically illustrate the possible quantitative impact
of my analytical results. Finally, I discuss limitations and extensions of my model and
conclude.
2.2 The Economy
2.2.1 Demographics and Uncertainty
I consider an OLG model in continuous time that generalizes the Blanchard (1985)
model. I disentangle birth and death rates and let them change stochastically over
time.
3A key di¤erence in my model to the previous literature is the assumption of age-independent
mortality. This is essential to keep the model analytical tractable and has the advantage to isolate my
results from the ndings in previous literature. The results in Brooks (2000, 2004) and Geanakoplos et
al. (2004) are mainly driven by the fact that an agents "life expectancy" is decreasing in age. Thus,
my results should be viewed as a complement to previous ndings rather than as a substitute.
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The economy is populated with a continuum of agents of measure Nt. The birth
rate is denoted by nt and the new born cohort at time t is of the size ntNtdt.4 Each
agent faces an instantaneous probability of death tdt. Conditional on being alive at
time t1, an agents survival probability until time t2 > t1 is e
  R t2t1 vdv. To keep the
model tractable, I do not allow for heterogeneity in the arrival rate of death. Imposing
mortality rates to be age-independent is restrictive and counterfactual, but it is a
small price to pay when one is interested in the common time variation in death rates.
According to the much celebrated Lee and Carter (1992) approach, time variation in
(age specic) death rates is mostly due to one (across cohorts) common stochastic time
component.5 The main general equilibrium implication of age-independent mortality
is that the marginal propensity to consume is independent of age. Arguably the most
interesting life-cycle e¤ects on (age-dependent) consumption and savings behavior do
not come from the time variation in the marginal propensity to consume but from the
hump-shaped pattern of earnings over the life-cycle, and my model accounts for this
feature.
Timing of death is uncertain to the individual, but on the aggregate the size of a
cohort declines non-stochastically over the next instant of time because the economy
is populated by a continuum rather than a nite number of agents. The size of cohort
s (agents born at time s) shrinks to nsNse 
R t
s vdvds until time t > s. The population
size is Nt =
R t
 1 nuNue
  R tu vdvdu = NseR ts nv vdv.6 dNtNt = (nt   t) dt is a term in
only dt, and population size Nt follows a locally deterministic process (zero quadratic
variation).
In the USA the crude birth rate (denoted by nt in the model) declined from about
3% in 1910 to 1.5% in 2006. Annual changes are subject to a standard deviation of 3.8%
(unconditionally), and shocks appear to be persistent (the current birth rate level is a
good predictor of next years level). In addition to "short term" uncertainty (annual
volatility), there are major "long term" transitions. Statistics from other developed
4The instantaneous probability of an existing agent to give birth to a new agent at time t is ntdt.
5The Lee and Carter (1992) model is widely used in demographic research and has also gained
much attention in other elds of research. In asset pricing and household nance literature many
papers employ it (Cox et al., 2006; Chen and Cox, 2009; Cocco and Gomes, 2009; DeNardi et al.,
2009; Maurer, 2011; Hanewald and Post, 2010).
6I need the technical assumption that the economy already exists for an innite amount of time.
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Figure 2.2: Top-left panel: Crude birth rate (in %) in the USA from 1910 until 2006.
Source: Department of Health and Human Services, National Center for Health Sta-
tistics, USA; and The Human Mortality Database, University of California, Berkeley
and Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research. Top-right panel: Lee and Carter
(1992) model output (in %) for US mortality data from 1900 to 2006 provided by
National Center for Health Statistics. Estimation of common stochastic time compo-
nent across generations. Bottom-left panel: Percentage changes in crude birth rate.
Bottom-right panel: Percentage changes in common stochastic time component of Lee
and Carter (1992) model estimation.
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countries reveal similar patterns. Mankiw and Weil (1988) also illustrate the uncer-
tainty in the birth rate process and the di¢ culty the USA census bureau has to forecast
the future evolution of the birth rate (gure 2 in their paper).
The US central death rate over all ages (denoted by t in the model) is mostly
decreasing and changes are subject to a yearly unconditional standard deviation of
5.1%. Shocks to the death rate are persistent (cf. Lee and carter (1992)). US population
statistics are representative for the developed world with the exception that many
European countries su¤ered more from the two world wars than the USA.
2.2.2 Production
The supply side in the consumption goods market is constituted by a representative
rm which is endowed with capital stock Kt and has access to a technology described
by a Cobb-Douglas production function Yt = At (Gt)
a (Kt)
1 a. At denotes TFP, Gt
the employed amount of labor, and Yt determines the quantity of consumption goods
produced by the rm. Except for the last section, I assume At to grow at an exogenously
given (deterministic) rate dAt
At
= (A)dt, and there are no stochastic TFP shocks for
illustrative purposes. The rm is assumed to not face any economic decision, and
I presume for the capital stock Kt a deterministic growth path according to dKtKt =
(K)dt.7
I assume full employment in the economy. An agent born at time s supplies G (s; t)
labor e¢ ciency units at time t. To match the hump-shaped prole of life-cycle earn-
ings in Hubbard et al. (1993), I let G (s; t) =
P2
i=1Bie
 i
R t
s nudu with the techni-
cal assumption of i >  1.8 G (s; t) generates the desired hump-shape pattern if
B1 > jB2j > B2 and 1 < 2. For some derivations I use a simpler specication
with B2 = 0 (or 1 = 2). Aggregation yields the total amount of labor e¢ ciency
units employed by the rm, Gt =
R t
 1G (s; t)nsNse
  R ts ududs = NtP2i=1 Bi1+i . Gt is
7No economic decision in the sense that the rm does not invest, employs all supplied labor at a
competitive wage equal to the marginal productivity of labor, and pays out all remaining earnings as
dividends. Capital growth is understood as a byproduct of production (for free) as is technological
progress. I may set (K) = 0 without altering any of my results.
8i >  1 must hold in order to ensure aggregate supply of labor to stay nite, jGtj =R t 1G (s; t)nsNse  R ts ududs < 1. See also Garleanu and Panageas (2010) for a similar speci-
cation.
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Labor E¢ ciency Units over the Life-cycle, G (s; t)
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Figure 2.3: Double exponential function G (s; t) =
P2
i=1Bie
 i
R t
s nudu with the parame-
terisation (B1; B2; 1; 2) = (31:25; 30; 2:65; 2:95) (left panel), and (B1; B2; 1; 2) =
(1:75; 0; 1:3; 0) (right panel).
locally deterministic, dGt
Gt
= (nt   t) dt, but has long run risk inherent. The sup-
ply of consumption goods follows a locally deterministic process with the growth rate
dYt
Yt
= 
(Y )
t dt =

(A) + (1  a)(K) + a (nt   t)

dt.
Labor is paid according to its marginal productivity, yt = a YtGt . An agent of cohort
s earns in exchange for his labor yst = aYt
G(s;t)
Gt
. The rm does not invest and pays the
remaining fraction of output, (1  a)Yt as dividends Dt to the shareholders of the rm.
2.2.3 Financial Markets: Equity, Bond, and Insurance
Financial markets are assumed to be dynamically complete.9  denotes the (unique)
SDF in the economy and is determined in equilibrium. Agents are born without any
nancial wealth but are endowed with labor. Financial wealth at time t of an agent
of cohort s is denoted by W st , and cW st describes total wealth (nancial and human
wealth). An agent of cohort s consume cst and allocates the remaining part of his
nancial wealth to equities and bonds. Equities are claims on the stream of dividends
Dt paid out by the representative rm. The price of an equity is denoted by Pt. The
supply of equities is normalized to one. Xst denotes the number of equities purchased
9This assumption is satised given equity, bond and annuity contracts as long as there is only one
source of uncertainty, i.e. either the birth rate or the death rate is stochastic. In the general case
where both rates are characterised as random processes I implicitly suppose the existence of further
contracts that dynamically complete nancial markets. My focus lies on equity, bond and annuity
markets only.
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by an agent of cohort s.10 Bonds are instantaneously risk free and pay interest rt.
Bonds are in zero supply. The part of an agents nancial wealth that is not used to
buy stocks, (W st  Xst Pt) is invested in bonds.
Agents have access to annuity contracts supplied by a large, competitive insurance
company as in Blanchard (1985). A claim (long position) on an insurance contract pays
o¤as follows: if the agent survives the next time period dt he receives the premium tdt
from the insurer, and if he dies he pays 1. Agents have an incentive to fully annuitize
because their objective functions are strictly increasing in consumption and they do
not draw utility from bequest. The insurer breaks even almost surely (earnings and
liabilities coincide).
2.2.4 AgentsObjective Functions and Budget Constraints
An agents nancial wealth W st evolves according to the dynamics
dW st = W
s
t tdt| {z }
insurance premium
+ W st rtdt| {z }
risk free return
+Xst (dPt +Dtdt  Ptrtdt)| {z }
stock market excess return
+ ystdt|{z}
labor income
  cstdt|{z}
consumption
(2.1)
with the initial condition W ss = 0. As in Blanchard (1985) I impose the transversality
condition (given the agent is still alive at time u) limu!1 e 
R u
s vdv u
s
W su = 0. This
ensures that agents do not borrow without limit, accumulate an innite amount of
debt, and protect themselves by buying annuity contracts.
The set of feasible cash ows is (M + ys +W ss ) 
n
xs : F
()
s (xs   ys) W ss 2M
o
.
F
()
s is a discount function such that F
()
s (xt) = e
  R ts uduxt, andM denotes the set of all
marketable cash ows.11 The set of admissible cash ows is =  (M + ys +W ss )\L+.
L+ includes all non-negative processes adapted to FP (ltration generated by asset
prices). An agents consumption process cs has to be an element of the set of admissible
cash ows =.
Agents are assumed to feature homogeneous preferences and the only heterogeneity
in the model is timing of death and wealth between agents across cohorts (but not within
10To do not permit arbitrage opportunities I restrict trading activities according to the standard
technical assumption X
s
t Pt
W st
2 L2, where L2 
n
x 2 L j R T
0
x2tdt <1 a:s:
o
and L is the set of
processes adapted to the ltration FP generated by asset prices, FPt   fPs : s  tg
11A cash ow is marketable if it is nanced by a trading strategy Xs 2 L2.
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the same cohort). Preferences are described by a stochastic di¤erential utility function
of the Kreps and Porteus (1978) type introduced by Du¢ e and Epstein (1992a, 1992b).
Following Du¢ e and Epstein (1992a) and adding the feature of lifetime uncertainty
(for the formal derivation see the appendix), the utility specication is
V st = Et
Z 1
t
f (csu; V
s
u ) du

(2.2)
with the aggregator function f (:) given by
f (csu; V
s
u ) =
 (csu)
  

 + 
1 u

[(1  )V su ]

1 
 [(1  )V su ]

1  1
(2.3)
The term 1
1  equals the IES,  controls risk aversion, and  species time discounting.
The term 
1 u discounts future utility due to risk aversion towards uncertainty
about the timing of death. Intuitively, the probability of dying early creates an in-
centive to save less than an innitely-lived agent (or an agent with a xed lifetime)
because there is no bequest motive. In contrast, the possibility of surviving longer than
life expectancy (state of high marginal utility) creates an incentive for precautionary
savings. The former intuition corresponds to a positive discount of utility from future
consumption, while the latter one implies that the agent cares relatively more about
future consumption. It depends on the preference parameters whether the rst or the
second e¤ect dominates and the discount is positive or negative. Under time additive
utility only the rst e¤ect matters while the second e¤ect is irrelevant because agents
are risk neutral towards uncertainty about the timing of death.12
An agents objective is to maximize the value function subject to the dynamic or
equivalently the static budget constraint,
sup
fcs;Xsg2(=L2)

V ss (c
s) = Es
Z 1
s
f (csu; V
s
u ) du

; s:t: ds; dns (P1)
12For a related discussion on risk aversion towards uncertainty about the timing of an agents death
I refer to Bommier (2003).
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2.3 The Equilibrium
2.3.1 Denition of Equilibrium
An equilibrium is dened by a set of adapted processes fc;X; g such that
(i) for every agent utility is maximized subject to the dynamic budget constraint,
problem (P1) is solved 8s,
(ii) consumption markets clear, Yt = Ct =
R t
 1 c
s
tnsNse
  R ts ududs, and
(iii) nancial markets clear,
R t
 1X
s
t nsNse
  R ts ududs = 1 and .R t
 1 (W
s
t  Xst Pt)nsNse 
R t
s ududs = 0.
2.3.2 General Remarks about the Equilibrium Analysis
The optimal consumption-to-wealth ratio is given by the function  t (; n) =
cstcW st , which
is constant across cohorts. The functions F y;t;(i) (; n; t), 8i 2 f1; 2g dene the present
value of labor income of a new born agent, cW tt = YtNt P2i=1 F y;t;(i) (; n; t). These quanti-
ties are essential to determine the aggregate consumption share of the new born cohort,
nt
P2
i=1 F
y;t;(i) t =
cttntNt
Ct
. In equilibrium, the interest rate depends crucially on c
t
tntNt
Ct
.
Moreover, the variation in  t (; n) is a su¢ cient statistic for the variation in future
consumption growth, which is needed for pricing risky assets.
To understand what a¤ects the SDF , I provide a short sketch of its derivation.
I employ the market clearing condition in the consumption goods market, which must
hold almost surely at all times and implies dYt = dCt. Growth in aggregate consumption
depends on three terms: aggregation of optimal consumption growth of individuals,
dying agents who abruptly stop their stream of consumption, and consumption of the
new born cohort,
dCt =
Z t
 1
dcst
cst
cstnsNse
  R ts ududs  tCtdt+ cttntNtdt (2.4)
Applying Itôs lemma to the rst order condition of the optimal consumption choice
problem (P1) implies that the dynamics of an individuals optimal consumption are
independent of his cohort but dependent on birth and death rates and the dynamics
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of the SDF, dc
s
t
cst
= 

dt
t
; nt; t; dnt; dt

.13 Plugging into (2.4), I can solve for the
dynamics of the SDF,
dt
t
=  1
0@dYt
Yt
+ tdt  c
t
tntNt
Yt
dt| {z }; nt; t; dnt; dt
1A
consumption growth of existing agents
(2.5)
According to (2.5) the dynamics of the SDF are a function of the consumption growth of
existing agents, and it is the Euler equation of existing agents that matters for pricing.
Therefore, because shocks to birth and death rates cause a redistribution of aggregate
consumption within the population and particularly the distribution between the new
born cohort and existing agents (which a¤ects the consumption growth rate of existing
agents), demographic shocks are crucial for pricing. It is important to understand that
uncertainty in the distribution of consumption is a pricing channel which is independent
of the pricing implications of (demographic) shocks to the expected production output
growth rate. In the following I show that the pricing implications of uncertainty in the
distribution of consumption within the population dominate the pricing implications
of shocks to expected production output growth.
Lemma 2.1 In equilibrium the stock price Pt is given by
Pt =
Yt
 t (; n)| {z }
aggregated total wealth
  Yt
2X
i=1
F y;t;(i) (; n; t)
1 + i| {z }
aggregated present value of labor income
(2.6)
Proof. See appendix.
The stock price is determined in nancial market clearing and is equal to aggregated
nancial wealth (total wealth minus present value of labor income).
Lemma 2.2 The expected excess return of an asset paying the stream of dividends Dt
is
Et

dPt +Dtdt
Pt

  rtdt =  dPt
Pt
dt
t
(2.7)
13Function 

dt
t
; nt; t; dnt; dt

represents the left hand side of equation (2.102) combined with
(2.86).
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Proof. See appendix.
An asset is compensated with a positive (negative) risk premium if its instantaneous
returns are negatively (positively) correlated with the marginal utility process.
2.3.3 Constant Birth and Mortality Rates
As a benchmark, I consider the case of no demographic changes. I explore the di¤erences
in the dependence of the interest rate on birth and death rates. Comparative statics
help to get an intuition of how demographic changes a¤ect the economy.
Proposition 2.1 Consider an economy as described. Suppose that the birth rate and
the mortality rate are constant over time and the two assumptions (i) (Y ) (1 + i)n <
r and (ii) 
1 + > r hold. There exists an equilibrium with a constant interest rate
r which is a root to the equation
r = |{z}
time
discounting
+ (1  )| {z }
= 1
EIS

(Y ) +   nNtc
t
t (r)
Ct

| {z }
consumption growth
of existing agents
  |{z}
annuity
payo¤
+

1  | {z }
time discounting due
to uncertain lifetime
(2.8)
with ctt (r) specied in the appendix. The SDF is non-stochastic and the return on
equities is constant and equal to the risk free interest rate r.
Proof. See appendix.
Conditions (i) and (ii) are required to ensure total wealth to stay nite and the
consumption-to-wealth ratio to be non-negative. The equity premium and the volatility
of asset prices are zero because there is no uncertainty on the aggregate. The focus lies
on the interest rate.
The interest rate in an equivalent economy populated by an innitely-lived repre-
sentative agent is r =  + (1  )(Y ) with (Y ) = (A) + (1  a)(K). It di¤ers from
the rate in the OLG economy by the term
r   r = (1  )

  nNtc
t
t (r)
Ct

| {z }
(I)
+ (1  ) a (n  )| {z }
(II)
  |{z}
(III)
+

1  | {z }
(IV )
(2.9)
The di¤erence arises for four reasons.
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(I) Following equation (2.5), r 6= r holds because aggregate consumption growth
(consumption of the innitely-lived agent) di¤ers from consumption growth of existing
agents in the OLG economy. Deaths of existing agents have a positive e¤ect on con-
sumption growth of surviving agents because survivors have to share total production
output with less peers. Births of new agents mean a decline in the older cohortsshare of
aggregate consumption and their consumption growth because new agents claim a frac-
tion of aggregate consumption. The death rate increases and the birth rate decreases
the interest rate compared to the rate found in the innitely-lived agent economy.
(II) In an OLG economy the growth rate of total output depends on population
growth, (nt   t) dt. A high birth rate causes total output to grow fast which positively
a¤ects the interest rate. A high death rate results the opposite.
(III) The insurance premium has the same impact on an agents wealth dynamics
(equation (2.1)) and optimal consumption path as the risk free interest rate. As the
insurance premium works as a substitute to the interest rate, in equilibrium the interest
rate is not required to be as high as in a world without insurance payments. Accordingly,
the interest rate in an OLG economy is lower than the rate in an innitely-lived agent
economy due to annuity contracts.
(IV ) In an OLG economy an agent faces risk aversion towards uncertainty about
the length of his life. There is a trade o¤ between how much savings an agent requires
for consumption until death and how much he is willing to risk when facing the proba-
bility of an early death. The rst reason tells that an agent saves more under lifetime
uncertainty than if he knew the exact time of death because there is a chance that
he will live an unexpectedly long life and thus, his marginal utility is high in future
(precautionary savings). The latter reason says that an agent consumes bigger parts
of his wealth early in time under lifetime uncertainty because he faces a probability
that he will not be alive to consume his savings in future and draw utility from it.
In an OLG economy agents save more (less) and the interest rate is smaller (larger)
than in an innitely-lived agent economy, if the discount of future utility due to agents
risk aversion towards uncertainty about the timing of death is negative (positive) and

1  < (>) 0 holds (cf. discussion on time discounting due to lifetime uncertainty in
section 2.4).
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Lemma 2.3 Suppose (i)  > 1, (ii) B1+B2B1
1+1
+
B2
1+2
> 1  1+ 1 aa 
1 

n
, and the technical condi-
tions in the appendix hold. There exists a cut-o¤ value EIS
(r)
such that the condition
EIS < EIS
(r)
su¢ ces for the interest rate in an OLG economy to be smaller than
the rate in an equivalent economy populated by an innitely-lived representative agent
(r < r).
Proof. See appendix.14
Condition (ii) requires life-cycle earnings to be su¢ ciently decreasing in age. For
B2 = 0, the condition is 1 >  1+
1 a
a

1 

n
. Agents have to save for retirement if life-cycle
earnings are decreasing in age, and a big supply in savings implies a low interest rate
(Blanchard, 1985).
Under a strong motive for consumption smoothing (small , EIS), an agent seeks to
atten his consumption path over the life-cycle, which corresponds to a large consump-
tion-to-wealth ratio and few savings (few nancial wealth).15 Given a large consumption-
to-wealth ratio, the new born cohort claims a big fraction of aggregated consumption
and nNtc
t
t
Ct
is large enough to ensure expression (2.9) to be negative and r < r to hold.
To get an intuition how a change in the birth rate a¤ects the interest rate I take
the rst derivative of r with respect to n,
@r
@n
= (1  )
faster growth
in total outputz}|{
a  
increase in new
born generationz}|{
Ntc
t
t
Ct
+
decrease in consumption share
of individual new born agent
nNt
z }| {
@
@n

  c
t
t
Ct

1 + (1  )nNt @@r

ctt(r)
Ct
 (2.10)
with @
@n

  ctt
Ct

= 1
Nt
P2
i=1
 a+1+i
r (Y )+(1+i)nF
y;(i) (F y;(i) and  are specied in the appen-
dix).
To ensure that the denominator in equation (2.10) is positive, I let f (r) (x) =  +
(1  )
h
(Y ) +   nNtctt(x)
Ct
i
  1  
1   x and suppose f (r) (x) to be decreasing at x = r.
14The conditions are su¢ cient but not necessary. The technical conditions in the appendix are easy
to satisfy and I do not worry about them. The same is true for all Lemmas that follow.
15I suppose that an agents consumption grows with age ( c
s
t
css
> 1, for 8 s < t). This is a natural
assumption and is true for a large enough growth in GDP. c
s
t
css
> 1 implies @@( )

cst
css

< 0, 8 s < t.
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The requirement on the slope of f (r) (:) is not a strong assumption. For instance, under
the conditions in Lemma 2.3 there exists r 2  (Y ); r that satises the requirement.
There are three o¤setting e¤ects of the birth rate on the interest rate. First, the
workforce and production output grow faster as the birth rate increases, which has a
positive impact on the consumption growth of existing agents (r %).
Second, holding ctt constant, an increase in the size of the new born generation
causes the new born cohorts claim on aggregate consumption to rise. The interest rate
is negatively a¤ected by an increase in the aggregate consumption share of the new
born cohort as it slows down consumption growth of existing agents (r &).
Third, labor income is declining in the birth rate.16 Intuitively, a boost in the
workforce causes the labor market to become more competitive and wages to drop. A
new born agents total wealth is equal to the present value of his life-cycle earnings,
which is sensitive to changes in labor income. In contrast, total wealth of an old agent
is less prone to labor income shocks because a large fraction of his endowment consists
of nancial wealth. A negative shock to labor income implies a (relatively) stronger
decline in total wealth of a new born agent than in total wealth of an old agent. Since
the consumption-to-wealth ratio remains unchanged, the aggregate consumption share
of a new born agent declines, and the consumption growth of existing agents increases
as the birth rate rises (r %).
Lemma 2.4 Suppose  > 1 and the technical conditions in the appendix hold. There
exists a cut-o¤ value EIS
(n)
such that the condition EIS < EIS
(n)
su¢ ces for @r
@n
< 0.
Proof. See appendix.
If I decrease the EIS, agents save less nancial wealth. An old agents total wealth
becomes more sensitive to labor income shocks, and the relative di¤erence in a drop
of total wealth of old versus young agents due to an increase in the birth rate (and a
decline in labor income) gets smaller. Accordingly the magnitude of @
@n

  ctt
Ct

shrinks.
A strong motive for consumption smoothing implies a large consumption-to-wealth
ratio and ctt (much consumption at birth). A large c
t
t ensures that (on the margin)
16I assume that 1 + 1 > a, so that the positive e¤ect of an increase in output and aggregate
labor income (due to an increase in n) is dominated by the negative e¤ect of a decrease in marginal
productivity of labor and productivity of agents. This is satised for a decreasing life-cycle earnings
prole. For now I ignore feedback e¤ects through the interest rate.
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the additional new born agent consumes more than what he "produces" (a Yt
Nt
  ctt =h
a  Ntctt
Ct
i
Yt
Nt
< 0).
As a result, if the EIS is small enough, there is one key channel through which
a change in the birth rate a¤ects the interest rate. A rise in the birth rate causes
more new born agents to enter the economy and to claim a bigger fraction of aggregate
consumption. Accordingly, consumption growth of existing agents slows down and the
interest rate declines.
Taking the rst derivative of r with respect to  yields,
@r
@
=
(1  ) [
slower growth
in outputz}|{ a +
surviving agents share
aggregate consump-
tion with less peersz}|{
1  
change in con-
sumption share of
new born cohortz }| {
nNt
@
@

ctt
Ct

] 
higher pay-
ments from
annuitiesz}|{
1 +
time discounting
due to lifetime
uncertaintyz }| {

1  
1 + (1  )nNt @@r

ctt(r)
Ct

(2.11)
with @
@

ctt
Ct

=   1
Nt
P2
i=1
a
r (Y )+(1+i)nF
y;(i) + 1
Nt

1 

1 
P2
i=1 F
y;(i).
The expression (1  ) ( a+ 1)   1 + 
1  summarizes the following four e¤ects.
An increase in mortality (i) decreases the workforce and production output (r &),
(ii) increases the consumption share and growth in consumption of survivors (r %),
(iii) implies a high insurance premium (r &), and (iv) increases the magnitude of
time discounting of future utility due to risk aversion towards lifetime uncertainty (if

1  > (<) 0, then r % (&)).
Keeping the interest rate constant, the consumption share of the new born cohort
changes with uctuations in the death rate for two reasons. First, an increase in
the death rate causes production output and the present value of labor income to
decline. Following the argument in the discussion of a change in the birth rate, the
new born cohorts aggregate consumption share decreases because of the negative labor
income shock (term  P2i=1 anr (Y )+(1+i)nF y;(i) , r %). Second, as mortality increases
agents discount future utility more positively (negatively) and increase (decrease) their
consumption-to-wealth ratio, if 
1  > (<) 0. Accordingly, the consumption level at
birth and the aggregate consumption share of the new born cohort increase (decline)
(term n 
1 

1 
P2
i=1 F
y;(i), r & (%)).
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Lemma 2.5 Suppose  > 1 and the technical conditions in the appendix hold. There
exists a cut-o¤ value EIS
()
such that the condition EIS < EIS
()
su¢ ces for @r
@
> 0.
Proof. See appendix.
The term (1  ) ( a+ 1)  1 is positive if the EIS is small enough.
As I shrink the EIS, the aggregate consumption share of the new born cohort
becomes less sensitive to changes in mortality. The intuition is similar to the discussion
on changes in the birth rate.
For  > 1 and EIS < 1, agents (positively) discount future utility because of risk
aversion towards lifetime uncertainty. The discount and the (positive) e¤ect on the
interest rate become large if the EIS is small.
As a result, for a small enough EIS, I end up with the following key driving forces
that causes the interest rate to be increasing in mortality. As the death rate increases,
agents face a higher probability of dying early and discount future utility stronger. As
a consequence they consume more of their wealth early in life and save less nancial
wealth, which causes the interest rate to increase in equilibrium. In addition, aggre-
gate consumption has to be split among less survivors and the consumption growth of
existing agents and the interest rate increase.
For the remaining discussion I assume @r
@n
< 0 and @r
@
> 0.
From Lemma 2.1 and 2.2 it is straightforward to derive the Gordon growth model
Pt =
Dt
r   (Y ) (2.12)
The stock price is increasing in the birth rate. As more agents enter the work-
force, growth in total output and future stock dividends increase and the discount rate
declines.17
@P
@n
=
increase in growth
of future dividendsz}|{
a  
decrease in
discount ratez}|{
@r
@n
r   (Y ) Pt (2.13)
17Equivalently, the stock price increases because the demand for stocks hikes driven (i) by an increase
in aggregate savings (boost in present value of aggregate labor income) and (ii) by a drop in interest
paid by the risk free asset, which makes stocks more attractive as an alternative investment to the
riskless bond market.
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The stock price is decreasing in the death rate. An increase in mortality causes
growth in output and future dividends to decline, and the discount rate to increase.
@P
@
=
decrease in growth
of future dividendsz}|{ a  
increase in
discount ratez}|{
@r
@
r   (Y ) Pt (2.14)
The consumption-to-wealth ratio,  depends crucially on agentspreferences. Time
discounting of future utility has a positive impact on  . Depending on the dominance
of either income or substitution e¤ect (EIS < 1 or EIS > 1), the rate of return on
wealth (from bonds and annuities)18 is positively or negatively related to  .
 =
=EISz }| {
1
1   [
time
discountingz}|{
 +
discounting due to
uncertain lifetimez }| {

1    
trade o¤ between income
and substitution e¤ectz }| {
( r|{z}
interest
rate
+ |{z}
annuity
payo¤
) ] (2.15)
The consumption-to-wealth ratio is decreasing in the birth rate if EIS < 1. As
the interest rate declines the agent experiences a negative income shock; savings grow
slower and the agent can a¤ord less consumption in future. If the agent cares enough
about consumption smoothing, he will save more and consume less today to compensate
for the negative shock to future endowment/ consumption (income e¤ect dominates
substitution e¤ect).
@ 
@n
=   
1  
@r
@n
(2.16)
The consumption-to-wealth ratio is increasing in the death rate if EIS < 1 and
 > 1. Agents discount utility from future consumption stronger due to an increase in
mortality ( 
1  > 0) and prefer to consume a larger part of their wealth early in life. In
addition, future consumption becomes cheaper as the interest rate and the insurance
premium increase and agents instantly consume part of the "newly gained income"
(income e¤ect).
@ 
@
=
1
1  


1     

@r
@
+ 1

(2.17)
18Or equivalently the inverse of the price of future consumption.
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2.3.4 Regime Shifts in the Birth Rate: Two State Markov
Switching Model
I keep mortality constant and let the birth rate randomly jump between two levels.
Random switches capture the long run prole of baby boom and bust transitions found
in US birth rate data. Once the birth rate process is stochastic, long run risk is
introduced in the economy and I can explore the impact of demographic uncertainty
on pricing stocks.
I let the birth rate process be dnt = s(n)dS
(n)
t , with s
(n) = nH   nL. S(n)t 2 f1; 0g
follows a two state, continuous time Markov switching process with transition probabil-
ity matrix between time t and t+ given by (S;n) () =
0@ 1  (n)H  (n)H 

(n)
L  1  
(n)
L 
1A.
The birth rate switches between the two values nt 2 fnL; nHg. Because the model has
only two states, key variables, which depend on the birth rate, switch between two
distinct values.
There are minor changes to the utility specication as described in the appendix.
Agentsobjectives stay the same.
Proposition 2.2 Suppose an economy as described. In general, there exists an equilib-
rium with a SDF  that follows a stochastic process driven by the same two state Markov
switching process S(n) as the birth rate. The equilibrium interest rate rt switches between
two distinct levels, rt 2
n
r
(n)
L ; r
(n)
H
o
dened by
r
(n)
j =  + (1  )
"

(Y;n)
j +   nj
2X
i=1
F
y;(i);(n)
j  
(n)
j
#
  + 
1   (2.18)
 (n)j
0@  (n)k
 
(n)
j
!  1  

  1
1A+ 1     
1   
(n)
j
0@  (n)k
 
(n)
j
!  1 

  1
1A
8 (j; k) 2 f(L;H) ; (H;L)g, with rt j [nt = nL] = r(n)L and rt j [nt = nH ] = r(n)H . The
market price of risk jumps between two distinct values, t 2
n

(n)
L ; 
(n)
H
o
given by

(n)
j =  
0@  (n)k
 
(n)
j
!  1  

  1
1A (2.19)
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8 (j; k) 2 f(L;H) ; (H;L)g, with t j [nt = nL] = (n)L and t j [nt = nH ] = (n)H .
Demographic uncertainty is priced in equilibrium and the equity premium is non-zero.
In the special case of power utility, the SDF follows a locally deterministic process and
the equity premium disappears. The functions F y;(1);(n)L , F
y;(2);(n)
L , F
y;(1);(n)
H , F
y;(2);(n)
H ,
 
(n)
L , and  
(n)
H are determined in a system of 6 non-linear equations provided in the
appendix.
Proof. See appendix.
To understand why the market price of risk is non-zero in the general case of recur-
sive utility and zero in the special case of CRRA preferences, it is best to look at the
optimal consumption path for an individual agent
cst
css|{z}
variation in current
consumption growth
= e
1
1 
R t
s
@
@V su
f(csu;V
s
u )+udu
0@ V st ( t; t)
V ss ( s; s)| {z }
1A
1  
(1 )(1 )
variation in future
consumption growth
0@ t
s|{z}
1A
  11 
variation in marginal
utility process
(2.20)
Suppose that the SDF had zero quadratic variation. Because the value function V s
features a discontinuity at the time of a regime shift, optimal consumption must jump
as a regime shift occurs. As each agent is a¤ected the same (dynamics of the value
function are independent of the cohort), the aggregate consumption process features
jumps. But, the aggregate supply of consumption goods has no instantaneous variation
and markets could not possibly clear (dYt 6= dCt). To resolve the problem it must be
that the SDF is driven by a jump process such that all discontinuities in V s are exactly
o¤set and optimal consumption of the individual follows a locally deterministic process
(cf. equation (2.119)).
The SDF is dened as a (deterministic) multiple of the marginal utility process
(Gateau derivative of the utility function), which depends on current and future con-
sumption. As current consumption follows a locally deterministic process it does not
introduce any stochastics in the marginal utility process and its dynamics are irrelevant
for the derivation of the equity premium. The variation in the consumption-to-wealth
ratio is a su¢ cient statistic of the variation in future consumption growth. As a result
the market price of risk is a non-linear function of the ratio  H
 L
.
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In the case of CRRA preferences optimal consumption does not depend on the
agents value function (cst = c
s
se
  1

(t s)

t
s
  1

), and the consumption path of an
individual agent is (locally) deterministic. The SDF must not be stochastic to ensure
market clearing. The market price of risk is zero and pricing of risky assets is not
a¤ected by stochastic changes in the birth rate.19
Lemma 2.6 Suppose  2 (1; 1  ) ( < 0) and the technical conditions in the appen-
dix hold. There exists a cut-o¤ value EIS
(n)
1 such that the condition EIS < EIS
(n)
1
su¢ ces for the interest rate during a period characterized by a high birth rate (baby
boom) to be lower than the rate during times of a low birth rate (baby bust), r(n)L > r
(n)
H .
The consumption-to-wealth ratio is decreasing and the magnitude of the market price
of risk is increasing in the birth rate,  (n)L >  
(n)
H and j(n)L j < j(n)H j.
Proof. See appendix.
The intuition for r(n)L > r
(n)
H and  
(n)
L >  
(n)
H is equivalent to the argument provided
in the static case. j(n)L j < j(n)H j is a technical property of the model.
The stock price is a state dependent multiple of GDP (Lemma 2.1),
P
(nj)
t = Pt j [nt = nj] = Yt
"
1
 
(n)
j
 
2X
i=1
F
y;(i);(n)
j
1 + i
#
(2.21)
8j 2 fL;Hg. The growth rate is stochastic and conditional on the state of the world
dPt
Pt
j [nt = nj] = (Y;n)j dt+
Yt
P
(nj)
t
"
1
 
(n)
k
  1
 
(n)
j
 
2X
i=1
F
y;(i);(n)
k   F y;(i);(n)j
1 + i
#
jdS(n)t j
(2.22)
8 (j; k) 2 f(L;H) ; (H;L)g. GDP follows a locally deterministic process because de-
mographic uncertainty introduces only long run risk in the economy. In contrast, the
stock price has non-zero quadratic variation since stocks are forward looking and incor-
porate changes in growth prospects of the economy (information about future growth
in dividends and future changes in the discount rate). Demographic uncertainty intro-
duces in a natural way excess volatility of asset returns over the variation in aggregate
consumption growth (Barsky and De Long (1993)).
19Another way to understand that the SDF is locally deterministic is by noticing that in case of time
additive utilities, marginal utility depends solely on current consumption but not future consumption.
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Following Lemma 2.2, the equity premium is
1
dt
Et

dPt +Dtdt
Pt

  rt j [nt = nj] = (n)j
Yt
P
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0@  (n)k
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8 (j; k) 2 f(L;H) ; (H;L)g. Demographic uncertainty is priced in equilibrium and the
equity premium switches between two distinct values. In the special case of power
utility with 1      = 0 the equity premium is zero.
Lemma 2.7 Suppose 1  

< 0 and the technical conditions in the appendix hold.
There exists a cut-o¤ value EIS
(n)
2 such that the condition EIS < EIS
(n)
2 su¢ ces for
the equity premium to be positive in both states of the world.
Proof. See appendix.
A key result is the inequality j 1
 
(n)
H
  1
 
(n)
L
j   jP2i=1 F y;(i);(n)H  F y;(i);(n)L1+i j > 0. The stock
price moves into the opposite (same) direction as a change in the consumption-to-
wealth ratio (total wealth). This is consistent with the developed intuition from the
comparative statics analyses in the previous section.
By equation (2.81) and (2.119), (1  )V st is decreasing (increasing) in the con-
sumption-to-wealth ratio if 1 

> (<) 0. Combining equations (2.3) and (2.68), mar-
ginal utility is decreasing (increasing) in (1  )V st if 1  1  < (>) 0. Accordingly,
condition 1  

< 0 is necessary for changes in the stock price (or total wealth) and
the SDF to be negatively correlated. The payo¤ of stocks is low (high) in states of
the world when marginal utility is high (low) and more (less) wealth is desired, and
investors require a positive compensation for holding stocks.
Lemma 2.8 Suppose 
(n)
H > (<) 
(n)
L , and the conditions in Lemma 2.6 and 2.7 hold.
There exists a cut-o¤ value EIS
(n)
3 such that the condition EIS < EIS
(n)
3 ensures that
the equity premium is larger (lower) during a baby boom than the premium during times
of a low birth rate.
Proof. See appendix.
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The parameters 
(n)
L and 
(n)
H determine the probability of a regime switch condi-
tional on being in a low and high birth rate state. The ratio 
(n)
H

(n)
L
describes the ratio
between the instantaneous risk in stock returns during a high and a low birth rate state.
The equity premium is higher during a high birth rate state, if a baby boom lasts on
average shorter (the risk for a regime switch is higher) compared to a low birth rate
state. US population data over the last 100 years reveal that this seems true.
Consistent with the result in the previous section, Lemma 2.6 and 2.7 imply that
the stock price is increasing in the birth rate,
P
(nH)
t   P (nL)t = Yt
"
1
 
(n)
H
  1
 
(n)
L
 
2X
i=1
F
y;(i);(n)
H   F y;(i);(n)L
1 + i
#
> 0 (2.24)
A baby boom causes the stock market to boom and the growth rates of the stock price
and dividends are high. There is an immediate stock market bust (negative jump)
as soon as the baby boom stops (at the time of a regime shift from a high to a low
birth rate). The model implies a slow growth in asset prices and in dividends when the
birth rate is low, but it does not imply a major stock market bust as the baby boom
generation "retires".20 This follows because all key quantities are Markov processes
and immediately adjust at the time of a regime shift, when agents are surprised by a
change in the economic environment.
The result that the retirement of the baby boom generation does not have an impact
on asset prices can be challenged on di¤erent grounds. First, capital accumulation (with
convex adjustment costs) is likely to alter the result because a slow-down in population
growth causes disinvestment. Because of convex adjustment costs there is not one
immediate cut in the capital stock as the birth rate drops, but disinvestment continues
over a long horizon and the desired capital stock is approached slowly (cf. Abel, 2003).
Second, the specication of the life-cycle earnings prole enforces by construction
the Markov property of aggregate supply of labor e¢ ciency units, which implies the
consumption-to-wealth ratio and total wealth to be Markov processes. A choice of a
more general path for life-cycle earnings (e.g. discontinuity at time of retirement) causes
20Retirement can be dened as the age when an agent is endowed with less labor e¢ ciency units
then some level x, for instance the data in Hubbard et al. (1993) suggest the people at age 65 earn
about 35-40% of the maximal labor income over the lif-cycle.
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the consumption-to-wealth ratio and total wealth to be history-dependent functions
(in particular I have to keep track which cohort retires at which point in time). The
introduction of age-dependent death rates also causes the variables to depend on the
past. If the consumption-to-wealth ratio and total wealth are not Markov processes,
then asset prices depend on past observations of the birth rate, and baby booms and
busts have implications on asset prices for a long time after a regime shift occurs. As a
result the models answer to the question whether the retirement of the baby boomers
causes a stock market bust has to be treated with caution. Brooks (2000, 2004) and
Geanakoplos et al. (2004) complement my model with respect to these issues and
deliver an answer to the question. My model is setup to explore how demographic
uncertainty a¤ects asset pricing in addition to the e¤ects documented by Brooks (2000,
2004) and Geanakoplos et al. (2004).
A numerical exercise helps to illustrate the quantitative magnitude of my qualitative
results. I set nL = 1:5%, nH = 2:5%, 
(n)
L = 1%, 
(n)
H = 6:7% and  = 1%, which roughly
captures the long run transitions in the birth rate and the average death rate in the
USA in the 20th century. I chose  = 0:005, a = 0:9 and (A) + (1  a)(K) = 1:55%,
so that (Y;n)L = 2% and 
(Y;n)
H = 2:9%. I x  = 2:5 and numerically solve the model
for EIS 2 [0:05; 0:25].
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Figure 2.4: Left panel: Interest rate in the two state Markov switching model for
nL = 1:5% (black line), nH = 2:5% (red line), and interest rate in a model with
constant birth rate for nL = 1:5% (green line), nH = 2:5% (purple line). Rigth panel:
Equity premium in the regime shifting model for nL = 1:5% (black line), nH = 2:5%
(red line).
The black and the red line in the left panel in gure 2.4 report the equilibrium
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interest rates corresponding to nL and nH in the regime switching model. The green
and the purple line indicate the interest rates in a static model with a constant birth
rate equal to nL respectively nH (agents do not anticipate changes in the birth rate).
The interest rate during a baby boom is lower than the rate in a state of a low birth
rate. For a low enough EIS the interest rate during a baby boom is even negative.
Because I exclude TFP shocks the interest rate is relatively high during times of a low
birth rate. TFP shocks decrease the interest rate due to precautionary savings.
The right panel shows the risk premium paid by stocks due to random regime
shifts in the birth rate. The black line indicates the premium paid in a state of a low
birth rate and the red line describes the premium during a baby boom. Stocks pay a
substantially higher excess return during a baby boom than in a state of a low birth
rate. The introduction of levered equity would amplify the di¤erence.
The model helps to explain some of the long run time variation in the interest rate
and in stock market excess returns in the USA. Keeping the numerical results in mind
I look at US data from 1926 to 2009. I dene the period between the early 1940s and
the early 1960s as a baby boom and the periods before the 1940s and after the early
1960s as times of a low birth rate. During the two periods of a low birth rate the real
interest rate were on average between 1%  2% and the stock market paid on average
5:5% in excess of the (nominal) interest rate. In contrast, during the baby boom the
real interest rate was on average  2:5% and the stock market paid on average an excess
return of 16%.
2.3.5 Regime Shifts in the Mortality Rate: Two State Markov
Switching Model
To analyze the impact of random changes in the death rate on nancial markets, I x
the birth rate while letting the mortality rate switch between a high and a low level.
The results and the discussion are similar to the previous section.
I let the death rate process be dt = s()dS
()
t , with s
() = H   L. S()t 2 f1; 0g
follows a two state, continuous time Markov switching process with transition probabil-
ity matrix between time t and t+ given by (S;) () =
0@ 1  ()H  ()H 

()
L  1  
()
L 
1A.
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The death rate switches between the two values t 2 fL; Hg.
There are minor changes to the utility specication as described in the appendix.
Agentsobjectives stay the same.
Proposition 2.3 Suppose an economy as described. In general, there exists an equilib-
rium with a SDF  that follows a stochastic process driven by the same two state Markov
switching process S() as the death rate. The equilibrium interest rate rt switches be-
tween two distinct levels, rt 2
n
r
()
L ; r
()
H
o
dened by
r
()
j =  + (1  )
"

(Y;)
j + j   n
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8 (j; k) 2 f(L;H) ; (H;L)g, with rt j [t = L] = r()L and rt j [t = H ] = r()H . The
market price of risk also jumps between two distinct values, t 2
n

()
L ; 
()
H
o
given by

()
j =  
0@  ()k
 
()
j
!  1  

  1
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8 (j; k) 2 f(L;H) ; (H;L)g, with t j [t = L] = ()L and t j [t = H ] = ()H . De-
mographic uncertainty is priced in equilibrium and the equity premium is non-zero,
except for the special case of power utility. The functions F y;(1);()L , F
y;(2);()
L , F
y;(1);()
H ,
F
y;(2);()
H ,  
()
L , and  
()
H are determined in a system of 6 non-liner equations provided
in the appendix.
Proof. See appendix.
Lemma 2.9 Suppose  2 (1; 1  ) ( < 0) and the technical conditions in the appen-
dix hold. There exists a cut-o¤ value EIS
()
1 such that the condition EIS < EIS
()
1
su¢ ces for the interest rate during a period characterized by a high death rate to be
higher than the rate during times of low mortality, r()L < r
()
H . The consumption-to-
wealth ratio is increasing and the magnitude of the market price of risk is decreasing in
the death rate,  ()L <  
()
H and j()L j > j()H j.
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Proof. See appendix.
The result is equivalent to the nding in the static case.
The stock price is a multiple of GDP (Lemma 2.1),
P
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t = Pt j [t = j] = Yt
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j
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#
(2.27)
8j 2 fL;Hg and the growth rate is
dPt
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8 (j; k) 2 f(L;H) ; (H;L)g. GDP is locally deterministic, while stock returns are sub-
ject to instantaneous volatility due to the forward looking property of the stock price.
According to Lemma 2.2, the equity premium is
1
dt
Et

dPt +Dtdt
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8 (j; k) 2 f(L;H) ; (H;L)g. In the special case of CRRA utility with 1       = 0,
there is no equity premium.
Lemma 2.10 Suppose 1  

< 0 and the technical conditions in the appendix hold.
There exists a cut-o¤ value EIS
()
2 such that the condition EIS < EIS
()
2 su¢ ces for
the equity premium to be positive in both states of the world.
Proof. See appendix.
Lemma 2.10 is equivalent to Lemma 2.7.
Consistent with the comparative statics analysis in section 3.3, the stock price is
decreasing in the death rate (under the conditions in Lemma 2.9 and 2.10),
P
(L)
t   P (H)t = Yt
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> 0 (2.30)
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Lemma 2.11 Suppose 
()
L > (<) 
()
H and the conditions in Lemma 2.9 and 2.10 hold.
There exists a cut-o¤ value EIS
()
3 such that the condition EIS < EIS
()
3 ensures that
the equity premium is larger (lower) during a period characterized by a low death rate
than the premium in times of high mortality.
Proof. See appendix.
2.3.6 General Model with Brownian Uncertainty: Numerical
Illustration
I illustrate the possible quantitative magnitude of my results in a numerical exercise. I
model the birth rate and the death rate as Brownian di¤usion processes,
dnt
nt
= (n)dt+ (n)dfWt (2.31)
dt
t
= ()dt+ ()dfWt (2.32)
(i) and (i) denote constant drift and di¤usion terms of process i, and fWt is a d
dimensional Brownian motion. I also introduce TFP shocks to the economy and let
dAt
At
= (A)dt+ (A)dfWt (2.33)
with (A)
 
(n)
T
= (A)
 
()
T
= 0(dd).
Proposition 2.4 Suppose an economy as described. In general, there exists an equi-
librium with a SDF  with the dynamics
dt
t
=  rtdt  tdfWt (2.34)
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The interest rate rt is
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Demographic uncertainty is priced in equilibrium except in the special case of power
utility. The functions F y;t;(1) (; n; t), F y;t;(2) (; n; t), and  t (; n) are determined in a
system of 3 di¤erential equations provided in the appendix.
Proof. See appendix.
Precautionary savings induced by TFP shocks and demographic uncertainty have a
negative impact on the interest rate (if 1  

< 0).
The argument of the previous discussion carries over to explain why demographic
uncertainty is priced under recursive preferences but not in case of power utility.
Following Lemma 2.1, the stock price is
Pt = Yt
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with the dynamics
dPt = 
(P )
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fWt (2.38)
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The expected return and volatility are stochastically changing over time. There is
instantaneous excess volatility of nancial assets over consumption growth.
The equity premium follows from Lemma 2.2,
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Lemma 2.12 Suppose  2 (1; 1  ) ( < 0). There exists EIS (nt; t) such that
EIS < EIS (nt; t) su¢ ces for the interest rate to be decreasing in the birth rate and
increasing in the mortality rate and the equity premium to be positive.
Proof. See appendix.
The result is similar to the ndings in the earlier discussion, but weaker. EIS (nt; t)
depends on the current level of the birth rate and the death rate.
I illustrate numerically the quantitative importance of the model. To match the
rst two moments of US population statistics I set (n) =  0:0076, (n) = 0:0381,
() =  0:0071, () = 0:051, and correl

dnt
nt
; dt
t

=  0:1. I choose  = 0:005,
(A) + (1  a)(K) = 2:1%, (A) = 2:5%, a = 0:9,  = 5 , and EIS = 0:067.
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Figure 2.5: Left panel: Interest rate and equity premium for  = 0:8% (black, blue),
 = 1% (red, purple),  = 1:5% (green, mangenta). Right panel: Interest rate and
equity premium for n = 1:4% (black, blue), n = 2% (red, purple), n = 2:5% (green,
mangenta).
Figure 2.5 shows the equilibrium interest rate and equity premium dependent on
the birth rate and the death rate. The interest rate is increasing in the death rate. It
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is mostly decreasing in the birth rate, but changes to be increasing if the birth rate
is large. A high birth rate implies a low consumption-to-wealth ratio, and ctt is small.
An additional increase in the birth rate causes the aggregate consumption share of the
new born cohort to increase only little (as ctt is small), and puts moderate downward
pressure on the interest rate. But, an increase in the birth rate also a¤ects the interest
rate positively due to the acceleration in production output growth, and the positive
impact is independent of the current level in the birth rate. The latter (positive) e¤ect
is dominant if the birth rate is large, and the interest rate becomes increasing in the
birth rate. Technically, Lemma 2.12 is more di¢ cult to satisfy (a lower EIS is required)
if the birth rate is high, i.e. @EIS(nt;t)
@n
< 0.
The equity premium is decreasing in the death rate and mostly increasing in the
birth rate. Given a large current level in the birth rate, the equity premium starts to
be decreasing in the birth rate because the consumption-to-wealth ratio (which is in
a positive relation to the interest rate) becomes less sensitive to changes in the birth
rate.
In the USA the birth rate was most of the time less than 2:5% in the 20th century,
and (given EIS = 0:067) for n < 2:5% the interest rate and equity premium are
decreasing respectively increasing in the birth rate.
The market price of risk compensating uncertainty in the birth rate follows a similar
pattern as the equity premium. Given the birth rate is less than 2:5%, it is always
increasing in the birth rate. The market price of risk compensating uncertainty in the
death rate is slightly decreasing in mortality.
Similar, the exposure of the risky asset to uncertainty in the birth rate is increasing
in the birth rate as long as the current level in the birth rate not too large, while the
exposure to risk in the death rate is almost independent of the level in the death rate.
Changes in the birth rate cause a variation of considerable magnitude in the market
price of (birth rate) risk, the exposure of the risky asset to uncertainty in the birth
rate, and the equity premium. In contrast, changes in the death rate hardly cause any
variation in neither the market price of (mortality) risk, the exposure of the stock to
uncertainty in the death rate, or the equity premium.
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Interest Rate and Equity Premium (in %): Calibration vs Data
1920 1940 1960 1980 2000
-10
0
10
20
year
.
Re
al
 In
te
re
st
 R
at
e 
(in
 %
)
1920 1940 1960 1980 2000
0
5
10
15
year
.
Eq
ui
ty
 P
re
m
iu
m
 (i
n 
%
)
Figure 2.6: Left panel: Real interest rate in USA (black) and model implied interest
rate using US birth and mortality (red). Right panel: 10 year averages of US stock
market excess returns (black line) and model implied equity premium using US birth
and mortality data (red).
Figure 2.6 compares the real interest rate and 10 year averages of stock market
excess returns in the USA with the model implied interest rate and equity premium
constructed from the calibration results and observed birth and death rates. The model
is able to explain some of the time variation in the interest rate and the equity premium.
Most of the variation in the equity premium is due to changes in the birth rate, while
changes in the death rate have a small impact. The presented results do not consider
leverage in equities. Leverage amplies the time variation in the equity premium. In
addition, features like nancial constraints and limited asset market participation as
discussed in Brooks (2004) and Geanakoplos et al. (2004) are likely to improve the
results.
I simulate birth and death rate data and analyze the unconditional moments of ag-
gregate consumption growth, the interest rate and stock returns. 100000 simulations of
100 years of birth and death rate data show that on average the unconditional volatil-
ity of aggregate consumption growth is 3%, volatility of the interest rate is 8:5%, and
volatility of stock returns is 24:8%. Demographic uncertainty introduces a substan-
tial di¤erence between the unconditional variation in consumption growth and asset
returns.
Figure 2.7 illustrates the volatility clustering in stock returns due to demographic
uncertainty. I simulate 1000 years of birth and death rate data and calculate model
implied stock returns. The left panel shows the stock returns and the right panel
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squared returns.
Simulated Stock Returns
Figure 2.7: Simulation output using 1000 years of simulated birth and death rate data:
stock return (left panel) and squared stock return (right panel).
2.4 Extension and Comments
I heuristically discuss three important extensions of the model.
1) Generalization of Birth and Death Rate Processes
For simplicity I have modelled birth and death rates as geometric Brownian motions
with constant drifts and di¤usions. Instead I may consider for instance autoregressive
processes. An AR(1) process with a positive rst autocorrelation term describes changes
in the birth rate well. Changes in the death rate are not autocorrelated.
If changes in the birth rate (and the death rate) are described by an autoregressive
process rather than white noise, I expect the consumption-to-wealth ratio and the
interest rate to depend (in addition to the current level and volatility) on recent changes
in the birth rate (and the death rate).
The static model in section 3.1 provides a good intuition. Assume that changes in
the birth rate are positively autocorrelated (as found in the data). Consider a large past
increase (decrease) in the birth rate. Accordingly, a further large increase (decrease) in
the birth rate is expected in the near future. Because the consumption-to-wealth ratio is
negatively related to the birth rate (for a small enough EIS), a large expected increase
(decrease) in the birth rate creates an incentive for a forward-looking agent to choose a
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low (high) current consumption-to-wealth ratio. The property @ 
@n
< 0 and the positive
relation between  t and 
( )
t =
1
dt
Et (d t) in equation (2.86) formalizes the intuition.
In equilibrium a low (high) consumption-to-wealth ratio corresponds to a low (high)
interest rate (if EIS < 1). As a result the consumption-to-wealth ratio and the interest
rate are negatively related to recent changes in the birth rate. I show in the rst section
in the appendix that there is empirical evidence for a negative relationship between the
level of the current interest rate and past changes in the birth rate. Geanakoplos et al.
(2004) document a similar relation between changes in demographic quantities and the
level in the interest rate.
2) Social Security and other Intergenerational Transfers
The simplest way to model a social security system is by letting agents pay a (possi-
bly age-dependent) labor income tax which is redistributed to the entire population.21
In the limit when all labor income is collected and agents receive/ consume per capita
GDP, the consumption goods allocation is identical to the rst best allocation in an
Arrow economy with (intergenerational) market completeness.22
Other intergenerational transfers are modelled by assuming that agents care about
other agentsutilities. For instance, a parent may care about how much utility his
children obtain and vice versa. In the extreme case when agents care about other
agentsutilities the same as about their own utility, the economy achieves the rst best
allocation.
I look at the extreme case when the intergenerational wealth redistribution leads
to the rst best allocation. Noticing that under rst best ctt =
Ct
Nt
, equation (2.10) and
equation (2.11) become @r
@n
= (1  ) (a  1) and @r
@
= (1  ) (1  a) + 
1    1. The
comparative statics analysis suggests that for min
n
  a(1 )
(1 a)(1 ) 1 ; 0
o
>  the interest
rate and the consumption-to-wealth ratio are decreasing in the birth rate and increasing
in the death rate. The result is stronger than Lemma 2.4 and 2.5. The interpretation
21Alternatively, I may consider a set-up as in Gertler (1997) where agents randomly switch from
a working state to retirement and social security is a transfer between workers and retirees. In that
case, to keep my model tractable I must introduce a new set of contracts to let agents hedge the new
retirement risk and to keep markets dynamically complete. However, in Gertler (1997) the results are
driven by the market incompleteness due to retirment risk.
22See also Abel (2003) for a discussion on how a social security system can be employed to approach
the Golden Rule in the eocnomy
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and the key driving forces for the result remain the same. I expect the intuition to
continue to hold in a dynamic model with stochastic changes in birth and death rates.
Because the consumption-to-wealth ratio is sensitive to demographic changes, I expect
demographic uncertainty to be priced and the equity premium to be time varying.
Since my results are not a¤ected even if I impose the rst best allocation, I do not
expect that the introduction of a (reasonable) social security system or other intergen-
erational transfers alter the fundamental qualitative results of my model. Though the
quantitative magnitude of the e¤ects might change. For instance, Brooks (2004) ar-
gues that the introduction of a social security system has important quantitative asset
pricing implications.
3) Capital Accumulation
For simplicity I have assumed that rms cannot invest. But demographic changes
have a long term impact on the labor supply, and it is reasonable that a rm optimally
adjusts its capital stock in response to highly predictable long run changes in the labor
market.
I consider capital accumulation with convex adjustment costs as in Abel (2003).
Suppose the birth rate increases (decreases) or the death rate decreases (increases). The
stock price increases (declines). The rm starts to invest (disinvest) and less (more)
units of production output will be available to consumers. Under time additive utilities,
a drop (increase) in current aggregate consumption implies a high (low) marginal utility
state. As a result I expect a positive correlation between the marginal utility process
and stock returns which implies a negative equity premium.
In contrast, under recursive utilities it is not clear whether capital accumulation
has a negative or a positive impact on the equity premium. It is still true that cur-
rent aggregate consumption drops (increases) due to investment (disinvestment) by
the representative rm, which has a positive (negative) e¤ect on marginal utility. But
future aggregate consumption will grow faster (slower) due to the initial investment
(disinvestment) and under certain restrictions on the parameterization of the recursive
preferences, this has a negative (positive) impact on marginal utility. The two e¤ects
are o¤setting and it is not clear whether there is a positive or negative correlation
between the marginal utility process and stock returns.
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I expect capital accumulation to reduce the sensitivity of the interest rate and the
consumption-to-wealth ratio towards changes in birth and death rates. Capital accu-
mulation causes growth in production output to react stronger in response to changes in
birth and death rates because an increase (decrease) in the birth rate or a decrease (in-
crease) in the death rate comes with additional investment (disinvestment). Equation
(2.10) and (2.11) suggest that j @r
@n
j < 0, j@ 
@n
j < 0, j @r
@
j < 0 and j@ 
@
j < 0. Accordingly, a
decrease in the sensitivity of the consumption-to-wealth ratio to changes in birth and
death rates causes the market price of risk and the volatility of asset prices to decline.
2.5 Conclusion
I answer the questions how demographic transitions a¤ect the value of nancial assets
and whether demographic uncertainty is priced in nancial markets. I solve an an-
alytically tractable general equilibrium model with stochastically changing birth and
death rates. The interest rate is time varying due to demographic changes. For a small
enough EIS and a moderate RRA the interest rate is decreasing in the birth rate and
increasing in the death rate. I limit my focus to a discussion on the short rate and leave
term structure implications for future research. The equity premium is stochastically
changing over time and I provide conditions that su¢ ce for the equity premium to be
increasing in the birth rate and decreasing in the death rate.
An important result for future empirical research is that the identied asset pricing
implications of changes in death and birth rates work through di¤erent channels and
it is essential to model birth and death rates separately and not as one general state
variable that determines total population growth or the average age of the population.
Numerical calibrations suggest that stochastic changes in the birth rate have stronger
implications on asset pricing than changes in the death rate. Demographic uncertainty
explains part of the equity premium puzzle and the excess volatility of asset returns
over volatility in aggregate consumption growth. Moreover, the model is able to ex-
plain some of the time variation in the interest rate and stock market excess returns
in the USA in the 20th century. In particular, the model helps to explain why the
average interest rate was only  2:5% and the average stock market excess return was
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16% during the baby boom period (early 1940s to 1960s), and the interest rate was
roughly 1%  2% and the stock market excess return was only 5:5% in 1926-1940 and
after the early 1960s.
2.6 Appendix
2.6.1 Empirical Motivation
I use data from 1926 to 2006 provided by CRSP. I approximate the annual real interest
rate by the di¤erence between the annualized nominal interest rate (multiplication of
gross returns on 30 days Treasury Bills) and the realized ination (CPI). I assume
that in expectations realized ination equals expected ination. Stock market excess
returns are the returns on the value weighted stock index provided by CRSP minus the
nominal interest rate. I use a Hodrick-Prescott lter, a Baxter-King band pass lter
and an average over 10 years rolling windows of the stock market excess returns to get
estimates of the equity premium; all methods yield similar results.
Birth rate statistics are provided by the Department of Health and Human Services,
National Center for Health Statistics, USA, and The Human Mortality Database, Uni-
versity of California, Berkeley and Max Planck Institute. The immigration rate is found
in the Annual Statistical Yearbook by the U.S. Bureau of Citizenship and Immigra-
tion Services. Data on the central death rate are provided by the National Center for
Health Statistics, USA, and The Human Mortality Database, University of California,
Berkeley and Max Planck Institute.
It is questionable whether only birth rate data or a combination of birth and immi-
gration rates should be used to analyze my model. In the USA immigrants are rather
young and hence, in the model immigration could be considered as an equivalent to
births of agents. Over the past two centuries in the USA roughly 15%-20% of all im-
migrants were children (younger than 14 years old), about 65%-70% were young adults
(between 14 and 44 years old) and only 10%-15% were older than 44 years old (Source:
Economic History Association, EH.net).
I run the regression rt = (r)+
(r)
n nt+
(r)
i it+
(r)
 t+
(r)
nnt+
(r)
iit+
(r)
t+
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Figure 2.8: Left panel: Real interest rate in USA (red line), and implied interest rate
from regression results and demographic statistics (black line). Right panel: 10 year
averages of US stock market excess returns (red line), and implied equity premium from
regression results and observed birth, immigration and death rates (black line).

(r)
t .
23 rt represents the real interest rate, (r) is a constant term, 
(r)
n , 
(r)
i , 
(r)
 ,

(r)
n, 
(r)
i , and 
(r)
 are regression coe¢ cients, nt, it and t are the birth rate, the
immigration rate and the death rate,  is a lag operator, and (r)t is an error term.
The regression estimates are (r) =  0:007, (r)n =  1:66, (r)i = 9:19, (r) = 2:54,

(r)
n =  22:88, (r)i =  5, and (r) =  3:78. I construct an implied real interest
rate using the regression estimates and the observed birth, immigration and death
rates. The result is displayed in the left panel in gure 2.8. I also run the regression
r
(x)
t = 
(r(x)) + 
(r(x))
n nt + 
(r(x))
i it + 
(r(x))
 t + 
(r(x))
t . r
(x)
t represents the expected
excess return on the value weighted stock market index provided by CRSP, (r
(x)) is
a constant term, 
(r(x))
n , 
(r(x))
i , and 
(r(x))
 are regression coe¢ cients, nt is the birth
rate, it is the immigration rate, t is the death rate, and 
(r(x))
t is an error term. The
regression output is (r
(x)) =  0:068, (r
(x))
n = 9:8, 
(r(x))
i = 1:17, and 
(r(x))
 =  4:56.
I construct an implied equity premium using the regression estimates and the observed
birth and death rates. The result is presented in the right panel in gure 2.8.
Next, I run the two regression but exclude the immigration rate as an explanatory
variable. For the interest rate I have the regression rt = (r) + 
(r)
n nt + 
(r)
 t +
23It is not obvious whether the interest rate, the equity premium and the birth and death rates are
stationary or non-stationary processes. In the case of non-stationarity I interpret the estimation as a
Engle-Granger regression.
99
Interest Rate and Equity Premium (in %)
1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
-10
-5
0
5
10
1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
Figure 2.9: Left panel: Real interest rate in USA (red line), and implied interest rate
from regression results and demographic statistics (black line). Right panel: 10 year
averages of US stock market excess returns (red line), and implied equity premium from
regression results and observed birth and death rates (black line).
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Figure 2.10: Left panel: Real interest rate in USA (red line), and implied interest rate
from regression results and demographic statistics (black line). Right panel: 10 year
averages of US stock market excess returns (red line), and implied equity premium from
regression results and observed birth plus immigration rate and death rate (black line).
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(r)
nnt + 
(r)
t + 
(r)
t , and I get the output 
(r) = 0:037, (r)n =  2:47, (r) = 1:4,

(r)
n =  24:05, and (r) =  1:71. For the equity premium the regression takes the form
r
(x)
t = 
(r(x)) + 
(r(x))
n nt + 
(r(x))
 t + 
(r(x))
t , and the estimation gives 
(r(x)) =  0:063,

(r(x))
n = 9:7, and 
(r(x))
 =  4:72. I reconstruct again the model implied interest rate
and equity premium and present the results in gure 2.9.
Finally, I run the two regressions but add up birth and immigration rates and use
them as one explanatory variable (bnt = nt + it). For the interest rate I have the
specication rt = (r) + 
(r)bn bnt + (r) t + (r)bnbnt + (r)t + (r)t , and the estimation
results (r) = 0:03, (r)bn =  1:47, (r) = 0:53, (r)bn =  15:71, and (r) = 2:41. In the
case of the equity premium I run the regression r(x)t = 
(r(x)) + 
(r(x))bn bnt + (r(x)) t +

(r(x))
t , and estimate 
(r(x)) =  0:098, (r
(x))bn = 9:72, and (r(x)) =  2:96. I compare
the observed and the model implied nancial quantities of the last specication in gure
2.10.
2.6.2 Additional Calibrations of the Model
First, I present some further results obtained for the calibration exercise in the paper.
The left panel in gure 2.11 illustrates the model implied time variation in the market
price of risk for uncertainty in the birth respectively the death rate. Note that a negative
market price of risk for uncertainty in the death rate implies a positive equity premium
because the stock price reacts negatively to shocks in the death rate. The right panel in
gure 2.11 displays the (conditional) model implied stock price volatility due to birth
respectively death rate uncertainty. Clearly, uncertainty in the birth rate have a much
stronger impact on pricing of nancial assets than mortality risk. Moreover, most of the
time variation in the stock price volatility and the equity premium are due to changes
in the birth rate while changes in the death rate have a rather moderate impact.
I present two more calibration outputs of the general model with Brownian uncer-
tainty. First, I numerically solve the model with the inputs (n) =  0:0049, (n) =
0:0472, () =  0:0071, () = 0:051, correl

dnt
nt
; dt
t

=  0:1,  = 0:005, (A) +
(1  a)(K) = 2:1%, (A) = 2:5%, a = 0:9,  = 5 , and EIS = 0:067. The di¤erence
to the calibration in the text is that I use the moments of the sum of US birth and
immigration rates instead of only the birth rate. I plot the model implied interest rate
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Figure 2.11: Left panel: Model implied market price of birth rate risk (black) and
model implied market price of mortality risk (red). Right panel: Model implied stock
market volatility due to birth rate uncertainty (black) and model implied stock price
volatility due to death rate uncertainty (red).
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Figure 2.12: Left panel: Real interest rate in USA (black) and model implied interest
rate using US birth and mortality (red). Right panel: US stock market excess returns
using Hodrick-Prescott lter (black) and model implied equity premium using US birth
and mortality data (red).
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Figure 2.13: Left panel: Real interest rate in USA (black) and model implied interest
rate using US birth and mortality (red). Right panel: US stock market excess returns
using Hodrick-Prescott lter (black) and model implied equity premium using US birth
and mortality data (red).
and equity premium using the observed birth plus immigration rates and the death
rate.
The major di¤erence to the calibration output in the text (without immigration) is
that the short-lived immigration wave in the USA at around 1990 generates a substan-
tial but short-lived hike in the interest rate and the equity premium. In gure 2.12 I
plot observed/ estimated and model implied (real) interest rate and equity premium.
Second, I repeat the calibration exercise (case of birth plus immigration) but change
the EIS from 0:067 to 0:05. As expected the interest rate increases and the variation
in the equity premium becomes stronger and closer to what I observe in nancial data.
The results are provided in gure 2.13.
2.6.3 Derivation of Kreps and Porteus (1978) Type Stochastic
Di¤erential Utilities given Uncertain Lifetimes
Stochastic di¤erential utilities are a continuous time counterpart to the recursive utili-
ties discussed by Epstein and Zin (1989, 1991). Du¢ e and Epstein (1992a) restrict their
derivation to the case of Brownian information. In a model with uncertain lifetimes the
dynamics of the value function include a Poisson jump term that sets the value func-
tion to zero when the agent passes away. If information is generated by a Brownian
motion and a Poisson jump process (due to lifetime uncertainty), then I have to make
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some adaptations to the utility specication introduced in Du¢ e and Epstein (1992a).
Following the notation in Du¢ e and Epstein (1992a), the dynamics of the utility (given
the agent is still alive at time t and will die at time ) have to be rewritten as (given
t  )
dVt = tdt+ tdBt   VtdQt (2.40)
B is a Brownian motion, Q is a compensated Poisson jump process with hazard rate
t. The agent dies if Q jumps the rst time since the agent is born and I denote the
time of the rst jump by  . The arrival rate of death is time varying and stochastic,
i.e. Q is a doubly stochastic process (Cox process). Following the lines in Du¢ e and
Epstein (1992a) this implies
t =  f (ct; Vt) 
1
2
A (Vt)
2
t   t [M (Vt; Vt ) M (Vt ; Vt )] (2.41)
=  f (ct; Vt)  1
2
A (Vt)
2
t   t [M (Vt    Vt ; Vt ) M (Vt ; Vt )]
=  f (ct; Vt)  1
2
A (Vt)
2
t + tM (Vt ; Vt )
M (y; x) = h(y)
h0(x) is the local gradient representation of the certainty equivalent m, i.e.
rm (x; p) =
R
M (y; x) dp (y), and h (:) is dened as h (m (V )) = E (h (V )).
Since
Vt = Et [VT j  > T ] + Et
Z T
t
 sds

(2.42)
it follows that as T goes to innity
Vt = Et
Z T
t
f (cs; Vs) +
1
2
A (Vs)
2
s   sM (Vs; Vs) ds

(2.43)
I can show as in Du¢ e and Epstein (1992a) that the following transformation leads
to an equivalent utility function V t =  (Vt) with
f (ct; z) =
f (ct;  (z))
0 (z)
(2.44)
m(z) =  1 (m [ (z)]) (2.45)
0 (z)M (y; z) = M ( (y) ;  (z)) (2.46)
A(x) = 0 (x)A ( (x)) +
00 (x)
0 (x)
(2.47)
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This follows from
dV t =

0 (Vt)

 f (ct; Vt)  1
2
A (Vt)
2
t + tM (Vt; Vt)

+
1
2
00 (Vt)2t

dt
+0 (Vt)tdBt    (Vt) dQt (2.48)
=

 f  ct; Vt  1
2
A
 
V t

2t + tM
 
V t; V t

dt+ tdBt   V tdQt
with
t = 
0 (Vt)t (2.49)
and
  f (ct; Vt)  1
2
A (Vt)
2
t + tM (Vt; Vt) (2.50)
=  f
 
ct; Vt

0 (Vt)
  1
2
A
 
V t

0 (Vt)
2t  
1
2
00 (Vt)
0 (Vt)
2t + t
M
 
V t; V t

0 (Vt)
=  f
 
ct; Vt

0 (Vt)
  1
2

A
 
V t

0 (Vt) +
00 (Vt)
0 (Vt)

2t + t
M
 
V t; V t

0 (Vt)
Choosing 00 (x) = 0 (x)A (x) implies A (x) = 0, and thus, m [x] = E [x].
For the specication introduced in Du¢ e and Epstein (1992a), featuring the Kreps
and Porteus (1978) property of preferences over the timing of risk resolution,
f (cs; Vs) =


cs   V s
V  1s
(2.51)
m (x) =
 
E

x1 
 1
1  (2.52)
Vt = Et
Z 1
t
f (cs; Vs) +
1
2
A (Vs)
2
s   sM (Vs; Vs) ds

(2.53)
= Et
Z 1
t


cs   V s
V  1s
  1
2

Vs
2s   s
Vs
1   ds

Letting  (x) = 1
1 x
1  to get an equivalent utility function V t =  (Vt), I end up with
f
 
cs; V s

= 0
 
 1
 
V s

f
 
cs; 
 1  V s (2.54)
=


cs  

(1  )V s
 
1 
(1  )V s
 
1  1
m (x) = E [x] (2.55)
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I get the utility specication
V t = Et
Z 1
t
f
 
cs; V s

+
1
2
A
 
V s

2s   sM
 
V s; V s

ds

(2.56)
= Et
"Z 1
t


cs  

(1  )V s
 
1 
(1  )V s
 
1  1
  sV sds
#
= Et
24Z 1
t
cs  

 + 
(1 )s
 
(1  )V s
 
1 


(1  )V s
 
1  1
ds
35
= Et
Z 1
t
bf  cs; V s ds
As shown in the online appendix of Garleanu and Panageas (2010) the same speci-
cation can be obtained as a continuous time limit of the discrete time recursive utility
function
Vt =
n
ct + (1  )Et

(1sVt+1)
1  1 o 1 (2.57)
=
n
ct + (1  )Et

(1  t)V 1 t+1
 
1 
o 1

=
n
ct + (1  ) (1  t)

1  Et

V 1 t+1
 
1 
o 1

1s is an indicator function determining whether the agent survives (1s = 1) or passes
away (1s = 0). The non-linear "discounting" term (1  t)

1  captures risk aversion
towards the timing of death. This relates to the discussion by Bommier (2003). De-
pending on the preference parameters, 
1  > (<) 0, an agent is less (more) concerned
about future consumption (utility) and wants to save less (more) than under a cer-
tain length of life. The utility specication in the paper of Garleanu and Panageas
(2010) di¤ers from my specication because (opposed to my approach) they exclude
risk aversion towards the timing of death.
Because the utility function is a continuous time version of the recursive utility
function introduced by Epstein and Zin (1989, 1991), in order for the agent to have a
preference for early (late) resolution of risk (in the sense of Kreps and Porteus (1978)),
I need
1   < (>)  (2.58)
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This insight becomes clear when considering the discrete time recursive utility function
Vt =
h
ct + (1  )Et

1sV
1 
t+1
 
1 
i 1

(2.59)
I dene Vt = V
1

t and rewrite the discrete time utility specication as
V t =
"
ct + (1  )Et

1sV
1 

t+1
 
1 
#
(2.60)
For  > 0, arg supfcs;Xsg2(=L2) fVtg = arg supfcs;Xsg2(=L2)

V t
	
and by Jensens in-
equality early (late) resolution of risk is preferred if 1 

< (>) 1 or 1   < (>) . For
 < 0, arg supfcs;Xsg2(=L2) fVtg = arg supfcs;Xsg2(=L2)max
 V t	 and by Jensens
inequality early (late) resolution is preferred if 1 

> (<) 1 or 1   < (>) :
The specication nests the special case of a time additive expected utility function
featuring a CRRA prole with  = 1
IES
. Indeed setting  = 1  reduces to the familiar
specication for power utilities
V t = Et
Z 1
t
c1 s
1     ( + s)V sds

(2.61)
= Et
Z 1
t
c1 s
1   e
  R st +ududs

The condition  = 1    implies indi¤erence with respect to timing of risk resolution;
neither early nor late resolution of risk is preferred. In the case of time additive utility
agents also become risk neutral towards uncertainty about the timing of death (cf. also
Bommier (2003)).
There are a few comments on the specication. As the utility function may be
dened on the negative space, it might seem that being dead is desirable. I can rule
out this problem by not giving the agent the option to commit suicide. One may also
circumvent the problem of suicidal agents by adding a large enough constant term to
the aggregator function f(:), so that the agent draws utility from simply being alive.
Such a constant term does not matter in the utility maximization problem. Further,
the specication here excludes bequest motives. This is restrictive, but in turn a too
large bequest motive may give rise to suicidal behavior of an agent and counter-intuitive
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results (for more details see Maurer, 2010).
The derivation of the utility specication in the economy with regime shifts (Markov
switching model) follows the same steps. Let the state of the world be indicated by the
state variable St 2 f0; 1g, which jumps when a regime shift occurs. Adjustments have
to be done with respect to the dynamics in the value function,
dVt = tdt+ 1fSt=1gs
(V )
1 jdbStj+ 1fSt=0gs(V )0 jdbStj   VtdQt (2.62)
bSt is a compensated Poisson jump process corresponding to the Markov switching
process St, and s
(V )
i denotes the change in the value function due to a jump from
state i 2 f1; 0g to the other state. The drift term is given by
t =  f (ct; Vt) + 1fSt=1gH
h
M

Vt  + s
(V )
1 Vt 

 M (Vt ; Vt )
i
(2.63)
+1fSt=0gL
h
M

Vt  + s
(V )
0 ; Vt 

 M (Vt ; Vt )
i
+ tM (Vt ; Vt )
The remaining of the derivation follows by applying the same lines of argument as
above. The specication of the SDU in case of regime shifts in the birth rate becomes
V ss = Es
Z 1
s
f (csu; V
s
u ) du

(2.64)
with
f (csu; V
s
u ) =
 (csu)
  

 + 
1 

[(1  )V su ]

1 
 [(1  )V su ]

1  1
 
264 1nS(n)u =1o(n)H s(V
s;n)
1
+1n
S
(n)
u =0
o(n)L s(V s;n)0
375 (2.65)
The specication in case of regime shifts in the death rate is written as
V ss = Es
Z 1
s
f (csu; V
s
u ) du

(2.66)
with
f (csu; V
s
u ) =
 (csu)
  

 + 
1 u

[(1  )V su ]

1 
 [(1  )V su ]

1  1
 
264 1nS()u =1o()H s(V
s;)
1
+1n
S
()
u =0
o()L s(V s;)0
375 (2.67)
108
2.6.4 Proofs of Propositions
Proposition 2.1 is a special cases of Proposition 2.4. Proposition 2.2 and 2.3 are closely
related to Proposition 2.4. I provide a proof for the general case and show afterwards
how to get from there the other Propositions.
Proof of Proposition 2.4. Following Du¢ e and Skiadas (1994, Theorem 2), the
Gateau derivative (directional derivative) of the utility function in equation (2.2) at cs
in the direction x is
rV ss (cs;x)  lim
!0
V ss (c
s + x)  V ss (cs)

(2.68)
= Es
Z 1
s
e
R t
s
@
@V su
f(csu;V
s
u )du @
@ct
f (cst ; V
s
t )xdt

= Es
Z 1
s
Rtxdt

The Riesz representation process Rt is dened as
Rt = e
R t
s
@
@V su
f(csu;V
s
u )du @
@ct
f (cst ; V
s
t ) (2.69)
Optimality implies for any agent born at time s (assuming that the optimal consump-
tion plan cs

is in the interior)
rV ss
 
cs

;

cs   cs = 0 (2.70)
for all admissible consumption plans cs 2 =. Since F ()s
 
cs   cs spans the set of all
marketable cash ows M ,
rV ss

cs

;F ()
 1
s (x)

= 0 (2.71)
holds for all marketable cash ows x 2 M . This implies that the Riesz representation
process is a multiple of a SDF ,
Rte
R t
s udu = st (2.72)
for some constant s. Since markets are dynamically complete, the found pricing kernel
is unique. I can solve for the optimal consumption plan for any agent born at time s
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by plugging in the expression for the Riesz representation process (from now I drop the
notation indicating the optimum by a star)
st = e
R t
s
@
@V su
f(csu;V
s
u )+udu @
@ct
f (cst ; V
s
t ) (2.73)
cst = (
s) 
1
1  
1
1  e
1
1 
R t
s
@
@V su
f(csu;V
s
u )+udu [(1  )V st ]
1  
(1 )(1 ) (t)
  1
1  (2.74)
cst = c
s
se
1
1 
R t
s
@
@V su
f(csu;V
s
u )+udu

V st
V ss
 1  
(1 )(1 )

t
s
  11 
(2.75)
Using dynamic programming to solve the utility maximization problem of an agent
born at time s, I can state the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation as follows
0 = sup
fcst ;Xst g
n
f

cst ; V
s
cW s; ; n; t dt+ Et hdV s cW s; ; n; tio (2.76)
with cW st = W st + Et hR1t e  R ut vdv ut ysudui representing the agents total wealth while
W s indicates his nancial wealth. The rst order condition with respect to optimal
consumption is given by
@
@cst
f

cst ; V
s
cW s; ; n; t = @
@cW sV s
cW s; ; n; t (2.77)
This holds conditional on survival. In the following I also condition on survival and
although it is not written explicitly, I keep in mind that the variables cs, W s, and V s
jump to zero when the agent dies. I make the following conjecture for the value function
V s
cW s; ; n; t =
cW st 1 
1   
1 
  t (; n)
  (1 )(1 )
 (2.78)
Plugging the conjectured value function into the FOC yields
cst = cW st  t (2.79)
Plugging back into the conjectured value function and solving for cst , allows us to rewrite
the expression for optimal consumption as
cst = [(1  )V st ]
1
1   
1

t 
  1
 (2.80)
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Combining this with the expression obtained from the martingale approach (equation
(2.74)) and solving for the value function leaves us with
V st =
1
1   (
s) 
1 
 e
1 

R t
s
@
@V su
f(csu;V
s
u )+udu
1 
  
  (1 )(1 )

t 
  1 

t (2.81)
@
@V st
f (cst ; V
s
t ) is independent of the agents time of birth, but is a function of only  and
n, and it is a Markov process,
@
@V st
f (cst ; V
s
t ) =
1     

 t  
1  

   t (2.82)
Solving for optimal consumption yields
cst = (
s) 
1
 
1 
 e
1

R t
s
1  

 u  1  du 
  1  

t 
  1

t (2.83)
cst = c
s
se
1

R t
s
1  

 u  1  du

 t
 s
  1  


t
s
  1

(2.84)
The dynamics of the utility function are given by (assuming the agent survives over
the next instant of time)
dV st
V st
=
1  


@
@V st
f (cst ; V
s
t ) + t

dt  1  

dt
t
(2.85)
+
(1  )2 (1  )
2
d t
 t
dt
t
  (1  ) (1  )

d t
 t
+
1
2
 
(1  )2
2
+
1  

!
dt
t
2
+
1
2
 
(1  )2 (1  )2
22
+
(1  ) (1  )

!
d t
 t
2
According to the denition of the value function, the drift term equals  f (cst ; V st ) dt,
which boils down to a PDE determining the function  t (; n) and at the same time
veries my conjecture about the value function (given a solution for the stated PDE
111
exists)
0 =
1  

 t (; n) 


  
1  t  
1  

1
dt
Et

d t
 t

(2.86)
+
1
2
1
dt

dt
t
2
+
(1  ) (1  )

1
dt
d t
 t
dt
t
+
1
dt
Et

 dt
t

+
1
2
 
(1  ) (1  )2
2
+
1  

!
1
dt

d t
 t
2
The last step is equivalent to solving the HJB equation.
Next, I make use of the static budget constraint,
0 = W ss = Es
Z 1
s
e 
R t
s vdv
t
s
(cst   yst ) dt

(2.87)
to solve for the optimal consumption level of new born agents, css. Plugging in expression
(2.83) for optimal consumption yields
css =
Es
hR1
s
e 
R t
s vdv t
s
ystdt
i
Es
R1
s
e 
R t
s vdve
1

R t
s
1  

 u  1  du

 t
 s
  1  


t
s
  1 

dt
 (2.88)
I dene the following functions
F c;s (; n; s) = Es
"Z 1
s
e 
R t
s vdve
1

R t
s
1  

 u  1  du

 t
 s
  1  


t
s
  1 

dt
#
(2.89)
and
F y;s;(i) (; n; s) = Es
"Z 1
s
t
s
a
Yt
Ys
Bie
 (1+i)
R t
s nvdv
B1
1+1
+ B2
1+2
dt
#
(2.90)
with
Ys
Ns
2X
i=1
F y;s;(i) (; n; s) = Es
Z 1
s
e 
R t
s vdv
t
s
ystdt

(2.91)
Thus, I have
css =
Ys
Ns
P2
i 1 F
y;s;(i) (; n; s)
F c;s (; n; s)
(2.92)
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I dene the variables
Zcs = Es
"Z 1
 1
e 
R t
 1 vdve
1

R t
 1
1  

 u  1  du

 t
  1
  1  


t
 1
  1 

dt
#
= e 
R s
 1 vdve
1

R s
 1
1  

 u  1  du

 s
  1
  1  


s
 1
  1 

F c;ss (2.93)
+
Z s
 1
e 
R t
 1 vdve
1

R t
 1
1  

 u  1  du

 t
  1
  1  


t
 1
  1 

dt
and
Zy;(i)s = Es
"Z 1
 1
t
 1
a
Yt
Y 1
Bi
B1
1+1
+ B2
1+2
e (1+i)
R t
 1 nvdvdt
#
(2.94)
=
s
 1
Ys
Y 1
e (1+i)
R s
 1 nvdvF y;ss
+
Z s
 1
t
 1
a
Yt
Y 1
Bi
B1
1+1
+ B2
1+2
e (1+i)
R t
 1 nvdvdt
Noticing that the newly dened quantities, Zcs , Z
y;(1)
s and Z
y;(2)
s are (local) martingales
and (by the tower property of conditional expectations) their drift terms equal zero, I
get PDEs that determine the functions F c;s (; n; s), F y;s;(1) (; n; s) and F y;s;(2) (; n; s)
0 =

 s + 1     

 s  
1


1  


dsF c;ss + ds 
1  

ds
s
dF c;ss (2.95)
+Es [dF
c;s
s ] 
1  

Es

ds
s

F c;ss  
1     

Es

d s
 s

F c;ss
+
1
2
(1     ) (1  ) (1  )
22

d s
 s
2
F c;ss +
1
2
1  
2

ds
s
2
F c;ss
+
(1     ) (1  )
2
d s
 s
ds
s
F c;ss  
1     

d s
 s
dF c;ss
and 8i 2 f1; 2g
0 =

1
ds
Es

ds
s

+ (Y )s +
1
ds
ds
s
dYs
Ys
  (1 + i)ns

dsF y;s;(i)s (2.96)
+Es

dF y;s;(i)s

+ dF y;s(i)s
ds
s
+ dF y;s(i)s
dYs
Ys
+ a
Bi
B1
1+1
+ B2
1+2
ds
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Alternatively, using equation (2.79) I can derive F c;s (; n; s) as follows
css = cW ss s = W ss + Es Z 1
s
e 
R t
s vdv
t
s
ysdt

 s (2.97)
= Es
Z 1
s
e 
R t
s vdv
t
s
cstdt

 s = c
s
sF
c;s
s  s
F c;ss =
1
 s
(2.98)
Combining with the PDE determining F c;s (; n; s) (equation (2.95)) I end up with
0 =
1  

 sds 


ds  
1  sds 
1  

Es

d s
 s

(2.99)
+Es

 ds
s

+
1
2
 
(1  ) (1  )2
2
+
1  

!
d s
 s
2
+
1
2

ds
s
2
+
(1  ) (1  )

d s
 s
ds
s
which is the same as the PDE (2.86) that determines  t (; n). This veries the con-
jecture about the value function (2.78). Equation (2.79) also tells us that  t (; n)
describes the consumption to wealth ratio.
Market clearing in the consumption market implies
dYt = dCt (2.100)
Growth in aggregate output is exogenously given and for aggregate consumption I have
dCt = d
Z t
 1
cstnsNse
  R ts ududs

(2.101)
= cttntNtdt+
Z t
 1
dcst
cst
cstnsNse
  R ts ududs  tCtdt
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I can use expression (2.83) to get the dynamics of the optimal consumption process
dcst
cst
=
1     

 tdt  
1  

dt  1     

d t
 t
(2.102)
 1

dt
t
+
1 + 
22

dt
t
2
+
1     
2
d t
 t
dt
t
+
(1     ) (1  ) (1  )
222

d t
 t
2
Plugging back into the market clearing condition and solving for growth in the SDF
gives
dt
t
=   dYt
Yt
  tdt+ nt
2X
i 1
F y;t;(i) tdt+
1     

 tdt (2.103)
  1  

dt  1     

d t
 t
+
1     

d t
 t
dt
t
+
1 + 
2

dt
t
2
+
(1     ) (1  ) (1  )
22

d t
 t
2
Using (2.86) and (2.96), and plugging in the expression for the SDF, I can derive a
system of 3 di¤erential equations that determines the quantities  t and F
y;t;(i), 8i 2
f1; 2g
0 =  
"
rt   (Y )t + 
 
(A)
2
+
1     


( )
t
 t
(A) + (1 + i)nt
#
F
y;t;(i)
t (2.104)
+
(F y;(i))
t  
1     


(F y;(i))
t

( )
t
 t
+ (1  )(A)(F y;(i))t +
aBi
B1
1+1
+ B2
1+2
0 =   t +
1
1   +

1  

1  t  

1  rt +

( )
t
 t
(2.105)
 1
2

1  

+

1  
 

( )
t
 t
!2
  1
2

1  
 
(A)
2
+

1  
(A)
( )
t
 t
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with the dynamics of F y;t;(i) and  t dened as

(F y;(i))
t = F
y;(i)
 t
() + F y;(i)n nt
(n) +
1
2
F
y;(i)

 
t
()
2
(2.106)
+
1
2
F y;(i)nn
 
nt
(n)
2
+ F
y;(i)
n tnt
()
 
(n)
T

(F y;(i))
t = F
y;(i)
 t
() + F y;(i)n nt
(n) (2.107)

( )
t =  t
() +  nnt
(n) +
1
2
 
 
t
()
2
(2.108)
+
1
2
 nn
 
nt
(n)
2
+  ntnt
()
 
(n)
T

( )
t =  t
() +  nnt
(n) (2.109)
By denition of rt = Et
h
 dt
t
i
and t =  dtt  Et
h
 dt
t
i
, Proposition 2.4 follows,
rt =  + (1  )
"

(Y )
t + t   nt
2X
i 1
F y;t;(i) t
#
  1     
1   t (2.110)
+
1     
2
 

( )
t
 t
!2
   (2  )
2
 
(A)
2   1     

(A)

( )
t
 t
t =
1     


( )
t
 t
+ (A) (2.111)
Proof of Proposition 2.1. Proposition 2.1 is a special case of Proposition 2.4 and
follows immediately when using (A) = 0, dt = 0 and dnt = 0. Moreover, I rewrite
ctt (r) =
Ct
Nt
2X
i=1
F y;t;(i) t (2.112)
=
Ct
Nt
a
R1
0
e(
(Y ) n r)tG (0; t) dtR1
0
G (0; s)ne nsds


1  

1  +
1
1    

1  r

Proof of Proposition 2.2 and 2.3. The proof of Proposition 2.2 and 2.3 are
basically the same. The main di¤erence to Proposition 2.4 is that the function  t (; n)
does not follow a continuous di¤usion process, but jumps between two distinct values.
The argument follows basically the same lines. The derivation from equation (2.68)
to equation (2.83) is carried over without any change. The further derivation di¤ers
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slightly and is described now. To derive optimal consumption of new born agents I make
use of the static budget constraint and dene the functions F c;s (; n; s), F y;s;(i) (; n; s),
Zcs and Z
y;(i)
s as before. Using the martingale property of the Z functions and setting
the drift zero yields
0 =

 s  + 1     

 s   
1  



dsF c;s  + ds (2.113)
 1  

Es
"
d
(cp)
s 
s 
#
F c;s  +
1
2
1  
2
 
d
(cp)
s 
s 
!2
F c;s 
+Es
" 
 s
 s 
  1  


s
s 
  1 
 F c;s
F c;s 
  1
!
F c;s jdSsj
#
and
0 =
"
Es
"
d
(cp)
s 
s 
#
+ 
(Y )
s  ds  (1 + i)ns ds
#
F y;s ;(i) (2.114)
+Es

s
s 
F y;s;(i)
F y;s ;(i)
  1

F y;s ;(i)jdSsj

+
aBi
B1
1+1
+ B2
1+2
ds
where the superscript (cp) denotes the continuous (smooth) part of the process (for
notational details see Shreve, 2004). Using the relation F c;s = 1
 s
gives the equation
determining  t
0 =
1  

 s  (; n) 


  
1  s   
1
ds
Es
"
d
(cp)
s 
s 
#
(2.115)
+

1  Es
" 
 s
 s 
  (1 )(1 )


s
s 
  1 

  1
!
jdSsj
#
Given these functions, it holds
css =
Ys
Ns
2X
i=1
F y;s;(i) s (2.116)
The dynamics of the optimal consumption process for the individual agent are (using
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equation (2.83))
dcst
cst 
=

1     

 t  (; n) 
1  



dt (2.117)
 1

d
(cp)
t 
t 
+
1 + 
2
 
d
(cp)
t 
t 
!2
+
cst   cst 
cst 
jdStj
and
cst cst 
cst 
is given by
cst   cst 
cst 
=

 t
 t 
  1  


t
t 
  1

  1 (2.118)
From equation (2.118) and the fact that on the aggregate consumption and output are
smooth, Ct = Ct  and Yt = Yt  (no discontinuities), it follows that the pricing kernel
process must have a jump component inherent, and in particular, it must hold
t
t 
=

 t
 t 
  1  

(2.119)
dt 
t 
  d
(cp)
t 
t 
=
 
 t
 t 
  1  

  1
!
jdStj (2.120)
Finally, imposing market clearing in the consumption good market as before (dYt =
dCt) and solving for the SDF yields
d
(cp)
t
t
=
"
 (Y )t  
1  

   t + nt
2X
i 1
F y;t;(i) t +
1     

 t
#
dt
+
1 + 
2
 
d
(cp)
t
t
!2
(2.121)
Adding the jump component leaves us with the quantities
rt  =  + (1  )
"

(Y )
t  + t    nt 
2X
i 1
F y;t ;(i) t 
#
  1     
1   t  (2.122)
 t 
 
 t
 t 
  1  

  1
!
+
1     
1   t 
 
 t
 t 
  1 

  1
!
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and
t  =  
 
 t
 t 
  1  

  1
!
(2.123)
with
dt
t
=  rtdt  t
dbSt (2.124)
and
 s  =
1
1   +

1  

1  s   

1  rs  (2.125)
  
1  s 
 
 s
 s 
  1  

  1
!
  
1  

1   s 
 
 s
 s 
  1 

  1
!
=    (Y )s  + ns 
2X
i 1
F y;s ;(i) s  +

1  s   

1   s 
 
 s
 s 
  1 

  1
!
F y;s ;(i) =
1
rs    (Y )s  + (1 + i)ns  + s 

 s
 s 
  1  


1  F y;s;(i)
F y;s ;(i)
 aBiB1
1+1
+ B2
1+2
(2.126)
2.6.5 Proofs of Lemmas
Proof of Lemma 2.1. From market clearing in nancial markets it follows immedi-
ately that
Pt =
Z t
 1
W st nsNse
  R ts vdvds (2.127)
From the static budget constraint it follows the expression for nancial wealth
W st = Et
Z 1
t
e 
R u
t vdv
u
t
(csu   ysu) du

(2.128)
The constraint is binding at optimum because of local non-satiation (utility is increasing
in consumption). Plugging in yields
Pt =
Z t
 1
Et
Z 1
t
e 
R u
t vdv
u
t
csudu

nsNse
  R ts vdvds (2.129)
 
Z t
 1
Et
Z 1
t
e 
R u
t vdv
u
t
ysudu

nsNse
  R ts vdvds
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For the rst term I have
Z t
 1
Et
Z 1
t
e 
R u
t vdv
u
t
csudu

nsNse
  R ts vdvds (2.130)
=
Z t
 1
cW st nsNse  R ts vdvds = Z t
 1
cW st
cst
cstnsNse
  R ts vdvds
=
Z t
 1
1
 t (; n)
cstnsNse
  R ts vdvds = 1
 t (; n)
Ct
For the second term it holds
Z t
 1
Et
Z 1
t
e 
R u
t vdv
u
t
ysudu

nsNse
  R ts vdvds (2.131)
=
Z t
 1
Et
"Z 1
t
e 
R u
t vdv
u
t
a
Yu
Gu
 
2X
i=1
Bie
 i
R t
s nvdve i
R u
t nvdv
!
du
#
nsNse
  R ts vdvds
=
Z t
 1
2X
i=1
e i
R t
s nvdvEt
Z 1
t
e 
R u
t vdv
u
t
a
Yu
Gu
Bie
 i
R u
t nvdvdu

nsNse
  R ts vdvds
=
Z t
 1
2X
i=1
Yt
Nt
e i
R t
s nvdvF y;t;(i) (; n; t)nsNse
  R ts vdvds
= Yt
2X
i=1
F y;t;(i) (; n; t)
Z t
 1
nse
 (1+i)
R t
s nvdvds = Yt
2X
i=1
F y;t;(i) (; n; t)
1 + i
Combining and imposing market clearing in the consumption goods market (Yt = Ct)
gives
Pt = Yt
"
1
 t (; n)
 
2X
i=1
F y;t;(i) (; n; t)
1 + i
#
(2.132)
Proof of Lemma 2.2. Following the denition of the price of an asset that pays
dividends Dt, I can write
Pt = Et
Z T
t
s
t
Dsds+
T
t
PT

(2.133)
Et [P0] = Et
Z T
0
s
0
Dsds+
T
0
PT

= Pt
t
0
+
Z t
0
s
0
Dsds (2.134)
Noticing that the Et [P0] is a martingale (according to the tower property of conditional
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expectations), it follows immediately
0 = Et [d (Et [P0])] = Et

dPt
t
0
+ Pt
dt
0
+ dPt
dt
0
+
t
0
Dtdt

(2.135)
Et

dPt +Dt
Pt

  rt =  dPt
Pt
dt
t
(2.136)
Proof of Lemma 2.3. First note that I often use the notation t (r) =
Ntctt(x)
Ct
=P2
i=1 F
y;(i)
t  t to describe the ratio between consumption of a new born agent and per
capita GDP. Let (r) = min2f(r)[0g fg with (r) =

 : (r) () = 0;  < 0
	
and
(r) () = a (n  )  
1   n (r ()). I show that the condition  < (r) (or EIS <
EIS
(r)
= 1
1 (r) ) su¢ ces for the interest rate in an OLG economy to be smaller than
the rate in an equivalent economy populated by a representative innitely-lived agent
(r < r). Moreover, I show that for B2 = 0 of 1 = 2, the function (r) () is
monotonically decreasing in   (for  < 0), and if lim %0

(r) ()

< 0, then the
set (r) is single valued, and otherwise empty. It follows that for B2 = 0 or 1 = 2
there exists no  > (r) that satises (r) () < 0. In the general case (B2 6= 0 and
1 6= 2) there might exist  > (r) that satises (r) () < 0. I need the technical
conditions r  
1  , r (Y ) > 0, and (Y )  1  na B1+B2B1
1+1
+
B2
1+2
6= 0. Given  > 1,
I have
(1  ) [a (n  ) +   n (r)]  1     
1    < (1  )

a (n  )  
1    n (r)

(2.137)
The expression in equation (2.9) is negative and it holds r < r, if the su¢ cient condition
n (r) > a (n  )  
1   (2.138)
is satised. Because  is constant across cohorts, it holds
ctt
cst
=
cW ttcW st = YtYs NsNt
cW sscW st = e
R t
s 
(Y ) (n ) (r+  )du = e
R t
s 
(Y ) n r+ du (2.139)
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and
 (r) =
ctt
Ct
Nt
=
cttR t
 1 c
s
tns
Ns
Nt
e 
R t
s duds
=
1R t
 1
cst
ctt
ne 
R t
s nduds
(2.140)
=
1R t
 1 e
R t
s r (Y )  dunds
=
 + (Y )   r
n
with  + (Y )   r > 0 since  + (Y )   r = n (r). I look at how condition (2.138)
behaves in the limit when the EIS approaches zero. Taking the limit of  approaching
 1, I get for the key variables
lim
! 1
r
1   = 
(Y )   
1    n lim! 1 (r) (2.141)
and
lim
! 1
 
1   = lim! 1
r
1   (2.142)
and 8i 2 f1; 2g
lim
! 1
(1  )F y;(i) = 1
lim! 1 r1 
aBi
B1
1+1
+ B2
1+2
(2.143)
Suppose j lim! 1 r1  j <1 and lim! 1 r1  6= 0, I get
lim
! 1
 (r) = a
B1 +B2
B1
1+1
+ B2
1+2
(2.144)
Indeed j lim! 1 r1  j = (Y )  1  na B1+B2B1
1+1
+
B2
1+2
<1 and in general lim! 1 r1  =
(Y )   
1    na B1+B2B1
1+1
+
B2
1+2
6= 0. In the case of B2 = 0 or 1 = 2, lim! 1 (r)
simplies to
lim
! 1
 (r) = a (1 + 1) (2.145)
In the limit as the EIS approaches zero condition (2.138) is satised if B1+B2B1
1+1
+
B2
1+2
>
1  1+ 1 aa 
1 

n
. For B2 = 0 or 1 = 2, the condition boils down to 1 >  1+
1 a
a

1 

n
. Using
 > 1, r   
1     and the conditions of Lemma 2.3 (r   (Y ) > 0), and taking the
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derivative of r with respect to   gives
@r
@ ( ) =
(Y ) +   n (r)  n 1
1 

r      
1 
P2
i=1 F
y;(i)   1
1 
1 + (1  )n0 (r) (2.146)
=
(Y )   
1   n (r) 

1
1 r   11    11  1 

1
 
n (r)
1 + (1  )n0 (r)
=
1
 
(   n (r))

(Y )   
1   n (r)

1 + (1  )n0 (r)
=
1
 
 
r   (Y ) r   
1    

1 + (1  )n0 (r) =
1
 
 
r   (Y ) 1
1 

r   
1   

1 + (1  )n0 (r) > 0
Assuming  < 0 and taking the derivative of  with respect to   yields
@ 
@ ( ) =
1
(1  )2

r   
1    

  
1  

 @r
@

(2.147)
=
1
(1  )2

r   
1    

1   1
 
r   (Y )
1 + (1  )n0 (r)

> 0
Analyzing the function  (r), I get
@ (r)
@r
=  
2X
i=1

1
r   (Y ) + (1 + i)nF
y;(i) + F y;(i)

1  

(2.148)
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and
@ ( (r))
@ ( ) =
1
n
@
 
 + (Y )   r
@ ( ) =
1
n

@ 
@ ( )  
@r
@ ( )

(2.149)
=
1
n
1
(1  )2

r   
1    
 
1 
1
 
 
r   (Y )
1 + (1  )n0 (r)
!
=
1
(1  )2
1
 
r   
1   
1 + (1  )n0 (r)

 + (Y )   r
n
+ (1  ) 0 (r) 

=
1
(1  )2
1
 
r   
1   
1 + (1  )n0 (r)

 
 (r)  (1  ) 
2X
i=1

1
r   (Y ) + (1 + i)nF
y;(i) + F y;(i)

1  
!
=
1
1  
1
 
r   
1   
1 + (1  )n0 (r)
 
 (r)   
2X
i=1
1
r   (Y ) + (1 + i)nF
y;(i) 
!
=
1
1  
1
 
r   
1   
1 + (1  )n0 (r)
2X
i=1
F y;(i) 

1   1
r   (Y ) + (1 + i)n

=
1
1  
1
 
r   
1   
1 + (1  )n0 (r)n
2X
i=1
F y;(i) 
r   (Y ) + (1 + i)n (1 + i    (r))
@((r))
@( ) > 0 holds and (r) is strictly increasing in  if
P2
i=1
F y;(i) 
r (Y )+(1+i)n (1 + i    (r))
> 0. In general it is hard to tell whether this condition is satised. However, if B2 = 0
or 1 = 2, then
@ ( (r))
@ ( ) =
1
1  
1
 
r   
1   
1 + (1  )n0 (r)n
 (r)
r   (Y ) + (1 + 1)n (1 + 1    (r)) (2.150)
and a (1 + 1) >  (r) and
@((r))
@( ) > 0 must hold for  < 0. I proof this statement as
follows. Suppose  (r) =  > 1 + 1 was true for some b < 0. Then, since  (r) is
a continuous function and 1 + 1 > (<)  (r) implies
@((r))
@( ) > (<) 0, 1 + 1 >  (r)
can never occur for  < b and  (r) will converge (from above) to b 2 [1 + 1;)
as  approaches  1. But this contradicts lim! 1 (r) = a (1 + 1). Similar, sup-
pose  (r) =  2 (a (1 + 1) ; 1 + 1) for some b < 0. Then, since  (r) is a con-
tinuous function and 1 + 1 > (<)  (r) implies
@((r))
@( ) > (<) 0,  (r) is approach-
ing the limit b 2 (; 1 + 1] (from below) as  approaches  1, which contradicts
lim! 1 (r) = a (1 + 1). The only possibility is that  (r) is strictly increasing and
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approaches the limit a (1 + 1) (from below) as  approaches  1. Finally, since  (r)
is a continuous function in  (for  < 0),  < (r) for (r) = min2((r)[f0g) fg with
(r)   : (r) = 0;   0	 and (r) = a (n  )  
1   n (r ()) satises condition
(2.138), if B1+B2B1
1+1
+
B2
1+2
> 1   1+ 1 aa 
1 

n
. Moreover, in the case of B2 = 0 or 1 = 2 and
1 >  1+
1 a
a

1 

n
, if condition (2.138) is not satised for % 0, then (r) is single valued
(as (r) is monotonic), and if condition (2.138) is satised for % 0, then (r) is empty.
A similar result can be achieved following the argument in Garleanu and Panageas
(2010). Provided the (su¢ cient) conditions
n (r) > a (n  ) + 
1  

1   (2.151)
and

1  +    
(Y ) > 0 (2.152)
and
   a (n  )  (Y ) > 0 (2.153)
the equilibrium interest rate in the OLG economy is lower than the respective interest
rate in an economy populated by an innitely-lived representative agent (r < r). I de-
ne r = (1  )(Y ) + (interest rate in innitely-lived representative agent economy).
Let the function f (r) (x) = (1  )(Y )+ 
1 + (1  )n (x) x. First, I note that
condition (2.153) implies that r > (Y ). Next, condition (2.151) implies 0 > f (r) (r),
and condition (2.152) implies 0 < f (r)
 
(Y )

. Since the function f (r) (:) is continuous,
then by the intermediate value theorem, there exists

r : r 2  (Y ); r ; f (r) (r) = 0	.
This means that there exists an equilibrium interest rate in the OLG economy that is
larger than the growth rate in GDP but smaller than the rate in an equivalent econ-
omy populated by an innitely-lived agent. As pointed out by Garleanu and Panageas
(2010), condition (2.151) can be interpreted as a requirement on life-cycle earnings
to be su¢ ciently strong declining in age. Assuming the special parameterization of
G (0; t) = B1e
 1nt (B2 = 0), it becomes
1 >

a (n  ) + 
1 

1 

   (Y )   a (n  )

n

a   a(Y )   a (n  )  (1  a) 1  1 
   1 (2.154)
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It requires 1 to be large enough and life-cycle earnings to decrease fast enough as an
agent age. Condition (2.152) is implied by  > 1. This is because condition (2.152)
it is implied by condition (ii) of Proposition 2.1 if  > 0 and r > (Y ) (which is an
implication of the just discussed intermediate value theorem), or it is satised for  < 0
and  =2

(Y )
(Y )+
; 1

. The condition (2.153) requires the IES to be small enough,
 <  a(n )
(Y ) a(n ) (given 
(Y )
 > 0).
The argument of both discussed proofs are interdependent and complement each
other. I need a su¢ ciently decreasing life-cycle earnings prole and a strong enough
consumption smoothing motive. The di¤erence is that once I explore the magnitude of
the EIS and once I focus on the labor income path.
Proof of Lemma 2.4. Let (n) = min2((n)[f0g) fg with (n) = f : (n) () = 0;
 < 0g and (n) () =  (r ()) a r() (Y )+(1+1)n
r() (Y )+an . I show that the condition  < 
(n) (or
EIS < EIS
(n)  1
1 (n) ) su¢ ces for
@r
@n
< 0 to hold. Moreover, I show that for B2 = 0
or 1 = 2, the function (n) () is monotonically increasing in   (for  < 0), and if
lim %0

(n) ()

< 0, then the set (n) is single valued, and otherwise (n) is empty.
It follows that for B2 = 0 or 1 = 2 there exists no  > (n) that satises (n) () > 0.
In the general case (B2 6= 0 and 1 6= 2) there might exist  > (n) that satises
(n) () > 0. I need the technical conditions B1 >
1+ 1
1
1+ 1
2
jB2j, 1 > 0, r   1    > 0,
(Y )   
1    na B1+B2B1
1+1
+
B2
1+2
6= 0 and the conditions of Proposition 2.1 and Lemma 2.3
to hold. For @r
@n
< 0 to hold, I need a   (r) + nP2i=1  a+1+ir (Y )+(1+i)nF y;(i) < 0. Using
the assumptions 1 > 0 and Lemma 2.3 (r   (Y ) > 0), I get
a   (r) + n
2X
i=1
 a+ 1 + i
r   (Y ) + (1 + i)nF
y;(i) (2.155)
= a   (r) +
2X
i=1

1  r   
(Y ) + an
r   (Y ) + (1 + i)n

F y;(i) 
= a 
2X
i=1
r   (Y ) + an
r   (Y ) + (1 + i)nF
y;(i) < a  r   
(Y ) + an
r   (Y ) + (1 + 1)n (r)
which implies that
 (r) > a
r   (Y ) + (1 + 1)n
r   (Y ) + an (2.156)
su¢ ces for @r
@n
< 0 to hold. First, I look at how condition (2.156) behaves in the limit
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when the EIS approaches zero. Following the result in Lemma 2.3, I get
lim
! 1
 (r) = a
B1 +B2
B1
1+1
+ B2
1+2
(2.157)
and for B2 = 0 or 1 = 2, lim! 1 (r) simplies to
lim
! 1
 (r) = a (1 + 1) (2.158)
Moreover,
lim
! 1
a
r   (Y ) + (1 + 1)n
r   (Y ) + an = lim! 1 a
r
1  +
 (Y )+(1+1)n
1 
r
1  +
 (Y )+an
1 
= a (2.159)
In the limit as the EIS approaches zero condition (2.156) is satised (lim! 1 (r) >
lim! 1 a
r (Y )+(1+1)n
r (Y )+an ) if
B1+B2
B1
1+1
+
B2
1+2
> 1 or equivalently B1 >
1+ 1
1
1+ 1
2
jB2j. In the case
of B2 = 0 or 1 = 2 condition B1+B2B1
1+1
+
B2
1+2
> 1 boils down to 1 > 0. Next, I note that
a r 
(Y )+(1+1)n
r (Y )+an 2 (a; 1 + 1). Using  > 1, r   1   , 1 + 1 > a and the conditions
of Lemma 2.3 (r   (Y ) > 0), I see that the term a r (Y )+(1+1)n
r (Y )+an is strictly decreasing
in   until it approaches a in the limit where  approaches  1, because
@

a r 
(Y )+(1+1)n
r (Y )+an

@ ( ) = a
@

1 + (1+1)n an
r (Y )+an

@r
@r
@ ( ) (2.160)
=  an 1 + 1   a
(r   (Y ) + an)2
@r
@ ( ) < 0
Following Lemma 2.3, I also know that @((r))
@( ) > 0 holds and  (r) is strictly increasing
in   if
2X
i=1
F y;(i) 
r   (Y ) + (1 + i)n (1 + i    (r)) > 0 (2.161)
It is hard to tell whether this condition is satised in general. However, if B2 = 0 or
1 = 2, then
@ ( (r))
@ ( ) =
1
1  
1
 
r   
1   
1 + (1  )n0 (r)n
 (r)
r   (Y ) + (1 + 1)n (1 + 1    (r)) (2.162)
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and a (1 + 1) >  (r) and
@((r))
@( ) > 0 must hold for  < 0 (as shown in Lemma 2.3).
In conclusion, since  (r) and a r 
(Y )+(1+1)n
r (Y )+an are continuous functions in  (for  < 0),
 < (n) satises condition (2.156) and @r
@n
< 0 (if B1 >
1+ 1
1
1+ 1
2
jB2j). Moreover, in the
case of B2 = 0 or 1 = 2, if condition (2.156) is not satised for  % 0, then (n) is
single valued (as (n) is monotonic), and if condition (2.156) is satised for % 0, then
(n) is empty.
Proof of Lemma 2.5. Let () = min2(()[f0g) fg with () = f : () () = 0;
 < 0g and () () = 1   a  

  
1 
1
 ()
  a
r() (Y )+(1+1)n

na (1 + 1)   1  (1 )(1 ) .
I show that the condition  < () (or EIS < EIS
()  1
1 () ) su¢ ces for
@r
@
>
0 to hold. Moreover, I show that for B2 = 0 or 1 = 2, the function () () is
monotonically increasing in   (for  < 0), and if lim %0

() ()

< 0, then the
set () is single valued, and otherwise () is empty. It follows that for B2 = 0
or 1 = 2 there exists no  > () that satises () () > 0. In the general case
(B2 6= 0 and 1 6= 2) there might exist  > () that satises () () > 0. The
technical conditions needed are the same as in Lemma 2.4. For @r
@
> 0 to hold, I
need (1  )

1  a+P2i=1 anr (Y )+(1+i)nF y;(i)   n 1  1 P2i=1 F y;(i)   1  1  > 0.
Suppose that  < 0. Using  > 1, and  (r) < a (1 + 1) (result of Lemma 2.3), I note
that
(1  )
0@ 1  a+P2i=1 anr (Y )+(1+i)nF y;(i) 
 n 
1 

1 
P2
i=1 F
y;(i)
1A  1     
1   (2.163)
> (1  )
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
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1  
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
n (r)

  1     
1  
> (1  )

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
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
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
  1     
1  
> (1  )

1  a 

  
1  
1
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r   (Y ) + (1 + 1)n

na (1 + 1)
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  1     
1  
Condition
(1  )

1  a 

  
1  
1
 
  a
r   (Y ) + (1 + 1)n

na (1 + 1)

  1     
1   > 0
(2.164)
su¢ ces for @r
@
> 0. For the case when the EIS approaches zero condition (2.164) is
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satised since
lim
! 1

  
1  
1
 
  a
r   (Y ) + (1 + 1)n

= 0 (2.165)
and
lim
! 1
(1  )

1  a 

  
1  
1
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r   (Y ) + (1 + 1)n

na (1 + 1)

 1     
1   > 0
(2.166)
The term 1  
1  is increasing in  (since  > 1). The expression  1  1   ar (Y )+(1+1)n
is decreasing in   if P F y;(i) 
r (Y )+(1+i)n (1 + i    (r)) > 0, because
@
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1 
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  a
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@ ( ) (2.167)
=
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 2
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a
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1
(1  )2

r   
1  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1   1
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 1 2
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1   1
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1+(1 )n0(r)

+ a
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1+(1 )n0(r)
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+a (1  ) 1
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1+(1 )n0(r)
35
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
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(1  )2
1
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24 1   1 r (Y )1+(1 )n0(r)
  (1  ) 1
 
r (Y )
1+(1 )n0(r)
35
=

1  

r   
1    

1
(1  )2
1
 2

1  1
 
r   (Y )
1 + (1  )n0 (r)

=

1  
1
1  
1
 3
r   
1   
1 + (1  )n0 (r)n
2
2X
i=1
F y;(i) 
r   (Y ) + (1 + i)n (1 + i    (r))
where the rst inequality follows from  < r   (Y ) + (1 + 1)n and the second
one from  
1  > a. As in the discussion in Lemma 2.4, it is hard to tell whetherP F y;(i) 
r (Y )+(1+i)n (1 + i    (r)) > 0 is satised in general. However, if B2 = 0 or
1 = 2, then a (1 + 1) >  (r) and
@((r))
@( ) > 0 must hold for  < 0. Since   1  1  
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a
r (Y )+(1+1)n and  
1  
1  are continuous function in  (for  < 0), it follows that
 <  satises condition (2.164) and @r
@
> 0 (if B1 >
1+ 1
1
1+ 1
2
jB2j). Moreover, in the case
of B2 = 0 or 1 = 2, if condition (2.164) is not satised for % 0, then () is single
valued (as () is monotonic), and if condition (2.164) is satised for % 0, then ()
is empty.
Proof of Lemma 2.6. Let (n)1 = min2
n

(n)
1 ;0
o fg with (n)1 = f : (n)1 () = 0;
 < 0g and (n)1 () = r(n)L ()   r(n)H (). I show that for  < (n)1 (or EIS < EIS
(n)
1 =
1
1 (n)1
), the interest rate during a period characterized by a high birth rate (baby boom)
is lower than the rate during times of a low birth rate (baby bust), r(n)H < r
(n)
L . This is
a su¢ cient condition and there might exist some  > (n)1 that satises r
(n)
H < r
(n)
L . I
need the technical conditions B1 >
1+ 1
1
1+ 1
2
jB2j, 1 > 0, (Y;n)L   1   nLa B1+B2B1
1+1
+
B2
1+2
6= 0
and (Y;n)H   1   nHa B1+B2B1
1+1
+
B2
1+2
6= 0. The conditions  < 0 and  2 (1; 1  ) imply
1  

< 0, and  (n)H < (>) 
(n)
L is true if r
(n)
H < (>) r
(n)
L holds. I can show this using a
proof by contradiction. Suppose  (n)H >  
(n)
L and r
(n)
H < r
(n)
L . I have
 
(n)
H    (n)L =  

1  

r
(n)
H   r(n)L

| {z }
<0
  
1  
(n)
H
0@  (n)L
 
(n)
H
!  1  

  1
1A
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<0
(2.168)
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<0
+

1  
(n)
L
0@  (n)H
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 

  1
1A
| {z }
<0
+

1  

1   
(n)
L
0@  (n)H
 
(n)
L
!  1 

  1
1A
| {z }
<0
which contradicts the assumption  (n)H >  
(n)
L . Hence, if there exists a solution, then
 
(n)
H <  
(n)
L and r
(n)
H < r
(n)
L must hold. The same line of argument holds for r
(n)
H > r
(n)
L
and  (n)H >  
(n)
L .
Next, I look at the di¤erence between the interest rate during a baby bust and the
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rate during a baby boom. To proof the Lemma I have to nd conditions such that
the r(n)L   r(n)H > 0 holds. I explore the behavior of r(n)L   r(n)H under the limit when
 approaches  1. I rst suppose that 8j 2 fL;Hg, i 2 f1; 2g, j lim! 1 r
(n)
j
1  j < 1,
lim! 1
r
(n)
j
1  6= 0, j lim! 1
 
(n)
j
1  j <1, lim! 1
 
(n)
j
1  6= 0, j lim! 1 (1  )F y;(i);(n)j j <
1, and lim! 1 (1  )F y;(i);(n)j 6= 0 hold, and verify these assumptions in the end.
For the interest rate I have 8 (j; h) 2 f(L;H) ; (H;L)g
lim
! 1
r
(n)
j
1   = 
(Y;n)
j  

1    nj lim! 1
 
2X
i=1
F
y;(i);(n)
j  
(n)
j
!
(2.169)
For the consumption to wealth ratio I get 8 (j; h) 2 f(L;H) ; (H;L)g
lim
! 1
 
(n)
j
1   = lim! 1
r
(n)
j
1   (2.170)
For the function F y;i;(n)j , 8i 2 f1; 2g, (j; h) 2 f(L;H) ; (H;L)g it holds
lim
! 1
(1  )F y;(i);(n)j =
1
lim! 1
r
(n)
j
1 
aBi
B1
1+1
+ B2
1+2
(2.171)
The consumption share of the new born cohort is 8j 2 fL;Hg
nj lim
! 1
 
2X
i=1
F
y;(i);(n)
j  
(n)
j
!
= nja
B1 +B2
B1
1+1
+ B2
1+2
(2.172)
Plugging the last expression into the equation of lim! 1
r
(n)
j
1  , it follows that my as-
sumptions are indeed true. I can now compare how r(n)H and r
(n)
L behave in the limit,
lim
! 1
 
r
(n)
L
1    
r
(n)
H
1  
!
= a (nH   nL)
 P2
i=1Bi
B1
1+1
+ B2
1+2
  1
!
(2.173)
As a result, in the limit as  approaches  1, lim! 1

r
(n)
L   r(n)H

> 0 is satised,
if B1+B2B1
1+1
+
B2
1+2
> 1 or equivalently B1 >
1+ 1
1
1+ 1
2
jB2j holds. This is the same condition as
in the static case (Lemma 2.4), and requires that B1jB2j is large enough and (2   1) is
small enough. In the case of B2 = 0 or 1 = 2, the condition becomes 1 > 0. In
conclusion, since the functions r(n)L () and r
(n)
H () are continuous in , the condition
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 < 
(n)
1 ensures that r
(n)
L > r
(n)
H holds.
It is straightforward that j(n)L j < j(n)H j must hold given r(n)H < r(n)L ,  (n)H <  (n)L and
1  

< 0. It is true that
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(2.174)
and rearranging yields
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Proof of Lemma 2.7. Let (n)2 = min2
n

(n)
2 ;0
o fg with (n)2 = f : (n)2 () = 0;
 < 0g and (n)2 () = 1 (n)H () 
1
 
(n)
L ()
 P2i=1 F y;(i);(n)H () F y;(i);(n)L ()1+i . I show that for  < (n)2
(or EIS < EIS
(n)
2 =
1
1 (n)2
), the equity premium is positive in both states of the world.
This is a su¢ cient condition and there might exist some  > (n)2 which is consistent with
a positive equity premium in both states of the world. I need the technical conditions

(Y;n)
L   1    nLa B1+B2B1
1+1
+
B2
1+2
6= 0 and (Y;n)H   1    nHa B1+B2B1
1+1
+
B2
1+2
6= 0. Condition
1  

< 0 implies (independent of  (n)L >  
(n)
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(n)
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H ) 8 (i; j) 2 f(L;H) ; (H;L)g
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  1
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To ensure that Et
h
dPt+Dtdt
Pt
i
  rtdt > 0, 8 nt 2 fnL; nHg, it is su¢ cient to show that
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the two inequalities
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8 (i; j) 2 f(L;H) ; ); (H;L)g, hold. Note that (1  )P (nL)t and (1  )P (nH)t are posi-
tive and nite for  < 0. Rewriting both inequalities yields the single condition
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From Lemma 2.6 it follows that
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In the limit as  approaches  1, condition (2.179) is satised. Since the function

(n)
2 () is continuous, the condition  < 
(n)
2 ensures that condition (2.179) is satised
and Et
h
dPt+Dtdt
Pt
i
  rtdt > 0, 8 nt 2 fnL; nHg.
Proof of Lemma 2.8. Let (n)3 = min2
n

(n)
1 ;
(n)
2 ;
(n)
3 ;0
o fg with(n)3 = f : (n)3 () =
0;  < 0g, (n)3 () = 
(n)
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
(n)
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and (n)1 and 
(n)
2 as
dened in Lemma 2.6 and 2.7. I show that the condition  < (n)3 (or EIS < EIS
(n)
3 
1
1 (n)3
) ensures that the equity premium is larger (lower) during a period characterized
by a high birth rate (baby boom) than the premium during times of a low birth rate
(baby bust). This is a su¢ cient condition and there might exist some  > (n)2 which
is consistent with the result of the Lemma. To give proof I have to show that for

(n)
H > (<) 
(n)
L , it holds
Et

dPt +Dtdt
Pt

 rtdt j [nt = nH ] Et

dPt +Dtdt
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
 rtdt j [nt = nL] > (<) 0 (2.181)
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or plugging in the expression for the equity premium
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L (by Lemma 2.6), j 1 (n)H  
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j > jP2i=1 F y;(i);(n)H  F y;(i);(n)L1+i j (by Lemma
2.7), and  < 0,  2 (1; 1  ) (by Lemma 2.6 and 2.7), it su¢ ces to show that the last
term in square brackets is positive (negative),
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In the limit as the EIS approaches zero condition (2.183) is satised if
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Since the function (n)3 () is continuous in  < 0, the condition  < 
(n)
3 ensures that
condition (2.183) is satised and Et
h
dPt+Dtdt
Pt
i
  rtdt j [nt = nH ] > (<)Et
h
dPt+Dtdt
Pt
i
 
rtdt j [nt = nL].
Proof of Lemma 2.9. Let ()1 = min2
n

()
1 ;0
o fg with ()1 = f : ()1 () = 0;  <
0g and ()1 () = r()H () r()L (). I show that for  < ()1 (or EIS < EIS
()
1  11 ()1 ),
the interest rate during a period characterized by a high death rate is higher than the
rate during times of a low mortality, r()H > r
()
L . This is a su¢ cient condition and there
might exist some  > ()1 which is consistent with the result of the Lemma. The proof
follows the same line of argument as the proof of Lemma 2.6. I need the technical
conditions (Y;)L   1 L   na B1+B2B1
1+1
+
B2
1+2
6= 0 and (Y;)H   1 H   na B1+B2B1
1+1
+
B2
1+2
6= 0.
The conditions  < 0 and  2 (1; 1  ) imply 1  

< 0, and  ()H >  
()
L is implied by
r
()
H > r
()
L holds. I can show this using a proof by contradiction. Suppose  
()
H <  
()
L
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and r()H > r
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L . I have
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which contradicts the assumption  ()H <  
()
L . Hence, if there exists a solution, then
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H >  
()
L and r
()
H > r
()
L holds.
Next, I look at the di¤erence between the interest rate in a high death rate state
and the rate in a low death rate state. To proof the Lemma I have to nd conditions
such that the r()H   r()L > 0 holds. In the limit as EIS goes to zero my key quantities
are essentially the same as derived in Lemma 2.6, for j 2 fL;Hg, k 2 f1; 2g
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Proof of Lemma 2.10. Let ()2 = min2
n

()
2 ;0
o fg with ()2 = f : ()2 () = 0;
 < 0g and ()2 () = 1 ()L () 
1
 
()
H ()
 P2i=1 F y;(i);()L () F y;(i);()H ()1+i . I show that for  < ()2
(of EIS < EIS
()
2  11 ()2 ), the equity premium is positive in both states of the world.
This is a su¢ cient condition and there might exist  > ()2 which is consistent with a
positive equity premium in both states of the world. The proof is the same as the proof
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only have to show that 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It follows that in the limit as  approaches  1, the equity premium is positive in both
states of the world. Since the function ()2 () is continuous in  < 0, the condition
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holds or plugging in the expression for the equity premium
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In the limit as the EIS approaches zero condition (2.197) is satised,
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Obviously, all assumptions are satised. The equity premium is positive in the limit
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Chapter 3
Uncertain Life Expectancy, Optimal
Portfolio Choice and the
Cross-Section of Asset Returns
Abstract
A model with stochastic changes in an agents death rate and a dependence between
asset prices and his life expectancy is solved. An agent demands more of an asset that
pays o¤ high (low) in states of the world when he expects to live longer (shorter) than
an asset with the opposite payo¤ schedule. In equilibrium, an asset with a positive
correlation between its returns and (unexpected) changes in the death rate pays a
higher expected return than an (equivalent) asset with a negative correlation between
its returns and changes in the death rate. Empirical evidence supports the model. A
trading strategy is constructed which exploits the (theoretical) relationship between
assetsexpected returns and their correlations to changes in the death rate. Out-of-
sample evidence suggests that the strategy pays a positive unexplained return according
to traditional market models.
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3.1 Introduction
The nancial economics literature usually assumes that investors face a constant or
deterministically changing probability of death. But empirical work by Lee and Carter
(1992) and a growing body of demographic literature suggest that mortality rates are
stochastically changing over time.
I explore the implications of stochastic changes in the life expectancy (or equiv-
alently the death rate) on an investors optimal portfolio choice and intertemporal
consumption decision. In equilibrium, I analyze how the cross-sectional relationship
between expected asset returns (yields) is a¤ected by the behavior of investors facing
stochastic changes in their life expectancies.
The literature consistently suggests that there is essentially no impact of lifetime un-
certainty on an agents optimal portfolio composition (Yaari (1965), Hakansson (1969),
Merton (1971, 1973), Richard (1975)). However, all models do assume a constant
probability distribution of death.
Given the agents utility function is of the time additive form, stochastic changes
in the life expectancy are not su¢ cient on its own to have any interesting impact on
the optimal portfolio composition. Once the assumption is added that changes in the
mortality rate are correlated with asset returns, it turns out that lifetime uncertainty
a¤ects an agents optimal investment strategy and equilibrium asset pricing.
I introduce a continuous time nance model featuring a dependency between asset
prices and agentsarrival rates of death. Agents maximize expected lifetime utility over
intermediate consumption. Ceteris paribus, an agent invests more respectively less in
an asset that pays o¤ high (low) respectively low (high) in states of the world when he
expects to live longer (shorter).
Under certain homogeneity conditions, I am able to state a "Three Fund Separation
Theorem" in a similar spirit as introduced by Merton (1973). I derive an equilibrium
asset pricing equation which states that the expected excess return of any asset depends
in a linear fashion on the expected excess return of the market portfolio and the expected
excess return of a fund, which features a positive correlation between its returns and
changes in mortality rates. The derived asset pricing equation predicts that assets with
a relatively strong positive correlation between their returns and changes in death rates
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earn a relatively high equity premium.
The theoretical results hold for any possible specications of time additive utilities,
given the restriction that utility at any time t is strictly increasing and concave in
consumption at time t.
The intuition for my result is simple. Consider an asset that is likely to pay o¤
high (low) in a state of the world where an agent expects to live longer (shorter). If an
agent suddenly expects to live longer (state of high marginal utility of consumption),
he would like to have more wealth to support his living standard. He is expected to buy
more of the asset (than predicted in a standard CAPM) since its payo¤ is high (low)
in states when the agent requires more (less) wealth and has a relatively high (low)
marginal utility. In equilibrium it is expected that the asset will have a lower equity
premium (than predicted in a standard CAPM) because of its hedging property.
The presence of a market for annuities (in the sense of Blanchard (1985)) does not
alter my results.
Empirically, I test the asset pricing implications of my theoretical model. Consistent
with my theory, empirical evidence suggests that assets with a relatively strong positive
correlation between their returns and changes in the (aggregate) death rate outperform
other assets on average. I construct a dynamic trading strategy which buys (sells)
assets with a strong (weak) positive correlation to changes in the (aggregate) death
rate. Out-of-sample evidence suggests that the constructed trading strategy earns a
positive unexplained return according to traditional market models. I also nd that
a factor based on the mentioned trading strategy helps to explain the cross-sectional
relationship in expected asset returns in addition to traditional factors.
The nancial economics literature has (implicitly) assumed that there is no depen-
dency between asset prices and an economic agents time of death. I claim that this
assumption is wrong.
A relation between asset returns and death rates is supported by empirical stud-
ies in the literature and my own empirical ndings. Empirical research suggests that
mortality depends on the level of development and availability of human capital, med-
ical technology, technological conditions, and the economic environment (Mokyr, 1993;
Schultz, 1993; Easterlin, 1999; Smith, 1999; Lichtenberg, 1998, 2002, 2003; Cutler et
147
al., 2006; Soares, 2005, 2007), key quantities which are also linked to asset prices.
Life expectancy is naturally related to GDP growth (and asset prices) because
growth in the population size and the workforce (which is an input factor in production
and aggregate output) are a¤ected by changes in death rates. Empirical studies by
Acemoglu and Johnson (2007) and Hanwald (2010) conrm a link between changes in
death rates and GDP.
Intuitively, it is reasonable to believe that an individuals life expectancy changes
as technology advances, and it is natural to assume that asset prices depend on tech-
nological progress. Consider a rm in the health industry. If the company develops
new pharmaceuticals, say a cure for cancer, an agents life expectancy increases and
the company is expecting high future earnings and its stock price increases. In con-
trast, if the new medicine turns out to be faulty, the rms stock price and the life
expectancy drop. This example induces a positive correlation between changes in the
life expectancy and the companys asset returns. The impact for an individual who
knows that he has cancer is much bigger than for someone who is healthy at the time
but might possibly get cancer in future. The correlation between asset returns and
changes in the life expectancy may di¤er considerably across agents.
There are many more examples for other industries. For instance, I also suspect
rms in the insurance industry to be exposed to changes in the life expectancy as
insurers o¤er many types of contracts related to the death of either an individual or
events related to the aggregate death rate.
Another way how a dependency is induced is by (rare) events like a pandemic or a
war. If suddenly a pandemic u of a comparable size to the "Spanish Flu" in 1918 was
circling the globe, the life expectancy would drop drastically as would most asset prices
(since business activity would be severely constrained in such times). Within the last
decade, three major inuenzas were spreading: the severe acute respiratory syndrome
(SARS), the avian u, and the swine u. Fortunately, none of them turned out to be
as severe as the Spanish u, and yet they a¤ected the life expectancy and asset prices
in local areas of outbreak (in particular Hong Kong and Mexico). For wars a similar
argument applies as for the event of a pandemic.
Another channel is given through the institution of dened benet pension plans. In
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the USA, on retirement employees oftentimes receive a pension from their former em-
ployer. A dened benet plan promises an employee on retirement for the rest of his life
a specic monthly payment depending on factors such as his time of employment, salary
history, etc, but not on investment returns. The employee receives a deterministic reg-
ular payment on retirement while the employer bears all investment risk.1 Accordingly,
it is bad (good) news for the employer if there is an increases (decreases) in the life
expectancy of retired employees because the employer is obliged to pay more (less) to
fund dened benet plans. Through this channel a negative correlation evolves.
According to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (2009) about 20% of private-
industry workers in the USA have a dened benet plan, and Coronado et al. (2008)
nd that about two-thirds of large companies in the USA o¤er dened benet pension
plans to employees. A substantial share of US stocks are a¤ected through this channel
and are expected to show a negative correlation between their asset returns and changes
in the aggregate life expectancy of US citizens.
There is few and limited research on stochastically changing mortality rates in the
theoretical nancial economics literature (for instance Cox et al. (2006), Yogo (2009),
Chen and Cox (2009), Cocco and Gomes (2009), DeNardi et al. (2009), Maurer (2011)),
and none of the papers has explored the cross-sectional yield relationship between assets
with a focus on stochastic shocks in death rates. Karatzas and Wang (2001) solve in
a complete market environment a utility maximization problem subject to a random
stopping time which is adapted to the ltration generated by asset prices.
To my research most closely related papers are by Martellini and Urosevic (2005)
and Blanchet-Scalliet et al. (2008). Both papers consider a portfolio choice problem
with the feature that the agents exit time is uncertain and not independent of asset
returns. In the special case of only one risky and one riskless asset and power utility it
is shown that if the probability of exiting the market is positively correlated with the
return on the risky asset, then the investment in the risky asset is higher than in a case
of no uncertainty about exiting the market.
My contribution in addition to latter two papers is that my results hold for any
1For an extensive treatment on dened benet plans I refer to Barnow and Ehrenberg (1979),
Bodie, Marcus and Merton (1988), Harrison and Sharpe (1983), Bulow and Scholes (1983), Haberman
(1997), Exley, Mehta and Smith (1997) and theirs references.
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specication of time additive utilities and for an arbitrarily large universe of assets.
Moreover, under fairly general conditions I can state a yield relationship between as-
sets and show that assets which are positively correlated with changes in death rates
are paying a higher expected return than assets which are negatively correlated with
changes in death rates. I also provide empirical evidence emphasizing the quantitative
relevance of my model.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 introduces the theoretical model,
and it is solved in section 3.3. Section 3.4 states a Tree Fund Separation Theorem
and discusses a yield relationship among assets in partial equilibrium. In section 3.5,
I show that the introduction of annuity markets does not change the results. Section
3.6 illustrates the empirical importance of the model. Section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 The Model
Financial markets are modelled in partial equilibrium as introduced by Merton (1971,
1973). I choose the simplest case of a constant investment opportunity set. I omit
a discussion of the specic assumptions needed and refer to Merton (1971, 1973) for
details.
Let (
;F1;P) be a (complete) probability space endowed with a ltration z =
(Ft) ; t 2 [0;1) - a right continuous, non-decreasing collection of (augmented) -
algebras, Fs  Ft  F1; 0  s  t  1. Let there be a d-dimensional Wiener process
W = (Wt;Ft) ; t 2 [0;1) on (
;F1; P )2.
My model assumes the existence of one risk free asset with a deterministic price
process P [0] =

P
[0]
t ;Ft

; t 2 [0;1) which increases with a constant rate of return r:3
The dynamics of P [0]t are
dP
[0]
t = rP
[0]
t dt (3.1)
There are N risky assets characterized by an N -dimensional (random) price process
P [1N ] =

P
[1N ]
t ;Ft

; t 2 [0;1) which follows an N -dimensional geometric Brownian
2I employ the notation W = (Wt;Ft) ; t 2 [0;1) as found in Liptser and Shiryaev (2001) to denote
a random process W = (Wt) ; t 2 [0;1) to be adapted to the ltration z.
3If I write constant, it is in the meaning of non-stochastic, i.e. in the sense that a constant variable
might vary over time but is deterministic, as in Merton (1973).
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motion,
dP
[1N ]
t = IPt
[1N ]
P dt+ IPt
[1N ]
P dWt (3.2)
where IPt is a (N N) diagonal matrix with diagonal element i equal to the price of
risky asset i

P
[i]
t

, [1N ]P is a (N  1) vector denoting the constant expected rate of
returns, and [1N ]P is a (N  d) dimensional constant di¤usion matrix. Let us write the
(N + 1) price vector of all asset prices as P =

P [0] P [1N ]
T
T
.
Next, I specify population growth. Let there be a one-dimensional, right continuous,
doubly stochastic Poisson process K = (Kt;Ft) ; t 2 [0;1) with intensity t and initial
value K0 on (
;F1; P ). K j  is a non-homogeneous Poisson process with (time
varying) intensity . K j  is independent of W . For a general treatment about
doubly stochastic or Cox processes I refer to Cox (1955, 2001) and his references. I let
the number of agents born up to time t be equal to Kt, and denote agent ks date of
birth by b(k), where b(k) is equal to the time of the (k  K0)th jump of K if k > K0,
and 0 otherwise. For the dynamics of the stochastic intensity parameter process  =
(t;Ft) ; t 2 [0;1) I assume
dt = ;tdt+ t;tdWt (3.3)
where ;t is a drift term which might depend on  and t (and must be such that  > 0
a:s:), ;t is a (1 d) dimensional di¤usion vector depending on t, and 0 is the process
initial value at time 0. Notice that the specication of arrivals of new agents is general
and exible. It is easy to match real birth and population growth data by adjusting
;t and ;t.
To dene uncertainty of death, I let J = (Jt;Ft) ; t 2 [0;1) be a K1-dimensional,
right continuous, doubly stochastic Poisson process with intensity t and J0 = 0 on
(
;F1; P ). J j  is a non-homogeneous Poisson process and independent of both W
and K. I dene the time of agent ks death as the point in time when the rst jump of
J (k) (the kth element of J) since time b(k) occurs and denote it by  (k)
b(k)
. For each k, the
intensity parameter of process J (k), (k) =


(k)
t ;Ft

; t 2 [0;1) itself is an adapted
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random process and follows a geometric Brownian motion,
d
(k)
t =
8<: 
(k)
t 
(k)
;b(k);t
dt+ 
(k)
t 
(k)
 dWt, if t > b
(k)

(k)
t 
(k)
;tdt+ 
(k)
t 
(k)
 dWt, otherwise
9=; (3.4)
where (k);t is a drift term which depends on only t, 
(k)
;b(k);t
is a drift term which depends
on b(k) and t (i.e. on time of birth and age), and (k) is a (1 d) dimensional constant
di¤usion vector.
This specication ensures positivity of (k), the arrival rate of death of agent k.
There is great exibility in this general specication of the drift term. Oftentimes in
nancial economics literature, the arrival time of death is modelled by a Poisson process
with a constant intensity parameter. Such a specication ts real mortality data badly.
For instance, it implies that many people pass away in a young age and fewer old
people. But, in the data we observe that young people have a low probability of dying
while most of the people die at an age of about 80 years (see for example Edwards,
2003). This is no problem in my specication because the drift term is a function of an
agents age, and I can start o¤ with a small  (arrival rate of death) and let it grow as
the agent gets older, which matches real mortality data well. Moreover, the process of
 at any time t < b(k) represents the evolution of the aggregate death rate for newborn
agents. My specication also matches the well-known model by Lee and Carter (1992).
The Lee and Carter (1992) approach is arguably the most popular two factor sto-
chastic mortality modeling method in (demographic) literature (Hanewald, 2010). Al-
though there are more sophisticated models from the epidemiology literature (Booth
et al., 2006), it is the simplicity and yet its power to forecast and model much of the
variation in (age-dependent) death rates that makes the Lee and Carter (1992) model
attractive to a variety of disciplines. In the asset pricing and household nance litera-
ture there are many papers which employ it (Cox et al. (2006), Chen and Cox (2009),
Cocco and Gomes (2009), DeNardi et al. (2009), Maurer (2011), Hanewald and Post
(2010)). Moreover, it has become a benchmark for the forecasts of the US Census bu-
reau, and the US Social Security Technical Advisory Panel recently suggested Trustees
to employ the method (Chen and Cox, 2009).
From the dynamics of the asset prices and the death rates it becomes evident that
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depending on how I choose the di¤usion terms I can construct either a case with a
(non-zero) correlation between changes in the death rates and asset returns or a case
with death rates which are independent of asset prices. The birth rate may also be
chosen to be dependent or independent of the other variables.
From the fact that J (k) given the realizations of (k) is a non-homogeneous Poisson
process, it is trivial to derive the probability of dying before time t given the realizations
of (k)
H(k) (t)  cdf

(k)
b(k)
j(k)t
(t) = Pr
n

(k)
b(k)
2 [b(k); t] j (k)t
o
(3.5)
= Pr
n
J
(k)
t  1 j (k)t
o
= 1  exp

 
Z t
b(k)
(k)s ds

j (k)t
and the probability of agent k surviving until time t
H
(k)
(t)  1 H(k) (t) (3.6)
for 0  b(k)  t < s < 1, where (k)t =
n
(k)s
o
s2[0;t]
; J
(k)
t = J
(k)
t   J (k)b(k) . The pdf of

(k)
b(k)
given the realizations of (k) is
h(k) (t)  pdf

(k)
b(k)
j(k)t
(t) =
@H(k)(t)
@t
= 
(k)
t exp

 
Z t
b(k)
(k)s ds

j (k)t : (3.7)
The conditional probability of surviving until time s given the agent has survived up
to time t is
H
(k)
(t; s)  H
(k)
(s)
H
(k)
(t)
(3.8)
and the conditional pdf of  (k)
b(k)
is
h(k) (t; s)  h
(k)(s)
H
(k)
(t)
(3.9)
Lemma 3.1 Agent ks life expectancy LE(k)t at time t is a function of his present
arrival rate of death (k)t (and further deterministic parameters), and is inversely related
to it, i.e. @LE
(k)
t
@
(k)
t
< 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
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Intuitively, if the arrival rate of death increases, then (for any s > t) the probability
of still being alive at some future point in time s decreases, and life expectancy de-
creases. Therefore, there is a negative relationship between an agent ks life expectancy
LE(k) and his arrival rate of death (k).
At every point in time t there are Kt 
PKt
k=1 1
n

(k)
b(k)
<t
o agents in the market, where
1n

(k)
b(k)
<t
o is an indicator function. Agent k is born at time b(k) and dies at time  (k)
b(k)
. His
preferences are described by a time additive expected utility function over consumption
c(k). Following the specication rst introduced by Yaari (1965), expected lifetime
utility of agent k at time t 2 [b(k);  (k)
b(k)
) is given by
Et
h
U (k)(c(k)) j  (k)
b(k)
> t
i
= Et
Z 1
t
H
(k)
(t; s)u(k)s
 
c(k)s

+ h(k)(t; s)B(k)

W
(k)
; s

ds

(3.10)
where the functions u(k)s (x) and B(k) (x; s) are strictly increasing and concave in x, and
there is some time discounting. u(k)s (x) is the stream of utility obtained from current
consumption at time s, and B(k) (x; s) is the utility from bequest given the agent dies
at time s.
I restrict my analysis to the class of time additive utility functions and do not dis-
cuss stochastic di¤erential utilities as introduced in Du¢ e and Epstein (1992a, 1992b).
Latter specications, which include utilities of the Kreps and Porteus (1978) type or
functions incorporating habit formation, may be able to generate additional interesting
asset pricing implications of lifetime uncertainty and stochastically changing mortal-
ity rates (Maurer (2011)). In addition, Bommier (2003) and Maurer (2011) point out
that the formulation of time additive utility functions implies agents to be risk neu-
tral towards lifetime uncertainty. Nevertheless, I do not want to worry about this in
my analysis. Focusing on time additive utilities ensures that the model is analytically
tractable and I can easily relate my innovations to the previous literature.
At time of birth, agent ks initial wealth is given by W
(k)
b(k) . Agent k allocates his
wealth at every point in time t to consumption c(k)t , a risky asset portfolio X
[1N ](k)
t
(measured in numbers of shares) or alternatively [1N ](k)t =
1
W
(k)
t
IPtX
[1N ](k)
t (relative
portfolio holdings), and the risk free asset. His wealth is a random process and evolves
154
according to the dynamics
dW
(k)
t = W
(k)
t rdt+W
(k)
t 
[1N ](k)T
t


[1N ]
P dt+ 
[1N ]
P dWt   r1(1N)dt

  c(k)t dt (3.11)
To prohibit arbitrage opportunities I make the technical assumption of [1N ](k)t 2
(L2)N , where L2 =
n
x 2 L j R T
0
x2tdt <1 a:s:
o
and L is the set of processes
adapted to the ltration FP generated by asset prices, FPt =  fPs : s  tg. I set
the further restriction that W
(k)
t at t = 
(k)
b(k)
has to be non-negative almost surely.
Problem 3.1 Agent k tackles the following expected lifetime utility maximization prob-
lem (given  (k)
b(k)
> t):
(P1)
V (k)

W
(k)
; (k); J
(k)
; t

= sup
fc(k);[1N ](k)g2<1+(L2)N
n
Et
h
U (k)(c(k)) j  (k)
b(k)
> t
io
s:t:
dW
(k)
t = W
(k)
t rdt+W
(k)
t 
[1N ](k)T
t


[1N ]
P   r1(1N)

dt
+W
(k)
t 
[1N ](k)T
t 
[1N ]
P dWt   c(k)t dt
d
(k)
t = 
(k)
t 
(k)
;b(k);t
dt+ 
(k)
t 
(k)
 dWt
W
(k)

(k)
b(k)
 0
where V (k)

W
(k)
; (k); J
(k)
; t

is the value function.
V (k)

W
(k)
; (k); J
(k)
; t

depends on the agents wealth, his arrival rate of death,
time, and on whether he is still alive J
(k)
= 0 or dead J
(k) 6= 0. The dynamics of  and
(l), for l 6= k, do not matter.
3.3 Solution to the Model
I employ dynamic programming to solve the agents maximization problem.
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Lemma 3.2 The optimal investment strategy [1N ](k)t of agent k is given by

[1N ](k)
t =
1
 V (k)
WW
W
(k)
t


[1N ]
P 
[1N ]T
P
 1 h
V
(k)
W


[1N ]
P   r1(1N)

+ V
(k)
W

[1N ]
P 
(k)T
 
(k)
t
i
(3.12)
The optimal investment strategy is a¤ected by stochastic changes in the agent ks in-
stantaneous probability of death, but independent of changes in the birth rate or changes
in other agentsdeath rates.
Proof. See Appendix.
Notice that the optimal investment strategy is not a¤ected if labor income is intro-
duced, as long as it is independent of asset prices.
It becomes evident that a correlation between asset returns and changes in the
agents arrival rate of death a¤ects the optimal investment strategy [1N ](k)t . To ex-
amine the e¤ect in more detail, it is crucial to explorer the properties of the value
function.
Lemma 3.3 Assume agent k does not derive any utility from bequest, B(k)

W
(k)
; s

=
0. For any specication of the utility function satisfying the general conditions described
in the model, the value function V (k)

W
(k)
; (k); J
(k)
; t

dened on t 2 [b(k);  (k)
b(k)
), has
the following properties:
1) the value function is strictly increasing in wealth, V (k)
W
> 0,
2) the value function is strictly concave, V (k)
WW
< 0, and
3) the value function satises V (k)
W
< 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
The rst two properties - the value function is strictly increasing and concave in
wealth - are standard.
The intuition for the third property is straightforward. Consider a decrease (in-
crease) in the instantaneous probability of death. The agent faces a longer (shorter)
expected lifetime horizon, and he expects that his wealth has to be allocated to more
(less) periods of time than before the drop (increase) in the death rate. The stream
of consumption in each period decreases (increases) and marginal utility increases (de-
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creases) because the utility function is concave in consumption. Accordingly, an addi-
tional dollar is more (less) valuable, and V (k)
W
< 0 follows.
Alternatively, when the value function is dened only on the positive space, the
result can be understood as follows. Ceteris paribus, an increase in the mortality rate
leads to a lower expected utility for any feasible consumption plan. It follows that
the optimal consumption plan c(l) given a low death rate l yields a higher ex-
pected utility then the optimal consumption c(h) given the probability of death is
high (h), Et

U (k)(c(l)) j l

> Et

U (k)(c(h)) j h

. If this was not the case, then
given l plan c(l) would be dominated by c(h) because c(h) yields a higher ex-
pected utility under l than under h, Et

U (k)(c(h)) j l

> Et

U (k)(c(h)) j h

>
Et

U (k)(c(l)) j l

. This is a contradiction to c(l) being optimal given l. Given
V
(k)
 < 0, one expects that one dollar is used more e¢ cientlyif  is low, and V
(k)
W
< 0
holds.
In the formal proof the result follows from the concavity of the utility function and
the fact that optimal consumption is increasing in the mortality rate. There is a simple
intuition for the claim that optimal consumption is increasing in the mortality rate. If
the probability of dying goes up at any time in future, the agent rather eats up more
of his wealth today than having the chance to die with a lot of wealth from which he
cannot derive any utility (no utility from bequest).
From the last argument it becomes evident why the assumption of no bequest utility
is important. If the agent derived utility from bequest, equation (3.45) (see Appendix)
had to be adjusted by the term
R1
t
h(k) (t; s)
@B(k)

W
(k)
;s

@W
(k)
s
@W
(k)
s
@W
(k)
t
ds. By equation (3.38)
(see Appendix) h(k) (t; s) is not always decreasing in (k)t , and for s small enough it is
increasing. This causes an ambiguity about the sign of @c
(k)
t
@
(k)
t
. If (for s small enough)
marginal utility from bequest is large (small) enough, then @c
(k)
t
@
(k)
t
< (>)0 holds. Intu-
itively, an agent prefers to take the chance to die with a lot of wealth and does not
want to consume too much today if the utility from bequest is large enough. The sign
of V (k)
W
depends crucially on the size of bequest utility relative to consumption utility.
The question arises whether it is reasonable to assume a bequest utility that domi-
nates consumption utility enough such that @c
(k)
t
@
(k)
t
< 0 holds. Indeed, such a constella-
tion may imply a suicidal agent, in the sense that he desires to face a high probability
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of dying, if his bequest utility dominates his consumption utility by too much.
Having established the properties of the value function I can explorer the impact of
a dependency between asset prices and the arrival rate of death on optimal portfolio
choice.
Proposition 3.1 The optimal investment strategy of agent k is given by

[1N ](k)
t =


[1N ]
P 
[1N ]T
P
 1 h
A
(k)
t


[1N ]
P   r1(1N)

 B(k)t [1N ]P (k)
T

i
(3.13)
for some positive parameters A(k)t and B
(k)
t . The optimal portfolio composition consists
of a standard myopic and a hedging demand. Ceteris paribus, agent ks demand is
higher (lower) for assets with returns that are stronger negatively (positively) corre-
lated with changes in his arrival rate of death and positively (negatively) correlated with
changes in his life expectancy. In general, [1N ]P 
(k)T
 6= [1N ]P (l)
T
 ; 8k 6= l is true, which
implies that every agent chooses a uniquely tailored optimal asset allocation depending
on his personal health condition and lifestyle.
Proof. See Appendix.
In the general case of many risky assets, I cannot unambiguously tell whether the
hedging demand is positive or negative (which crucially depends on the structure of the
covariance matrix). In the case of only one risky asset, the hedging demand is positive
(negative) if the assets returns are negatively (positively) correlated with changes in
agent ks arrival rate of death. One might speculate that this should lead to a lower
(higher) equity premium then in a model without lifetime uncertainty if the market was
negatively (positively) correlated with changes in the aggregate death rate. Indeed,
empirical evidence show both a too highequity premium in stock markets and an
overall positive relation between changes in the aggregate death rate and stock returns
(see below). I elaborate more on asset pricing implications of lifetime uncertainty later.
The last statement of the proposition says that agentsexposures to diverse risks
of death di¤er depending on many personal characteristics. I illustrate this by two
examples. Consider agent A who is HIV (human immunodeciency virus) positive and
the healthy agent B. A discovery of a cure for AIDS means a huge decrease (increase) in
agent As arrival rate of death (life expectancy) while the decrease (increase) in agent
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Bs arrival rate of death (life expectancy) is going to be moderate. The dependency
between asset returns of a company that is likely to ever produce pharmaceuticals
related to HIV and changes in the arrival rate of death for agent A is stronger than for
agent B, implying di¤erences in their optimal portfolio choice decisions.
In the same spirit, consider agent A who lives in a global city and agent B who
lives in the countryside. A global pandemic outbreak threatens agent A much more
than agent B, and changes in agent As life expectancy are more likely to be stronger
positively correlated with a large set of asset returns than changes in agent Bs life
expectancy, which implies a di¤erence in their optimal investment strategies.
My result implies that the e¤ect on optimal portfolio choice is exactly the opposite
as found in the special case of CRRA utility by Blanchet-Scalliet et al. (2008). The
di¤erence arises because in Blanchet-Scalliet et al. (2008) agents maximize utility
over terminal wealth (or in some sense there is only utility form bequest), rather than
time additive expected utility over a stream of intermediate consumption. My analysis
conrms the nding of Blanchet-Scalliet et al. (2008) and even generalizes it to a
more general class of time additive utility functions (not only for CRRA utility u(x) =
x1 =(1   ), with  > 1)4. If agent k is maximizing expected utility over terminal
wealth (bequest), rather than expected lifetime utility, then from the (adjusted) HJB
equation I get the same FOC with respect to [1N ](k)t . V
(k)
W
> 0 and V (k)
WW
< 0 still
holds, which can be seen when taking the rst and second derivatives with respect to
W
(k)
t from the value function and noticing that B
(k) (x; s) is a strictly increasing and
concave function in x,
V
(k)
W
= Et
24Z 1
t
h(k)(t; s)
@B(k)

W
(k)
; s

@W
(k)
s
@W
(k)
s
@W
(k)
t
ds
35 > 0 (3.14)
V
(k)
WW
= Et
24Z 1
t
h(k)(t; s)
@2B(k)

W
(k)
; s

@W
(k)
s @W
(k)
s
 
@W
(k)
s
@W
(k)
t
!2
ds
35 < 0. (3.15)
4Notice, however, that I do not get a closed form solution, while Blanchet-Scalliet et al. (2008)
were able to get in their special case a solution in closed form.
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In contrast to Lemma 3.3, now V (k)
W
> 0 holds, which follows directly from equation
(3.38) (see Appendix) in combination with
V
(k)
W
= Et
24Z 1
t
@h(k)(t; s)
@
(k)
t
@B(k)

W
(k)
; s

@W
(k)
s
@W
(k)
s
@W
(k)
t
ds
35 > 0 (3.16)
and the assumption of a large enough risk aversion coe¢ cient such that
Et
24@B(k)

W
(k)
; r

@W
(k)
r
@W
(k)
r
@W
(k)
t
35 > Et
24@B(k)

W
(k)
; s

@W
(k)
s
@W
(k)
s
@W
(k)
t
35 ;8r < s (3.17)
which is similar to the condition of  > 1 in the paper by Blanchet-Scalliet et al.
(2008). In the case of only one risky asset, the hedging demand is positive (negative)
if the assets returns are positively (negatively) correlated with changes in agent ks
arrival rate of death and negatively (positively) correlated with changes in agent ks
life expectancy, which is analogous to the results from Blanchet-Scalliet et al. (2008).
3.4 Special Case of some Homogeneity
In general agents choose individualized investment strategies depending on their spe-
cic health conditions and lifestyles. Now, I make the simplifying assumption of some
homogeneity among agents in form of [1N ]P 
(k)T
 = 
[1N ]
P 
T
 ; 8k. This does not imply
that every agents arrival rate of death is the same. It only says that all unexpected
(percentage) changes in arrival rates of death which are adapted to the ltration gen-
erated by asset prices are equal among agents. (k) and (l) (for k 6= l) may still load
di¤erently on some Brownian motions which are not driving asset prices, i.e. (k) 6= (l)
and yet [1N ]P 
(k)T
 = 
[1N ]
P 
(l)T
 ; 8k 6= l holds.
Agent ks absolute demand for risky assets is
d
(k)
t  W (k)t [1N ](k)t (3.18)
=


[1N ]
P 
[1N ]T
P
 1 h eA(k)t [1N ]P   r1(1N)  eB(k)t [1N ]P Ti
where eA(k)t = A(k)t W (k)t and eB(k)t = B(k)t W (k)t . The demand di¤ers among agents only
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in terms of eA(k)t and eB(k)t . It is possible to derive a Three Fund Separation Theorem in
the same spirit as introduced by Merton (1973).
Theorem 3.1 ("Three Fund Separation") Given the structure of the model de-
scribed above and further assuming [1N ]P 
(k)T
 = 
[1N ]
P 
T
 ; 8k, then there exist three
funds, such that (i) all Kt economic agents described above will be indi¤erent between
allocating their wealth to the original (N+1) assets or to the three funds; (ii) the con-
struction of the funds is based on an asset allocation depending solely on "technological"
criteria, but not on any characteristics of an individual agent (only dependent on vari-
ables in the investment opportunity set and the covariances of asset returns to common
changes in arrival rates of death); and (iii) an agent does neither require knowledge of
the investment opportunity set for individual assets nor of the composition of the three
funds.
Proof. See Appendix.
For the following (partial) equilibrium analysis, I assume that at death of agent k,
at  (k)
b(k)
, his entire portfolio is liquidated. The remaining wealth (which by assumption
is non-negative almost surely) must either be stored (invested in the risk free asset)
and distributed to newborn agents, or buried with the dead agent. It does not matter
for the analysis how I handle the remaining wealth as long as I do not distribute it
to agents who were born before  (k)
b(k)
because otherwise these agentsmaximization
problems must depend on the probability of other agents passing away and the chance
of receiving part of their legacies5.
Having discussed the demand functions for every agent k, I derive aggregate demand
which, not surprisingly, is a linear combination of the three funds derived in the Three
Fund Separation Theorem,
D
[1N ]
t =
KtX
k=1

d
(k)
t 1
n

(k)
b(k)
<t
o (3.19)
=


[1N ]
P 
[1N ]T
P
 1 h
At


[1N ]
P   r1(1N)

 Bt[1N ]P 
T

i
5To illustrate this point, think of the following example. Intuitively, an agent would have much
incentive to invest in a company which is doing a lot of research to nd a cure for cancer, if the agents
wealthy father is su¤ering from cancer. This is because the payo¤ of receiving the fathers legacy and
asset returns of the rm are negatively related.
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where At =
PKt
k=1
 eA(k)t 1n (k)
b(k)
<t
o and Bt =PKtk=1  eB(k)t 1n (k)
b(k)
<t
o.
I consider an exogenous supply of assets as in Merton (1973) and refer to his discus-
sion about modelling details. Aggregate supply in numbers of risky assets is denoted
by X(M)t , and the total value of risky assets supplied is Mt = X
(M)T
t P
[1N ]
t . The market
portfolio denoted by [1N ](M)t is

[1N ](M)
t =
1
Mt
IPtX
(M)
t (3.20)
I can now state the implications of uncertain life expectancy on the yield relationship
among assets in partial equilibrium.
Theorem 3.2 Given the structure of the model described above and assuming [1N ]P 
(k)T

= 
[1N ]
P 
T
 ; 8k, then in a nancial markets equilibrium every asset i satises an expected
(excess) return relationship given by
i   r = (M   r) (M)i + (   r) ()i (3.21)
with

(M)
i =
i
M
i;M   M;i;
1   M;2

()
i =
i

i;   M;i;M
1   M;2
where j is the expected return of asset j, j is the standard deviation of asset j, j;p
is the correlation between returns of asset j and p, 8 (j; p) 2 [i;M; ]  [i;M; ], and
 is the portfolio strategy [1N ] =


[1N ]
P 
[1N ]T
P
 1

[1N ]
P 
T
 , 
[0] = 1    1(1N)T [1N ].
Assuming  > r, an asset with a positive (negative) correlation between its returns
and common unexpected changes in arrival rates of death, pays a higher (lower) equity
premium, than what is expected in a model without uncertain life expectancy.
Proof. See Appendix.
The introduced equilibrium yield relationship is an extension of the ICAPM. The
second statement in the proposition conrms the intuition given at the beginning of
the paper.
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The asset pricing equation o¤ers a suitable groundwork for performing empirical
tests. (M)i and 
()
i are regression coe¢ cients of running a linear regression of asset is
excess returns on excess returns of the market portfolio and an uncertain life expectancy
hedging portfolio which is positively related to changes in mortality rates. (M   r)
and (   r) are risk premia for the two factors represented by the market portfolio

(M)
t and the uncertain life expectancy hedging portfolio , on which asset i loads with

(M)
i and 
()
i , respectively.
3.5 Market for Annuities
Within the above stated model I was able to show that uncertainty in the life expectancy
has an impact on an agents intertemporal consumption choice, optimal portfolio com-
position and on capital asset pricing. Although, I have considered a rather general
universe of assets, I did exclude the possibility to trade annuities. The payo¤ of an
annuity depends on the specic buyers mortality rate and date of death, but is not
an available asset for other agents. This characteristic is not incorporated in the asset
universe considered. In a discussion about lifetime uncertainty the question naturally
arises in how far the analysis alters in presence of a market for annuities and whether
the results continue to hold.
I consider annuities of a similar type as in Blanchard (1985). Let there be a large
competitive insurance company that o¤ers at any time t individualized contracts to
each agent k with claims depending on the instantaneous survival respectively death of
the agent. A contract bought by agent k at time t has a payo¤as follows: conditional on
survival over the next time period dt agent k receives an amount of money equal to his
instantaneous probability of death (k)t dt, and in case of death the insurance company
collects 1 from the agent. Because agents do not derive any utility from bequest in my
model and utility is strictly increasing in consumption, agents desire to buy as many
annuities as possible subject to the non-negativity constraint of wealth at time of death.
At any time t it is optimal for agent k to buy exactly W
(k)
t contracts such that the
insurer collects the agents entire wealth in case of death and the agent maximizes the
stream of payments received from the insurer as long as he stays alive.
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In expectation the insurance company breaks even because she gets W
(k)
t from
every agent k with probability (k)t dt and has to pay W
(k)
t 
(k)
t dt to every agent k with
probability

1  (k)t dt

; expected earnings and liabilities equal. In Blanchard (1985)
the insurance company breaks even almost surely because there is an innite number
of agents who face identical mortality rates and wealth is equally distributed within
a cohort. In my model there is a nite number of agents who have individualized
mortality rates, and the break even condition holds only in expectation. However, by
the law of large numbers in the limit as the number of agents in the market approaches
innity (and assuming total wealth in the economy is not concentrated to only few
agents) the prot of the insurance company converges (in probability) to zero.
Given a market for annuities, the wealth process of agent k has to be adjusted by
the additional income stream from the annuity (W
(k)
t 
(k)
t dt), and becomes
dW
(k)
t = W
(k)
t rdt+W
(k)
t 
(k)
t dt+W
(k)
t 
[1N ](k)T
t


[1N ]
P dt+ 
[1N ]
P dWt   r1(1N)dt

 c(k)t dt.
(3.22)
The maximization problem does not essentially change except for the new wealth
dynamics. The value function V (k)

W
(k)
; (k); J
(k)
; t

is again a function of the agents
wealth, his mortality rate, a state variable determining whether he is still alive, and
time. The impact of the death rate on the value function di¤ers compared to the
earlier discussion without annuities. The death rate is not only an important state
variable because it determines the life expectancy and the expected lifetime horizon of
the agent, but also because it matters for the dynamics of the wealth process. This
becomes evident when writing down the HJB equation. The HJB equation looks similar
to the one in the case without annuities expect that the Itô-Doeblin formula has to be
adjusted by the new drift term of the wealth process, i.e. the term V (k)
W
W
(k)
t 
(k)
t has
to be added. The adjustment of the HJB equation does e¤ectively change the value
function and particularly the dependency of the value function on (k)t .
The rst order conditions with respect to the two controls c(k)t and 
[1N ](k)
t are up
to the change in the value function identical to the rst order conditions derived in
absence of an annuity market. The proofs of Lemma 3.2 and 3.3 continue to hold.
Even though there is a new value function, the earlier derived qualitative properties
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still hold. V (k) is strictly increasing and concave in W
(k)
and V (k)
W
< 0. Given the FOC
is essentially unchanged and Lemma 3.2 and 3.3 continue to hold, all further derived
results about the impact of uncertain life expectancy on optimal portfolio choice and
capital asset pricing remain valid.
Accordingly, a market for annuities does not essentially matter for the analysis and
the achieved results. Even though the qualitative results are the same, the quantitative
impact may change. The quantitative impact depends crucially on (the magnitude
of) the value function and its dependency on (k), which is essential to determine the
magnitude of the hedging demand term in the specication of the optimal investment
strategy.
To get an intuition why annuity markets do not change my (qualitative) results,
I rst observe that the expected lifetime income paid by an annuity is equal to 1
independent of time and the level of the death rate
Et
Z 1
t
(k)s e
  R st (k)u duds

= Et
hh
 e 
R s
t 
(k)
u du
i1
t
i
= 1. (3.23)
It follows that the present value of an annuity is negatively (positively) related to the
death rate (life expectancy). An annuity bought by agent k pays a low (high) stream
of income if ks mortality rate is low (high) and his life expectancy and marginal utility
both are high (low). Accordingly, annuities exacerbate the uncertain life expectancy
problem. Assets with a negative correlation between returns and changes in the death
rate are expected to be even more desirable for their hedging property than in a world
without an annuity market. In equilibrium the hedging property should be priced with
an even higher premium than in a world without annuities.
3.6 Empirical Evidence
3.6.1 Data
I try to quantify and test the implications of the proposed model using data from the
USA ranging from 1927 to 2005.6 Mortality data is provided by the National Center
6Data on mortality is available since 1900.
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for Health Statistics (NCHS). I consider the 25 Fama-French portfolios (formed on
size and book-to-market characteristics) as my universe of assets (Fama and French,
1993). As a robustness check, I repeat all empirical tests using the 100 Fama-French
portfolios (formed on size and book-to-market); the results are weaker in the sense that
the magnitude of the e¤ects is smaller, but the same conclusions follow.
Unfortunately, the estimation of the model is di¢ cult. An agents instantaneous
probability of death is not observable. The best I can do is to use a noisy estimate based
on death counts and population size data. Second, the NCHS only provides death rate
data on an annual frequency. Accordingly, my sample size in terms of the number of
data points is small and it is hard to accurately estimate correlations between asset
returns and changes in death rates. I also expect the true correlation to be moderate
which makes it di¢ cult to recognize it at all (because the estimates are noisy). Finally,
I do not expect that the correlation between an assets returns and changes in death
rates is constant over time, but the only way to get an estimation is by assuming a
constant relation.
Following Theorem 3.2, I am interested in the correlation between asset returns
(in excess of the risk free rate) and common changes in death rates across all agents.
Indeed, Lee and Carter (1992) suggest that the stochastic time variation in age specic
death rates is mostly driven by one across cohorts common stochastic time component
which is well described by a Brownian di¤usion process. This result is similar to my
theoretical homogeneity condition [1N ]P 
(k)T
 = 
[1N ]
P 
T
 ; 8k, which is needed in the
model, and is vital for my analysis. Following Lee and Carter (1992), I estimate the
aggregate death rate(the common stochastic time component in age-dependent death
rates) t as follows. Let mx;t denote the mortality rate of cohort x at time t,7 ax and bx
two time-invariant constants which di¤er across age x, t a stochastic time component
(which is common to all cohorts), and ux;t a white noise term for cohort x and time t.
The Lee and Carter (1992) model states the relationship
ln (mx;t) = ax + bx ln (t) + ux;t (3.24)
7I estimate mx;t from the data as the ratio between the number of agents aged x passing away in
year [t; t+ 1) and the number of agents aged x in year t.
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with
P
x ax = 0 and
P
x bx =
P
x 1 (so that
P
t ln (t) =
P
t
1P
x 1
P
x ln (mx;t)). For
estimation details I refer to Lee and Carter (1992).
Estimation: Age Factors ax and bx
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Figure 3.1: Left panel: Estimation of age factor ax. Right panel: Estimation of age
factor bx.
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Figure 3.2: Left panel: Estimation of stochastic time component t. Right panel:
Percentage changes in t.
Figure 3.1 and 3.2 display the estimation output for the age specic factors ax and
bx and the stochastic time component t. Not surprisingly, ax is an increasing function
in age. More interestingly, bx is found to be declining in age; old people are relatively
less exposed to the stochastic time component than young people.8 For illustrative
8This might lead to interesting portfolio choice di¤erences between young and old investors; I do
not discuss this issue here.
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purposes, I exclude the Spanish u in the late 1910s from the plot of ln

(t)
(t 1)

.
Excluding the event of the Spanish u from the sample, the time series ln

(t)
(t 1)

has
a mean of  1:7% and a standard deviation of 3%.
3.6.2 In-sample Evidence
For the sample from 1927 to 2005, I estimate (using annual data) for each asset i
(25 Fama-French portfolios) the unconditional correlation between the assets excess
returns r(i)t   rt and the percentage changes in t.9 I denote the estimated correlation
coe¢ cient for asset i by bi; = Corr r(i)t   rt; ln (t)(t 1). For the same sample period,
I estimate for each asset i the average excess return bE r(i)t   rt, and the unexplained
expected excess return and the factor loadings of asset i according to the CAPM, the 3
factor Fama-French model and a 4 factor model (which includes a momentum factor).
Under the assumption of the CAPM, in order to estimate the unexplained expected
excess return of asset i, (CAPM)i and the factor loading 
(CAPM)
i , I run for each asset
i the time series regression
r
(i)
t   rt = (CAPM)i + (CAPM)m;i

r
(m)
t   rt

+ 
(CAPM;i)
t (3.25)
where r(m)t denotes the return on the market portfolio, and 
(CAPM;i)
t is white noise.
In case of the 3 factor Fama-French model I estimate the equation
r
(i)
t   rt = (3F )i + (3F )m;i

r
(m)
t   rt

+ 
(3F )
SMB;iSMBt + 
(3F )
HML;iHMLt + 
(3F;i)
t (3.26)
where SMBt and HMLt describe the size and book-to-market factors,10 and 
(3F;i)
t is
white noise.
Accordingly, for the 4 factor model I estimate
r
(i)
t  rt = (4F )i +(4F )m;i

r
(m)
t   rt

+
(4F )
SMB;iSMBt+
(4F )
HML;iHMLt+
(4F )
MOM;iMOMt+
(4F;i)
t
(3.27)
9r
(i)
t and rt denote the annual return of asset i and the risk free return in year t.
10Data for SMBt and HMLt are provided in K. Frenchs data library.
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where MOMt denotes the momentum factor,11 and 
(4F;i)
t is white noise.
I explorer the cross-sectional relation between the estimates bi; and the diverse -
nancial quantities. I nd a highly signicant positive relation between bi; and bE r(i)t   rt
(with a condence higher then 99%). The correlation is Corr
bi;; bE r(i)t   rt =
0:52.
In table 3.1 I show the various cross-sectional correlations between bi; and the
unexplained expected excess returns and the factor loadings according to the three
considered market models.
Correlations between bi; and nancial quantities
Market Correlations
Model (j)
bi;; (j)i  bi;; (j)m;i bi;; (j)SMB;i bi;; (j)HML;i bi;; (j)MOM;i
CAPM 0:55 0:01
3 Factor 0:47  0:36 0:28 0:04
4 Factor 0:43  0:33 0:28 0:06 0:41
Table 3.1: Cross-sectional estimation of correlations between bi; and the unexplained
expected excess return i and the factor loadings f;i according to the CAPM, the
Fama-French 3 factor and 4 factor models. Signicance of estimation: 4 starsdenote
an estimation of a coe¢ cient which is statistically di¤erent from 0 on a 1% signicance
level, 3 starsdenote a signicance on a 5% level, 2 starsdenote a signicance on a
10% level, and 1 stardenotes a signicance on a 15% level.
I nd a strong relation between an assets correlation to changes in the death rate
and its unexplained expected excess return according to the three tested market models.
There is also some evidence for a link between bi; and rm size and the momentum
factor. bi; appears to be independent of a rms book-to-market ratio.
The scatter plots in gure 3.3 visualize the correlation between bi; and (j)i , j 2
fCAPM; 4Fg. The positive relationship is evident for both displayed market models,
the CAPM and the 4 factor model.
Next, I sort the assets according to their correlations with changes in the death
rate (bi;), and divide them into Z = f2; 3; 4; 5; 10g percentiles. I compare the average
(annualized) bE r(i)t   rt and (annualized) (j)i , j 2 fCAPM; 3F; 4Fg of the assets in
the top percentile (assets with large bi;) to the assets in the bottom percentile (assets
11Data for SMBt and HMLt are provided in K. Frenchs data library.
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Figure 3.3: Left panel: Scatter plot and tted linear line showing positive relation
between bi; and (CAPM)i (monthly data). Right panel: Scatter plot and tted line
showing positive relation between bi; and (4F )i (monthly data).
with low bi;). Table 3.2 presents the results. Consistent with the results in table 3.1
and the scatter plot, the assets with a large bi; outperform the assets with a low bi;.
Top vs Bottom Percentiles of Assets sorted according to bi;
Z bE r(top)t   r(bottom)t  (CAPM)top   (CAPM)bottom (3F )top   (3F )bottom (4F )top   (4F )bottom
2 4:1% 3:1% 2:0% 1:5%
3 4:4% 3:9% 3:4% 2:8%
4 4:1% 3:7% 3:3% 2:8%
5 5:4% 4:7% 3:9% 3:4%
10 5:2% 3:3% 2:2% 1:6%
Table 3.2: Assets are sorted according to bi; and grouped into Z percentiles. I estimate
the average performance of the assets in each percentile and compare the top versus the
bottom percentile according to the measures bE r(top)t   r(bottom)t , (CAPM)top  (CAPM)bottom ,

(3F )
top  (3F )bottom, and (4F )top  (4F )bottom. The comparison is done 5 times for di¤erent numbers
of percentiles, and each row of the table shows into how many percentiles I have divided
the sample (Z = f2; 3; 4; 5; 10g).
The empirical results are robust in the sense that they do not essentially change if I
perform the same tests within a subsample of data (e.g. data from 1927-1980 or 1947-
2005) or if I use the 100 Fama-French portfolios (formed on size and book-to-market)
as the asset universe.
The empirical (in-sample) tests conrm the implications of my theoretical model
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that assets whose returns are relatively strong positively correlated to changes in the
(aggregate) death rate (large bi;) outperform other assets according to traditional
market models.
3.6.3 Out-of-sample Evidence
In the previous section, I have presented evidence for a general relation between an
assets performance and its correlation to changes in the death rate. In this section,
I test the out-of-sample performance of a dynamic (zero-cost) trading strategy that
buys (sells) assets which are relatively strong (weak) positively correlated to changes
in the death rate. I argue that this trading strategy is related to the Fama and French
(1992, 1993, 1996) factors, and my model on uncertainty in life expectancy provides a
theoretical rational for these factors.
At the end of each year t  1, I estimate for every asset i (25 Fama-French portfo-
lios) the correlation between its excess returns and the changes in the death rate over
the past 15 years (including the realization in year t   1) and denote the estimated
correlation coe¢ cient by b(i;)t .12 b(i;)t is an estimate of the (unobservable) conditional
correlation coe¢ cient Corrt

r
(i)
t   rt; ln

(t)
(t 1)

in year t. I sort the assets according
to the estimates b(i;)t and divide them into 5 percentiles. I form an equally weighted
portfolio based on the assets in the top (bottom) quintile (20% assets associated with
the highest (lowest) b(i;)t ) and denote the (monthly) returns of the high correlation
(low correlation) portfolio in year t by r(Top)t;m

r
(Bottom)
t;m

.13 My trading strategy takes
a long position in the high correlationportfolio and a short position in the low cor-
relationportfolio. I denote the (monthly) returns of the trading strategy in year t by
r
(TMB)
t;m = r
(Top)
t;m   r(Bottom)t;m .
The trading strategys turn over is by construction moderate. Over the sample
period from 1927 to 2005, the highand the lowcorrelation portfolios pay (on average)
an annual excess return of 14:1% respectively 9:7%, while facing almost the same risk.
The unconditional volatilities of the highand lowcorrelation portfolios are 24:1%
12The results hardly change and the conclusions are the same, if I drop the last observation, i.e. if
I estimate b(i;)t based on the data over the past 15 years excluding the realization in year t  1. This
might be preferred to ensure that (without any doubt) all data is available to get an estimate of b(i;)t
at the beginning of year t.
13Subscribt (t;m) = f(t; 1) ; (t; 2) ; :::; (t; 12)g denotes a vector of monthly data in year t.
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Performance of Trading Strategy and Highand
LowCorrelation Portfolios (Monthly Returns)
CAPM:
r
(i)
t;m   rt;m = i + m;i

r
(m)
t;m   rt;m

+ 
(i)
t;m
i m;i
High Corr. Portfolio 0:25% 1:11
Low Corr. Portfolio  0:02% 1:06
Trading Strategy 0:27% 0:05
3 Factor Model:
r
(i)
t;m   rt;m = i + m;i

r
(m)
t;m   rt;m

+ SMB;iSMBt;m + HML;iHMLt;m + 
(i)
t;m
i m;i SMB;i HML;i
High Corr. Portfolio  0:01% 1:06 0:55 0:38
Low Corr. Portfolio  0:22% 1:04 0:34 0:29
Trading Strategy 0:21% 0:02 0:21 0:09
4 Factor Model:
r
(i)
t;m   rt;m = i + m;i

r
(m)
t;m   rt;m

+ SMB;iSMBt;m + HML;iHMLt;m
+MOM;iMOMt;m + 
(i)
t;m
i m;i SMB;i HML;i MOM;i
High Corr. Portfolio 0:00% 1:06 0:55 0:37  0:01
Low Corr. Portfolio  0:17% 1:04 0:34 0:28  0:05
Trading Strategy 0:17% 0:02 0:21 0:09 0:04
Table 3.3: At the end of each year t   1, I sort assets according to their correlations
with changes in the death rate over the past 15 years
b(i;)t . I split the asset universe
into 5 percentiles (based on the b(i;)t sort), and form an equally weighted portfolio
consisting of the assets in the highest (lowest) quintile and call it the high (low)
correlation portfolio with monthly returns in year t denoted by r(TOP )t;m

r
(Bottom)
t;m

.
The trading strategy takes a long position in the high correlation portfolio and a
short position in the lowcorrelation portfolio, and pays in year t the monthly returns
r
(TMB)
t;m = r
(Top)
t;m   r(Bottom)t;m . I estimate for the two correlation portfolios and the trading
strategy the unexplained expected excess return and the factor loadings according to
the CAPM, the Fama-French 3 factor and 4 factor models. The regression coe¢ cients
are reported in the table. Signicance of estimation: 3 starsdenote a signicance on a
1% level that the estimated coe¢ cient is di¤erent from 0, 2 starsdenote a signicance
on a 5% level, and 1 starsdenotes a signicance on a 10% level.
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and 22:5%, and the CAPM-s are 1:11 respectively 1:06.
Table 3.3 compares the performance between the trading strategy and the high
and lowcorrelation portfolios. According to the CAPM the trading strategy pays
an annual unexplained expected excess return of 3:29% and has almost no exposure
to systemic risk. Within the 3 factor and 4 factor models the trading strategy pays
an annual unexplained expected excess return of 2:55% respectively 2:06%. While the
trading strategy is (mostly) market neutral (no exposure to changes in market portfolio
excess returns), it loads on the Fama-French factors.
In table 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6 I illustrate that the constructed trading strategy is a suitable
risk factor (I call it TMBt;m) which helps to explain the cross-sectional relation between
expected asset returns. The factor TMBt;m = r
(TMB)
t;m is simply equal to the (excess)
returns of the constructed trading strategy. Within the considered asset universe (25
Fama-French portfolios), the market portfolio on its own (CAPM) fails to explain a
substantial part of the cross-sectional yield relationship. It is well-known that adding
the Fama-French size and book-to-market factors reduces the unexplained expected
returns a lot (within the sample). However, a new 3 factor market model (I call it
the Uncertain Life Expectancy 3 Factor Model) which replaces the Fama-French size
factor (SMBt;m) by the new factor TMBt;m explains the cross-sectional variation in
expected asset returns even better. I conclude that the factor TMBt;m is able to explain
substantial parts of the size (and some parts of the value) premium documented by
Fama-French (1992).
Finally, I test whether assets load on the factor TMBt;m if I add it to the CAPM,
the 3 factor or 4 factor models. I run the following time series regression for each asset
r
(i)
t;m   rt;m = i + TMB;iTMBt;m + m;i

r
(m)
t;m   rt;m

+ 
(i)
t;m (3.28)
I nd that 17 out of the 25 estimated TMB;i coe¢ cients are statistically di¤erent from
zero on a 1% signicance level. I further run the regression
r
(i)
t;m   rt;m = i + TMB;iTMBt;m + m;i

r
(m)
t;m   rt;m

(3.29)
+SMB;iSMBt;m + HML;iHMLt;m + 
(i)
t;m
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Estimation of Unexplained Expected Excess Returns of 25 Fama
French Portfolios according to CAPM (Monthly Returns)
r
(i)
t;m   rt;m = i + m;i

r
(m)
t;m   rt;m

+ 
(i)
t;m
Book-to-Market
Size Low 2 3 4 High
Small  0:45% 0:13% 0:28% 0:53% 0:67%
(t-stat) ( 2:22) (0:82) (2:19) (4:29) (4:60)
2  0:30% 0:09% 0:36% 0:42% 0:55%
(t-stat) ( 2:27) (0:91) (3:80) (4:28) (4:47)
3  0:23% 0:16% 0:24% 0:41% 0:47%
(t-stat) ( 2:16) (1:99) (3:09) (4:67) (4:06)
4  0:13% 0:03% 0:29% 0:33% 0:41%
(t-stat) ( 1:75) (0:55) (4:11) (3:97) (3:58)
Big  0:07% 0:00% 0:19% 0:22% 0:26%
(t-stat) ( 1:32) (0:06) (2:69) (2:61) (2:23)
# coe¤ signicant on 1%, 5%, 10% level: 13,19, 20
Table 3.4: The table reports for each Fama-French portfolio the estimated i coe¢ cient
according to the CAPM. The t-statistics of the estimates are provided in brackets.
3 stars indicate a coe¢ cient di¤erent from 0 on the 1% signicance level, 2 stars
indicate a signicance on the 5% level, and 1starindicates a signicance on the 10%
level.
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Estimation of Unexplained Expected Excess Returns of 25 FF Port-
folios according to Fama-French 3 Factor Model (Monthly Returns)
r
(i)
t;m   rt;m = i + m;i

r
(m)
t;m   rt;m

+ SMB;iSMBt;m + HML;iHMLt;m + 
(i)
t;m
Book-to-Market
Size Low 2 3 4 High
Small  0:55%  0:05%  0:01% 0:16% 0:12%
(t-stat) ( 4:12)  0:57  0:17 3:01 2:01
2  0:22%  0:04% 0:10% 0:05% 0:01%
(t-stat) ( 3:17)  0:65 1:99 1:00 0:29
3  0:05% 0:04%  0:02% 0:03%  0:08%
(t-stat) ( 0:92) 0:63  0:31 0:49  1:21
4 0:06%  0:08% 0:05%  0:02%  0:11%
(t-stat) (1:16)  1:35 0:85  0:35  1:43
Big 0:14%  0:02% 0:06%  0:11%  0:24%
(t-stat) (3:28)  0:39 0:94  2:04  3:04
# coe¤ signicant on 1%, 5%, 10% level: 5, 8, 8
Table 3.5: The table reports for each Fama-French portfolio the estimated i coe¢ cient
according to the Fama-French 3 factor model. The t-statistics of the estimates are pro-
vided in brackets. 3 starsindicate a coe¢ cient di¤erent from 0 on the 1% signicance
level, 2 starsindicate a signicance on the 5% level, and 1starindicates a signicance
on the 10% level.
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Estimation of Unexplained Expected Excess Returns of 25 FF Portfolios
according to Uncertain Life Expectancy 3 Factor Model (Monthly Returns)
r
(i)
t;m   rt;m = i + m;i

r
(m)
t;m   rt;m

+ HML;iHMLt;m + m;iTMBt;m + 
(i)
t;m
Book-to-Market
Size Low 2 3 4 High
Small  0:34% 0:08% 0:09% 0:25% 0:23%
(t-stat) ( 1:63) (0:52) (0:73) (2:12) (1:73)
2  0:11% 0:03% 0:15% 0:11% 0:09%
(t-stat) ( 0:85) (0:29) (1:67) (1:23) (0:93)
3 0:03% 0:07% 0:07% 0:05%  0:03%
(t-stat) (0:30) (0:87) (0:10) (0:78) ( 0:40)
4 0:10%  0:08% 0:06%  0:01%  0:07%
(t-stat) (1:51) ( 1:26) (1:01) ( 0:11) ( 0:87)
Big 0:11%  0:06% 0:03%  0:13%  0:23%
(t-stat) (2:33) ( 1:03) (0:50) ( 2:14) ( 2:93)
# coe¤ signicant on 1%, 5%, 10% level: 1, 4, 6
Table 3.6: The table reports for each Fama-French portfolio the estimated i coe¢ cient
according to the Uncertain Life Expectancy 3 factor model. The t-statistics of the
estimates are provided in brackets. 3 starsindicate a coe¢ cient di¤erent from 0 on
the 1% signicance level, 2 starsindicate a signicance on the 5% level, and 1star
indicates a signicance on the 10% level.
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and nd that 8 out of 25 estimated TMB;i coe¢ cients are statistically di¤erent from
zero on a 1% signicance level. For the regression
r
(i)
t;m   rt;m = i + TMB;iTMBt;m + m;i

r
(m)
t;m   rt;m

(3.30)
+SMB;iSMBt;m + HML;iHMLt;m + MOM;iMOMt;m + 
(i)
t;m
I also nd that 8 out of 25 estimated TMB;i coe¢ cients are statistically di¤erent from
zero on a 1% signicance level. Moreover, for all three regressions I test whether the
loadings on TMBt;m are jointly di¤erent from zero. A 2 test rejects the null hypothesis
of TMB;i = 0;8i on a 1% signicance level.
My tests suggest that the factor TMBt;m adds important information to the CAPM,
the 3 factor model and the 4 factor model and is not absorbed by the other explanatory
variables.
As a robustness check I repeat the tests for the data set of 100 Fama-French port-
folios and/or the subsample periods 1927-1985 and 1947-2005. The conclusions are the
same.
3.7 Conclusion
I explore implications of a time variation in the life expectancy on an agents optimal
portfolio choice. Imposing a nancial markets equilibrium, I analyze (in a partial
equilibrium model) how the relation between assetsexpected returns are a¤ected by
the behavior of uncertain lived agents.
I introduced a continuous time nance model featuring a dependency between asset
prices and agents arrival rates of death. Agents maximize expected lifetime utility
over intermediate consumption. The model is solved for any possible specication
of time additive utilities subject to the (weak) restriction that the utility is strictly
increasing and concave in consumption. The optimal asset allocation of an agent is
a¤ected by a time variation in the arrival rate of death. Ceteris paribus, an agent
invests relatively more respectively less in an asset that pays o¤ high (low) respectively
low (high) in states of the world when he expects to live longer (shorter), than in an
asset which behaves independently of changes in his death rate. In general the portfolio
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composition of an agent depends on some individual characteristics such as his health
condition and lifestyle, and every agent will choose a tailored investment strategy which
di¤ers from the portfolio choice of other agents.
If certain homogeneity is assumed, I state a "Three Fund Separation Theorem"
which works in a similar spirit as introduced by Merton (1973). I derive an equilibrium
asset pricing equation which states that the expected excess return of any asset depends
in a linear fashion on the expected excess returns of the market portfolio and the
expected excess return of a fund which is positively related to changes in the (aggregate)
death rate. An asset with a positive (negative) correlation between its returns and
unexpected changes in the (aggregate) arrival rate of death, has a higher (lower) equity
premium, than what was expected in a model without lifetime uncertainty. I show that
my results continue to hold if a market for annuities is introduced.
My theoretical asset pricing model is supported by empirical evidence. Indeed, as-
sets with a relatively strong positive correlation between their returns and changes in
the (aggregate) death rate outperform other assets on average. I construct a dynamic
trading strategy which buys (sells) assets with a strong (weak) positive correlation to
changes in the (aggregate) death rate. Out-of-sample evidence suggests that the con-
structed trading strategy earns a positive unexplained return according to traditional
market models. Finally, I construct a factor based on the mentioned trading strategy
and provide evidence that it helps to explain the cross-sectional relationship in expected
asset returns in addition to traditional factors.
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3.8 Appendix
3.8.1 Specication of Expected Lifetime Utility and Wealth
dynamics
The expected lifetime utility of agent k at time t 2 [b(k);  (k)
b(k)
) is given by
Et
h
U (k)(c(k)) j  (k)
b(k)
> t
i
(3.31)
= Et
"Z  (k)
b(k)
t
u(k)s
 
c(k)s

ds+B(k)

W
(k)
; 
(k)
b(k)

j  (k)
b(k)
> t
#
= Et
Z 1
t
1n
J
(k)
s =0
ou(k)s  c(k)s + 1nJ(k)s =1\J(k)s =0oB(k) W (k); s ds j J (k)t = 0

= Et
Z 1
t
h(k)(t;m)
Z m
t
u(k)s
 
c(k)s

ds+B(k)

W
(k)
;m

dm

= Et
Z 1
t
H
(k)
(t; s)u(k)s
 
c(k)s

+ h(k)(t; s)B(k)

W
(k)
; s

ds

.
Agent ks wealth is a random process and evolves according to the dynamics
dW
(k)
t = r

W
(k)
t  X [1N ](k)Tt P [1N ]t

dt+X
[1N ](k)T
t dP
[1N ]
t   c(k)t dt (3.32)
= W
(k)
t rdt+W
(k)
t 
[1N ](k)T
t

(IPt)
 1 dP [1N ]t   r1(1N)dt

  c(k)t dt
= W
(k)
t rdt+W
(k)
t 
[1N ](k)T
t


[1N ]
P dt+ 
[1N ]
P dWt   r1(1N)dt

  c(k)t dt,
3.8.2 Proofs of Lemmas
Proof of Lemma 3.1. It is straightforward to show that
LE
(k)
t = Et
h

(k)
b(k)
j  (k)
b(k)
> t
i
(3.33)
=
1
H
(k)
(t)
Et
Z 1
t
sh(k) (u) ds

;
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and after plugging in the formulas for H
(k)
(t) and h(k) (t), and further rewriting for
s > t; (k)s in terms of 
(k)
t , I end up with a function in 
(k)
t ,
LE
(k)
t =
Z 1
 1
Z 1
t
s
(k)
t exp
Z s
t

(k)
;b(k);r
dr   1
2

(k)
 
(k)T
 (s  t) + (k)
p
s  tz

(3.34)
exp

 
Z s
t

(k)
t exp
Z u
t

(k)
;b(k);r
dr   1
2

(k)
 
(k)T
 (u  t) + (k)
p
u  tz

du

ds:
From this expression I can now determine whether LE(k)t is increasing or decreasing in

(k)
t . Note that
H
(k)
(t; s) = exp

 
Z s
t
(k)u du

(3.35)
= exp
8<: 
Z s
t

(k)
t exp
8<:
R u
t

(k)
;b(k);r
dr   1
2

(k)
 
(k)T
 (u  t)
+
(k)
 (Wu  Wt)
9=; du
9=; ;
and thus,
@H
(k)
(t; s)
@
(k)
t
=
ln

H
(k)
(t; s)


(k)
t
H
(k)
(t; s) < 0 a:s:; (3.36)
since H
(k)
(t; s) 2 (0; 1) a:s: Then, since
h(k) (t; s)  h
(k)(s)
H
(k)
(t)
(3.37)
= (k)s H
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(t; s)
= 
(k)
t exp
Z s
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
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
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
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@h(k) (t; s)
@
(k)
t
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(k)s

(k)
t
H
(k)
(t; s)
h
1 + ln

H
(k)
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a:s:; (3.38)
and hence, for (k)0t < 
(k)00
t
LE
(k)0
t = Et
Z 1
t
sh(k)0 (t; s) ds

(3.39)
> Et
Z 1
t
sh(k)00 (t; s) ds

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I also can think of it in another way. For (k)0t < 
(k)00
t by (3.36)
H
(k)0
(t; s) > H
(k)00
(t; s) a:s:; fors 2 (t;1) (3.40)
holds, and hence,
LE
(k)0
t > LE
(k)00
t (3.41)
must be true.
Proof of Lemma 3.2. Following Merton (1971), the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman
optimality principle implies that the maximization problem (P1) has the same solution
as
(HJB)
0 = supn
c
(k)
t ;
[1N ](k)
t
o
2<1+(L2)N
n
u
(k)
t

c
(k)
t

dt+ Et
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; t
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t 
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P dWt   c(k)t dt
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t 
(k)
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with the Transversality condition lim
t!1
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
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i
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Itô-Doeblin theorem for jump processes to the term dV (k)

W
(k)
; (k); J
(k)
; t

, I can
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rewrite the HJB equation as
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The rst order conditions with respect to the controls c(k)t and 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t imply
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The result follows immediately.
Proof of Lemma 3.3. Statement 1) follows immediately from the rst FOC and
the denition of u(k)t (:) being strictly increasing, hence, V
(k)
W
= @
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h
u
(k)
t

c
(k)
t
i
> 0. In
order to show proof for the latter two claims, I rst note that at optimum
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must hold. Intuitively, this equation says that the utility agent k gets from consuming
one additional dollar at time t must in expectation equal the utility that agent k derives
from investing one dollar at time t and consuming the proceeds at time s 2 [t;1) in
addition to c(k)s . This becomes evident by taking the rst derivative with respect to
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noting that
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what has (3.45) as a solution. An increase in W
(k)
t leads agent k to adjust his optimal
consumption plan and thus, to increase expected c(k)s , for some (at least one) s 2 [t;1).
But then, by (3.45) at optimum expected consumption at every point in time s 2 [t;1)
must increase, and hence, @c
(k)
t
@W
(k)
t
> 0. Then, remembering that u(k)t (:) is strictly concave
by denition and taking the derivative of the rst FOC with respect to W
(k)
t gives
V
(k)
WW
=
@2
@c2t
h
u
(k)
t

c
(k)
t
i
| {z }
<0
@c
(k)
t
@W
(k)
t| {z }
>0
< 0 (3.48)
what proves claim 2). To show statement 3), note that an increase in (k)t means
by (3.36) a decrease in survival probabilities H
(k)
(t; s), 8s > t, and ceteris paribus,
a decrease in H
(k)
(t; s))
@u
(k)
s

c
(k)
s

@cs
@W
(k)
s
@W
(k)
t
, 8s > t. But then, besides some other (here
uninteresting) adjustments to the optimal consumption plan,
@u
(k)
t

c
(k)
t

@ct
necessarily
has to decrease as well such that (3.45) will be satised again, what means that c(k)t
increases. Hence, I have shown that @c
(k)
t
@
(k)
t
> 0, and thus, using again the denition
that u(k)t (:) is strictly concave and taking the rst derivative with respect to 
(k)
t of the
14This is true since
R1
t
@c(k)s
@W
(k)
s
ds =
R1
t
@c(k)s
@W
(k)
s
@W
(k)
s
@W
(k)
t

@W
(k)
s
@W
(k)
t
 1
ds =
R1
t
@c(k)s
@W
(k)
t

@W
(k)
s
@W
(k)
t
 1
ds = 1
a:s:, where the last equation holds because of a simple accounting rule that a change in wealth at time
t by one dollar must equal a change of sumed up recent and future consumption by exactly one dollar
plus invested proceeds.
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FOC, I get
V
(k)
W
=
@2
@c2t
h
u
(k)
t

c
(k)
t
i
| {z }
<0
@c
(k)
t
@
(k)
t| {z }
>0
< 0, (3.49)
what completes the proof.
Yet another way to proof statement 2) and 3), is by employing the martingale approach
introduced by Cox and Huang (1989) to tackle agent ks optimization problem. First,
I see that the dynamic budget constraint implies the static constraint
W
(k)
t  Et
Z 1
t
H
(k)
(t; s)
s
t
c(k)s ds

(3.50)
where  is a stochastic discount factor. It is important to notice that the dynamic
and the static constraint are equivalent in the case of complete markets where there
is a unique SDF. However, in the case of incomplete markets with multiple SDFs
the dynamic constraint implies the static one but it does not hold the other way.
Moreover, assuming that the optimal consumption plan c(k) is in the interior, the
Gateaux derivative of expected utility at point of optimal consumption c(k) in direction 
c(k)   c(k) equals zero
rEt

U (k)(c(k))
 
c(k)   c(k) = 0 (3.51)
for all admissible consumption plans c(k). Dening Q(k)t (:) as a function such that
Q
(k)
t (xs) = H
(k)
(t; s)xs and noticing that Q
(k)
t
 
c(k)   c(k) spans the set of all mar-
ketable cash ows I get
rEt

U (k)(c(k))
 h
Q
(k) 1
t (x)
i
= 0 (3.52)
for all marketable cash ows x. But this implies that the Riesz representation process
Rs times 1
H
(k)
(t;s)
is equal to a SDF times a constant (k). Since for time additive utilities
as dened here the Riesz representation process R is given by
Rs = H
(k)
(t; s)
@u
(k)
s

c
(k)
s

@cs
, (3.53)
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I can derive for optimal consumption c(k)t the condition
@u
(k)
s

c
(k)
s

@cs
= (k)s. (3.54)
If markets are complete, the SDF is unique and there is no problem to determine (3.54).
In incomplete markets there are multiple SDFs and I have to choose the one SDF that
minimizes expected utility
(k) = arg inf
2

Et

U (k)(I
 
(k)

)
	
(3.55)
where the function I (:) is the inverse function of the marginal utility process
I
 
@u
(k)
s (xs)
@xs
!
= xs. (3.56)
Note that since u(k)s (:) is by assumption strictly increasing and concave, I (:) is positive
and strictly decreasing. The constant (k) is determined through the static budget
constraint using the SDF (k)
W
(k)
t = Et
"Z 1
t
H
(k)
(t; s)

(k)
s

(k)
t
I
 
(k)(k)s

ds
#
. (3.57)
Finally, combining condition (3.54) with the rst FOC from dynamic programming, I
have
V
(k)
W
= (k)
(k)
t (3.58)
Now, I can take the rst derivative from both sides in equation (3.57) with respect to
W
(k)
t
1 = Et
2666664
Z 1
t
H
(k)
(t; s)

(k)
s

(k)
t
@I

(k)
(k)
s

@

(k)
(k)
s

| {z }
<0
@(k)
@W
(k)
t
(k)s ds
3777775 (3.59)
what implies @
(k)
@W
(k)
t
< 0. In turn when taking the rst derivative from (3.58) with
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respect to W
(k)
t , I get
V
(k)
WW
=
@(k)
@W
(k)
t

(k)
t < 0 (3.60)
what proves statement 2). Moreover, taking the rst derivative from (3.57) with respect
to (k)t ,
0 = Et
2666664
Z 1
t
@H
(k)
(t; s)
@
(k)
t| {z }
<0

(k)
s

(k)
t
I
 
(k)(k)s

+H
(k)
(t; s)

(k)
s

(k)
t
@I

(k)
(k)
s

@

(k)
(k)
s

| {z }
<0
@(k)
@
(k)
t
(k)s ds
3777775
(3.61)
implies @
(k)
@
(k)
t
< 0. Finally, taking the rst derivative with respect to (k)t from (3.58)
yields
V
(k)
W
=
@(k)
@
(k)
t

(k)
t < 0 (3.62)
what completes the proof of Lemma 3.2.
3.8.3 Proofs of Propositions and Theorems
Proof of Proposition 3.1. From the FOC of the HJB, the expressions of [1N ](k)t ,
A
(k)
t and B
(k)
t follow immediately. Moreover, using Lemma 3.2 it is trivial to see that
A
(k)
t =
V
(k)
W
 V (k)
WW
W
(k)
t
> 0 and B(k)t =
 V (k)
W
 V (k)
WW
W
(k)
t

(k)
t > 0. The remainder of the proposition
follows straightforward.
Proof of Theorem 3.1 ("Three Fund Separation"). Denote the three funds
by 1, 2 and 3, and use the superscript [1N ] and [0] to indicate investments in risky
assets and the riskless asset, respectively. Let there be one fund consisting of the risk
free asset only

[1N ]
1 = 0; 
[0]
1 = 1, (3.63)
another fund being equal to the well known tangency portfolio in a standard CAPM

[1N ]
2 =


[1N ]
P 
[1N ]T
P
 1 

[1N ]
P   r1(1N)

 
1(1N)
T 

[1N ]
P 
[1N ]T
P
 1 

[1N ]
P   r1(1N)
 ; [0]2 = 0, (3.64)
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and nally a third fund which invests in a combination of the risk free and risky assets

[1N ]
3 =  


[1N ]
P 
[1N ]T
P
 1

[1N ]
P 
T
 ; 
[0]
3 = 1 
 
1(1N)
T

[1N ]
3 . (3.65)
Let agent ks investments in the three funds, denoted by


(k)
1;t ; 
(k)
2;t ; 
(k)
3;t

, be

(k)
1;t = W
(k)
t   (k)2;t   (k)3;t ; (3.66)

(k)
2;t = eA(k)t  1(1N)T [1N ]P [1N ]TP  1 [1N ]P   r1(1N) ; (3.67)

(k)
3;t = eB(k)t . (3.68)
Noting that the strategy


(k)
1;t ; 
(k)
2;t ; 
(k)
3;t

replicates exactly the demand d(k)t , proves (i).
Moreover, the three funds clearly satisfy (ii). Finally, noting that
 
1(1N)
T 

[1N ]
P 
[1N ]T
P
 1 

[1N ]
P   r1(1N)

=
2   r
22
; (3.69)
where 2   r and 22 are the risk premium respectively the variance of fund 2, proves
(iii).
Proof of Theorem 3.2. Imposing equilibrium in nancial markets, i.e. equating
aggregate demand and supply of risky assets
Mt
[1N ](M)
t = D
[1N ]
t (3.70)
= At


[1N ]
P 
[1N ]T
P
 1 

[1N ]
P   r1(1N)

 Bt


[1N ]
P 
[1N ]T
P
 1

[1N ]
P 
T
 ,
and solving for the vector of expected excess returns

[1N ]
P   r1(1N) =
Mt
At


[1N ]
P 
[1N ]T
P


[1N ](M)
t +
Bt
At

[1N ]
P 
T
 , (3.71)
allows us to get the following expression for any asset is (portfolio (i)t s) expected
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excess return by pre-multiplying (3.71) by [1N ](i)t
i   r = [1N ](i)
T
t


[1N ]
P   r1(1N)

(3.72)
=
Mt
At

[1N ](i)T
t


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P 
[1N ]T
P

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t +
Bt
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[1N ](i)T
t 
[1N ]
P 
T

=
Mt
At

[1N ](i)T
t


[1N ]
P 
[1N ]T
P


[1N ](M)
t +
Bt
At

[1N ](i)T
t


[1N ]
P 
[1N ]T
P

[1N ]
=
Mt
At
i;MiM +
Bt
At
i;i.
Moreover, (3.72) holds for i =M
M   r =
Mt
At
2M +
Bt
At
M;M, (3.73)
and i = 
   r =
Mt
At
;MM +
Bt
At
2. (3.74)
Thus, I can solve the system of equations (3.73) and (3.74) for Mt
At
and Bt
At
, and plug the
solutions back into (3.72) to get
i   r = (M   r)
i
M
i;M   M;i;
1   M;2 + (   r) i
i;   M;i;M
1   M;2 . (3.75)
Finally, to prove the second claim in the proposition, I rst note that
i;i = 
[1N ](i)T
t


[1N ]
P 
[1N ]T
P

[1N ] (3.76)
= 
[1N ](i)T
t 
[1N ]
P 
T
 = i;i,
and hence, the sign of the correlation between asset i and  is the same as the one of
the correlation between asset i and , i.e.
sign
 
i;

= sign
 
i;

. (3.77)
Further, in absence of lifetime uncertainty the second term in the equilibrium yield
relationship vanishes. Thus, if for asset i i; > (<)0, then (   r) ()i > (<)0, which
completes the proof.
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